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ABSTRACT
The purpose of this thesis was to explore the limited
entry alternative of fishery management by examining the
history of a particular limited entry scheme: the
Massachusetts inshore commercial lobster fishery license
limitation law. A review was made of existing limited
entry theory, followed by a description of limited entry
programs extant in u.S. fisheries. The legislative and
political histories of the Massachusetts lobster fishery
limited entry program was then examined. The limited entry
law was then analyzed by comparing what actually occurred
with what is supposed to occur according to limited entry
theory. A quantitative analysis of changes in catch per
unit of effort resulting from the law was demonstrated.
Major events resulting from the limited entry law were then
examined.
The overall conclusion of this thesis was that the
limited entry program for this fishery has failed to
achieve its objectives, but is not a failed policy. In
effect, Massachusetts went half way to achieving the system
they knew they needed for limited entry to be successful.
This thesis concludes with a proposal on how the State
should use limited entry in a new comprehensive lobster
fishery management plan.
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INTRODUCTION
While marine fisheries management in Massachusetts has
existed for most of the state's history, only in the last
two and a half decades has it become a dominant force in
the way the fishing industry operates. Prior to that time,
management actions were taken by the state Legislature and
were based primarily on intuition and convenience, or to
benefit fishermen and dealers by protecting them from
competition. 1 By 1960, however, steady increases in
numbers of fishermen and amount of gear that had been
occurring since World War II in all fisheries, including
the inshore lobster fishery, forced a major change in
Massachusetts fisheries management. During that year, the
state's Marine Fisheries Advisory Commission (MFAC) was
formed as a citizens body directly involved in the
formation of fisheries management policy, and subsequently,
the Division of Marine Fisheries (DMF) was expanded. This
event marked the advent of formal, scientific marine
fisheries management in Massachusetts.
Increases in effort in the Massachusetts inshore
commercial lobster fishery occurred partly because
increasing demand and prices stimulated expansion. This
increased effort raised total landings from approximately 2
million pounds in 1940 to an average of 3.5 million pounds
between 1950-1974. 2 The other reason for this expansion
1
was that the inshore lobster fishery was somewhere between
common property and open access in nature.
The only difference between open access and common
property is that, with the former, fishermen may enter or
exit a fishery whenever they desire to do so, while with
the latter, there are social or legislative restrictions on
who can or cannot fish. For example, the Massachusetts
offshore groundfish fisheries have traditionally been open
access. On the other hand, legislative restrictions on
entry into the inshore shellfishery, and social
restrictions on entry into the inshore lobster fishery have
historically made these fisheries common property. The
inshore lobster fishery became more open access as
motorized boats and hydraulic pot haulers came into use
because the range and speed of operations increased. This
tended to reduce territoriality.3
In any case, both systems operate the same in terms of
resource exploitation. That is, fishermen will tend to
increase their individual effort in the manner described by
Gerrett Hardin in his paper Tragedy of the Commons. Hardin
describes the tragedy of the commons as the innate tendency
of an individual to increase his stake in the commons
regardless of the potential long term effects of that
action. 4 Hardin's example is of a herdsman who sees that
the short term benefit, to himself, of adding one cow far
outweighs the short term detriment to the commons, a
pasture in this case, that the cow imposes. All the other
2
herdsmen using the commons also come to the same
conclusion. Initially, and for some time, this arrangement
works well since there are few cows and much pasture. But
eventually, as each herdsmen within the commons adds more
cows, the pasture becomes saturated,
and the herdsmen are ruined. Thus,
the grass runs out,
the tragedy of the
commons.
Hardin goes on to say that the tragedy of the commons
is of a class of problems that does not yield to technical
solutions; new fertilizers and special grass seed are not a
cure. Rather, the only cure for this tragedy is through,
as Hardin puts it, "mutual coercion, mutually agreed
upon. 115 Which is to say that people must be coerced into
stopping individual expansion of effort by pUblic agencies.
This tragedy manifested itself in the inshore
commercial lobster fishery through increasing numbers of
fishermen fishing greater numbers of traps while catch per
unit of effort decreased. Although the average catch
during the period from 1950-1974 averaged 3.5 million
pounds, effort, in terms of numbers of pots fished, more
than doubled while catch per pot decreased proportionately.
The only thing that maintained the fishery during this
period was continuous increases in ex-vessel prices. In
short, the inshore commercial lobster fishery became
overcapitalized while the coastal lobster resource became
fully exploited. 6
Massachusetts responded to this situation, and to
3
effort increases in all of its fisheries, in two ways.
First, in 1969, the Marine Fisheries Advisory Commission
was given authority to override and preempt special acts of
the Governor. This was followed in 1970 by general
licensing for commercial fishermen which gave the
Commission greater flexibility since it could tie licensing
sanctions to regulatory and statutory violations. with
this increased power and flexibility, the state was able to
respond to effort expansion in all of its fisheries by
implementing stringent regulatory measures over the actions
of fishermen. 7
One of these measures was implementation of escape vent
regulations for the inshore commercial lobster fishery in
the early 1970's, which was designed to complement existing
short and egg bearing lobster regulations. In addition,
DMF, MFAC and industry all worked to discover ways of
reducing effort in this fishery.
These efforts culminated in passage of a law in 1975
that placed a moratorium on entry into the inshore
commercial lobster fishery while a study took place to
design a more permanent limited entry program, and to
discover ways of reducing effort. So began Massachusetts
first attempt to implement limited entry in one of its
major fisheries; a process that, so far, has taken 12 years
and two laws to reach its present stage.
The purpose of this thesis is to analyze limited entry
in the Massachusetts inshore commercial lobster fishery,
4
and from this analysis, to conclude whether this limited
entry program has been successful. To do this a treatise
of limited entry theory is presented, followed by a
description of limited entry schemes extant in the u.s.
The legislative and political histories of the program are
then described, and the entire program is analyzed in
relation to limited entry theory. The thesis concludes
with a discussion of the successes and mistakes of this
limited entry system. This discussion includes suggestions
on what Massachusetts should now do to improve inshore
lobster fishery management.
5
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1 James Fair, "A Plan for the Management of the
Massachusetts Inshore Lobster Fishery," Draft document
prepared for the Massachusetts Division of Marine
Fisheries (1978): p. 17.
2 Ibid. p. 16.
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Fishery Management Plan, (October 17, 1978): p. 28.
4 Garrett Hardin, "The Tragedy of the Commons," Science
162 (1968): 1243-48, p. 1244.
5 Ibid. p. 1247.
6 Fair, 1978, p. 17.
7 Philip Coates, "The State of Massachusetts and
Increased Fisheries Management Responsibilities," in
Rethinking Fisheries Management, published by Center
for Ocean Management Studies, university of Rhode Island
(1986): 120-26, p. 122.
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CHAPTER I
THE THEORY OF TRADITIONAL FISHERIES MANAGEMENT AND
LIMITED ENTRY
The Scope of Fisheries Management
Marine fisheries management in the united States covers
a wide scope which consists of a number of significant
factors. The fish stocks themselves are a factor since the
dynamics of their life cycles greatly influences attempts
to catch, study and manage them. In addition, fishermen
are interested in maximizing their economic returns, and
have cultural ties to the fisheries. State fishery
management organizations are interested in optimizing the
yield of the fisheries, but are also involved with the
socioeconomic needs of their constituency (the fishermen
and the pUblic), and must handle intra-agency and inter-
agency problems, administrative concerns and political
pressure. Federal organizations must account for all of
the problems of state agencies, only on a larger scale, and
must conform to the tenets of the Magnuson Fisheries
Conservation and Management Act. Society is also a factor
since the fisheries, as well as other natural resources,
are held by the government in the pUblic trust, and it is
taxes that pay for all management efforts.
The fundamental relationship between the u.S.
7
government, natural resources and the users of these
resources was described by Theodore Roosevelt:
The nation behaves well if it treats the natural
resources as assets which it must turn over to the
the next ~eneration increased and not impaired
in value.
Congress viewed the role of management agencies as
managers and conservators when it placed the resources of
the pUblic lands and oceans in the pUblic trust. 2 This
meant that from the start, administrators of natural
resources in the u.s. had to simultaneously reconcile the
needs of the pUblic and of the resources themselves. The
complexity of fishery management, therefore, is obvious.
Open Access and Common Property Resources
Definition and background
Most fisheries in the U. S. are open access or common
property in nature. Open access fisheries are those that
have no restrictions on who can harvest or how much
resource they can take. Therefore, open access resources
are literally no one's property.3
Common property is defined as the distribution of
property rights in which a group of identifiable users are
co-equal in their usage rights. Access is free and open,
use rights are not lost through non-use, co-owners are not
necessar ily equal with respect to quanti ties of the
resources used over time, and there are no controls over
the amount of capital and labor making use of the resource.
Unlike open access, common property is not necessarily
8
everyone's property. For example, foreign fishing boats do
not have the same rights of access to fisheries in the
Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) as do u.s. boats. 4 In
addition, social and physical restrictions on resource use,
such as those defined by traditional use patterns and
government regulations, restrict access.
The fisheries of the united states are open access or
common property resources primarily because these fisheries
historically have been abundant. When resources are
abundant, there is little need for collective management,
and the evolution of property rights is retarded. Hence,
the resources are left open to be accessed by anyone. 5
T.X. Huxley reflected the historical view of marine
fisheries resources when he said:
I believe that probably all the great sea fisheries
are inexhaustible; that is to say, no~hing we do
seriously affects the number of fish.
This explains why property rights and collective management
of marine fisheries resources did not evolve along with
land resources. In the U. S., property rights and
collective management of terrestrial natural resources such
as land, water and minerals were necessary as much as a
hundred years before they became necessary for marine
fisheries. It has only been since World War II, when the
fishing fleet expanded dramatically in response to
increases in demand, that fisheries overexploitation was
recognized as a serious and widespread problem.?
Another reason why marine fisheries property rights and
9
collective management evolved slowly is because of the
inherent difficulty of owning or managing resources that
move and cannot be seen. These two characteristics of
marine fisheries resources, alone, make ownership,
It is because of this that u.s. marine
management
propositions. 8
and enforcement extremely expensive
fisheries have tended to remain open access and common
property even with severe resource depletion.
Consequences of common property
There are several shared consequences of open access
and common property in the fisheries. Fundamentally, both
circumstances produce excessive use of the resource and
overcapitalization by fishermen. 9 Excessive use is
intensified because every good year for fishing produces
increased construction and entry while decline in incomes
during poor years does not produce an equivalent reduction
in capacity .10 These events force the implementation of
additional regulations, thus causing increased costs to the
fisherman and increased management costs. Furthermore,
enforcement is a problem since fishermen are motivated to
disobey the rules if they believe others are disobeying
them also, or if they believe the rules are unfair. 11 with
open access and common property, excessive capital and
labor will enter the fisheries, overcapacity will worsen as
market prices rise (presuming they don't rise enough to
lessen consumer demand), biological depletion will occur
and costs of management will fallon the taxpayer. 12
10
Indirect conservation measures
Biological Management of open access and common
property fisheries has usually included a variety of so-
called indirect methods whose purpose is to reduce fishing
effort. The term indirect comes from the belief that the
best way to achieve resource conservation is indirectly
through management methods applied to the fishermen. In
effect, these management methods reduce the efficiency of
fishing operations. Indirect methods are widely used in
fisheries management because it has long been believed that
if effort on a fishery is reduced, overexploited fish
stocks will revive. 13
However, even though it seems intuitively obvious that
reducing fishing effort will allow fish stocks to revive,
using indirect methods, alone, to achieve conservation
objectives under open access or common property is
inadequate. The reason for this is that, in order for
biological management to be effective (that is, for
depleted fish stocks to revive), all aspects of effort must
be reduced. since indirect methods only address the
harvesting aspect of effort, fishermen respond by
increasing their effort in other ways. This results in the
consequences described above.
So what is the direct effect of indirect biological
management methods? A system utilizing indirect methods
increases the costs of fishing operations, and dictates who
can fish where, when and on what.
11
Therefore, resource
allocation is the direct effect of using indirect
methods. 14 The scenario for attempting to conserve fish
stocks in open access or common property fisheries using
indirect methods is described as follows:
Let's assume that scientific study has shown that too
many spotted trout were being caught. In order to
bring the level of removals back in line ... , it was
determined that fishing mortality needed to be
reduced. End of Biology and the beginning of
socio-economic decision making. 15
Not only has the use of indirect methods effected the
allocation of fisheries resources, it has also effected
theory. Biological management models advocate maximum
sustainable yield (MSY) in maintaining the health and self-
sustaining capacity of fish. In these models, harvests in
excess of MSY are biologically indefensible. On the other
hand, economists advocate a maximum economic yield model
(MEY) where production is maximized for the lowest cost per
unit of effort. This model demands that fish be caught as
soon as they reach maturity, or at least before their
growth rate decreases. 16 In practice, since indirect
methods tend to allocate resources, management actions tend
to be built around economic issues. 1? This has resulted in
the optimum yield (OY) model, which evolved as a compromise
between ecological, social and economic considerations in
resource management.
Indirect methods of fisheries management include
area/season closures, gear regUlations, size limits, and
quotas. The purpose of area closures is two-fold: to
protect fish that are spawning or for other reasons need to
12
be protected, or to allocate areas to specific gear types
to mitigate gear conflicts. Season closures function in
the same way as area closures except they are restricted to
certain times of the year.
For example, a spawning closure is an area/season
closure since presumably it closes fishing areas in which
fish spawn during their spawning period. Gear restrictions
include trap and trawl limits for fixed gear fishermen,
cod-end mesh size, door size and warp restrictions for
draggermen and vessel size restrictions in any fishery.
Size limits are designed to protect juvenile animals so
that there is strong recruitment, or so that animals are
allowed to spawn at least once before they are harvested.
Size limits therefore seek to maintain high year class
strength prior to recruitment. Quotas theoretically protect
resources by directly affecting the amount of fish that can
be caught either by trip, season or species.
Alternatives to the Traditional System
Goals and objectives
Before deciding which system will work best for a given
fishery, managers must determine what obj ectives are
desired. To this end, it is first necessary to establish
what rights exist in imposing regulations. Three major
property rights in fisheries management are the right to
conserve, the right to control access and the right to
extract rents. 18 The right to conserve has for many years
13
been accepted as a primary right for agencies that manage
resources in the public trust. The right to extract rents
is also accepted by the legal and legislative
establishment. The right to control access is still being
debated so far as entrance into fisheries is concerned, but
has in fact been exercised for years by fishery management
agencies using traditional methods of management. Harvest
quotas, season closures, area closures, gear requirements,
size limits and trip limits all restrict access to fish
stocks. 19
with these rights firmly established, managers are able
to set goals and obj ectives. state and federal managers
generally accept the Magnuson act goals and objectives of
fisheries management which are:
to prevent overfishing or depletion of fisheries
resources while aChieving, on a continuing basis, the
optimum yield from each fishery which enhances the
industrial health and stability of fisheries and
generates the greatest possible social and gconomic
values to the people of the United states. 2
Attempts to achieve these goals and objectives are
usually undertaken using ecological, technological,
economic, social, political and administrative measures. 21
That is, through indirect management techniques.
However, since it is the fishermen who bear the brunt
of whatever system managers choose to achieve their goals
and obj ectives, the planning of management systems must
include realistic assessments of how fishermen will react
to regulations. For example, the cheapest, most
politically feasible and most efficient management measures
14
to maintain and increase fish stocks are ones that utilize
the profit seeking motives of fishermen. 22 Also,
fishermen's economic incentives rarely favor conservation
under open access or common property because the prevailing
opinion among them is that whatever resource a fisherman
saves for tomorrow will be taken by another fisherman
today. 23 This last consideration must, however, be
tempered by the realization that fishermen are not always
economically rational.
Being economically rational implies that fishermen will
seek to maximize profits and minimize costs regardless of
what effects such actions have on fellow fishermen or on
the resource. That is, an individual takes as fast as he
can, purely for the profit. However, in reality, fishermen
do cooperate with one another in using the resource, and
with managers in conserving the resource. Community and
life-style are important factors in people's desire to be
fishermen, and maintaining that life-style requires a
certain amount of cooperation. Examples of this include
communal recognition of territories, voluntary effort
limits, communal fishing strategies, cooperative marketing
and fishermen's associations. 24 Many fishermen are also
directly involved in the management process through
advisory commissions and lobbying.
One consequence of overfishing and overcapitalization,
however, is increased economic rationality. The more
individual fisherman feel the pinch, the more likely they
15
will develop a me-first attitude.
Types of management systems
Once the objectives of fisheries management are
determined, agencies may decide between the different types
of management systems. There are several alternatives to
the traditional management system. These include laissez
faire, economic incentives or disincentives, augmentation
of the resource, limited entry, a continuation of the
present system, or a combination of these methods.
Laissez Faire
The laissez faire method of fisheries management is
mentioned more because it exists within the realm of
possibility than because of its feasibility, since it is
unlikely that management agencies will relinquish control
over fisheries resources. However, for discussions sake,
Laissez Faire does raise some interesting questions. If
r
formal fisheries management were phased out, would some
form of equilibrium be achieved between fishermen and fish
as in a classic predator prey relationship, or would fish
stocks become extinct? Also, is it conceivable that
management control over the fisheries would be taken over
by private entities? For example, might fishermen's groups
manage fisheries resources either through cooperation or
through coercion?
It can be argued that a form of laissez faire
management occurs under open access or common property.
Some regulations are so difficult to enforce, some places
16
so difficult to get to and most law enforcement agencies so
poorly funded that some fishermen operate as if regulations
were not in effect. There is ample evidence of this. For
example, sale for cash, falsification of catch reports
equipment modifications (such as cod-end net liners), and
cheating on area closures are all effective means of
avoiding regulations. In any case, the present trend in
fishery management is toward more efficient methods of
management rather than towards no management at all.
Economic incentives and disincentives
Another form of fisheries management is a system of
economic incentives or disincentives. Under this system,
incentives are put in place to prompt fishermen into
targeting underutilized species by using tax breaks or
other similar methods, or to get out of fishing altogether
through vessel buy-back programs. Disincentives are
simultaneously put in place to force fishermen to avoid
traditional high-valued species. However, substantial
management costs exist for monitoring and predicting catch
rates and administering the program. 25 Furthermore,
targeting underutilized species in open access or common
property fisheries will not cure the tendency for fish
stocks to become depleted.
Another form of economic disincentive is to levy taxes
or royal ties on fish landings, the logic of which is to
.. . . th . ht d . t . 26 Ichange economl.C l.ncentl.ves l.n e rl.g l.rec l.on. n
theory, fishermen operating under open access or common
17
property lack the economic incentive to conserve that
exists with other natural resources such as privately owned
range land. If a rancher over-grazes his land, he suffers
a direct loss in economic assets. On the other hand, the
cost of reducing fisheries resources is not directly felt
by individual fishermen since they do not own a finite
portion of the resource. Taxes and royalties on landings
therefore attempt to artificially instill financial
interest in the economic value of fish stocks by attaching
such a cost to fishing. This type of system has never been
tried in the United states primarily because its political
feasibility is questionable. 27
Resource augmentation
Resource augmentation through seeding or aquaculture is
another possible management option. This method allows for
the replenishment of resources either through the use of
hatcheries, or through the use of enclosed ecosystems in
which fish species are raised until maturity. One problem
with seeding is that it is impossible to determine the
success of the process. For example, lobster larvae ready
for release cannot be tagged because they shed so often.
As a result, it is presently impossible to determine what
percentage of released lobster reach maturity and therefore
benefit the resource. Nevertheless, this method does serve
political and research purposes for management agencies.
For example, a method for tracking released animals may yet
be found, and fishermen wholeheartedly support seeding
18
efforts.
For the most part, aquaculture is not yet a viable
option at this latitude because of the climate, the
migratory nature of most valuable fish species and the lack
of available land for fish farms. According to Hardin's
theory, the tendency for fish populations to continue being
depleted will remain with resource augmentation since this
is a technological solution to the tragedy of the commons.
Maintaining the present system
Another option for managing fisheries is to maintain
the present system of indirect controls. This should be
kept as an option for two reasons. First, analysis of
different types of management systems may reveal that while
the resource remains open access or common property, a
system of indirect controls is really the best option. In
this case, the likely reason is that significantly changing
the system is politically infeasible. Second, even with
other management strategies it may be desirable to maintain
indirect controls as is considered the case with limited
entry systems.
Use of a combination of techniques
The present management system really does consist of a
variety of methods, in fact some aspect of virtually every
method mentioned above. For example, laissez faire exists
when fishermen disregard regulations. Some form or another
of resource augmentation is used by many U.S. coastal
states. Economic incentives or disincentives, such as
19
vessel buyback programs, vessel subsidies and consumer
education programs for underutilized species are also
widely used. This overlap of methodology occurs because of
the different needs of particular fisheries, regional
socio-economic differences, management goals changing over
time and historical changes in management authority.
Overall, however, a carefully thought out management
plan, which takes into consideration the socio-economic
differences between fisheries, as well as within single
fisheries, will most likely be made up of numerous
management strategies, each of which is designed to address
one aspect or another of total effort on the resource. As
mentioned earlier in this section, carefully thought out
management plans thus attempt to reduce all aspects of
effort. Therefore, if the goal is to approach OY, plans
must address how many fishermen will be allowed to
participate, as well as how efficiently they harvest
product. Entry limitation is therefore an integral part of
the ideal fisheries management plan.
Limited Entry
Definition
Limited entry directly reduces inputs into a fishery by
restricting fishing to the holder of a legal right of
access. By regulating the fishing privileges of specific
fishermen or vessels, entry limitation improves the
economic efficiency of those fishermen or vessels that
20
remain in the fishery.28
The essential difference between limited entry and
traditional management methods is that it regulates who can
harvest, and potentially how much can be harvested, while
traditional systems attempt to control harvest levels
without saying who is allowed to harvest. 29 That is,
traditional management methods attempt to achieve
biological conservation while allowing effort to increase
in terms of the total number of fishermen. On the other
hand, limited entry taken alone regulates effort in terms
of the total number of fishermen but does not control
individual fishermen's effort.
Therefore, limited entry addresses an aspect of fishing
effort that is overlooked by traditional methods by placing
1 imits on inputs into a fishery. As a result, both
traditional conservation measures and limited entry,
together, conserve fish stocks by controlling overall
fishing effort. 30
The concept of limited entry is not new to resource
managers, having been employed in forestry, grazing,
minerals, recreational hunting and fishing and in
commercial fishing throughout the world. 31 For example,
limited entry was an integral part of the ancient fishery
management systems of many South Pacific islands where, due
to the lagoon/reef ecosystems, the fisheries were rarely,
if ever, plentiful. 32 In the U.S., limited entry has been
used for fisheries management since colonial times.
21
However, until recently, these systems tended to be
localized and of short duration. 33
Among different fisheries management methods, limited
entry has received the most attention and the greatest
controversy since it seeks to restrict freedom of entry
into a profession that is noted for its independence. This
controversy persists even though limited entry has been
employed by a number of fisheries management agencies in
the united states. 34 Limited entry is also controversial
because it opens an array of pUbl ic pol icy issues
concerning the preservation versus exploitation of
fisheries resources, and the role of government in this
process. 35
Types of limited entry
There are two classes of limited entry, indirect and
direct. 36 Indirect systems include taxes and fees,
fisherman quotas, price adjustments and other measures that
significantly increase the costs of fishing. Indirect
measures used in biological fisheries management can fall
into this class if they are stringent enough to make
fishing prohibitively expensive. In tax based systems
there are no regulations prohibiting entry into a fishery,
but participants may be taxed on poundage landed. Marginal
harvesters are discouraged by added costs, and some
economic rent is extracted for society's benefit. 3? Quota
systems may limit entry because regulating the number of
pounds of fish caught makes it unprofitable for many
22
operations. Price adjustment schemes require that ex-
vessel transactions take place at adjusted prices, and
. 38 I d' toperates in the same way as landJ.ng taxes. n J.rec
limited entry exists, therefore, when a fishery is too
expensive for many to get into or to stay in.
Direct systems include license limitations on either
boats or fishermen, stock certificate programs, territorial
use rights in fisheries (TURFs) and commodity shares.
License systems are the most common form of limited
entry in the U. S. because they are the simplest to
implement and administer. These schemes control the number
of participants in the fishery by limiting the number of
licenses to fishermen or vessels. criteria are established
for how licenses are to be allocated among historical and
potential participants. 39
License limitation converts open access fisheries into
a kind of common property where a fishery becomes made up
of an identifiable group of users with co-equal use rights.
Because the fishery is common property, competitive free
enterprise motivates each fisherman to attempt to increase
his share of the resource. As a result, adequate resource
conservation does not occur with license limitation alone
since the tragedy of the commons comes into play. Further
conservation measures are therefore always needed with this
system. 40
Stock certificate programs divide portions of the stock
into shares which are then allocated among fishermen in
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open market rather than being assigned to fishermen based
on arbitrary criteria. One theoretical advantage of this
type of system is that it overcomes the equity problems
encountered with other forms of limited entry. Shares are
placed on the open market and everyone who can afford to
buy them has equal opportunity to do so just as if they
were buying stock in a company. This system also places a
cost on fisheries resources. In all other business
involved in natural resource exploitation, costs exist for
the basic resource. A commodity shares system would
therefore place the fishing industry more in line with the
capitalist free enterprise system. 43
Territorial use rights in marine fisheries (TURFs)
attempts to overcome two perennial problems in fisheries
management: inefficient production of net benefits and
equity. Territorial use rights have existed for centuries,
being seen most often in sedentary species fisheries.
However, TURFs have also existed in other fisheries as
well, mostly through the traditional establishment of
territories. This form of management divides the ocean
resource into shares, rather than the fish stocks
themselves. 44
Justification for limited entry
Economic justification for limited entry systems is
often based on the perceived failure of the traditional
management approach in the open access environment
resul ting from the tragedy of the commons. 45 Some
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economists feel that limited entry by ecosystem is an
integral part of any management scheme if other measures
are applied as well. Any management scheme without limited
entry therefore has undesirable effects in terms of freedom
of participants, administration, enforcement and the fish
themselves. 46 In other words, any management system that
does not control inputs to fishing cannot offer much
lasting improvement in economic performance over open
access. 47
The economic theory behind limited entry is that it
eliminates the tendency for economic rent to be dissipated
as happens with common property. That is, fishermen no
longer have to worry about their profits gradually
dwindling to nothing as additional competitors enter the
fishery.48
Furthermore, limited entry provides three major
conservation benefits. First, it places a relatively
permanent limit on the input aspect of fishing effort
(either the number of fishermen or the number of boats).49
For example, capping or reducing the number of people or
vessels entering a fishery will temporarily reduce effort
on the resource.
The reason effort reductions from limited entry are
only temporary is because it makes fisheries resources
common property. Therefore, fishermen still tend to take
advantage of the decreased competition engendered by
limited entry by increasing their indidividual effort. In
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the lobster fishery, fishermen increase their effort by
increasing the total number of traps and by lengthening
their trawls. In the long run, these individual increases
in effort dissipate the conservation benefit of reduced
numbers of fishermen.
The second conservation benefit of limited entry is
that entry into a fishery is controlled when successful
conservation efforts have caused fish stocks to revive, or
stock improvement has occurred as a result of natural
causes. This benefit might be seen when adequate controls
on individual fishermen's effort are implemented concurrent
with the limited entry program.
The third benefit of limited entry is that it creates a
potential pool of political supporters for conservation
management among those who are left in the fishery.50 This
would occur when fishermen become convinced that present
sacrifices to conserve the resource would not be unfairly
distributed among present competitors, or among new
entrants.
The administrative justification for limited entry is
that reducing the number of units in need of regulation,
whether they be boats or fishermen, reduces the costs of
management. Reduction in the number of units also
increases the efficiency of management, which results in
society realizing the benefits of a properly managed
resource. 51
Most existing limited entry systems in the U. s. are
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justified on the basis of two potential outcomes. First,
that greater economic efficiency will be achieved and
second, that management will be made simpler because of the
presence of fewer fishermen. 52
The objectives of limited entry
The development of management plans, including those
utilizing limited entry, should include a set of goals.
This provides management agencies with definite
circumstances to strive for once the plan is implemented,
and gives management criteria against which the plans'
elements can be compared to jUdge their effectiveness.
Generally, the objectives of limited entry management are
socio/economic since it protects fishermen from the effects
of their own actions or from the actions of others. 53 In
this context, the numerous specific possible objectives of
limited entry systems can be divided into three areas:
economic, social and biological.
Economic objectives may include promotion of economic
efficiency, enhancement of fishery product value, increase
and stabilization of fishing fleet profitability and
reduction in fishery management costs born by the public. 54
Economic efficiency can be promoted because economic rent
is no longer dissipated among new entrants. Fishery
product value may be enhanced, especially in quota or
shares type limited entry systems, because fishermen are no
longer forced to harvest in a hurry, and therefore can
afford to supply a quality product.
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Profitability of the
fishing fleet may be improved since reduced entry and exit
tends to stabilize profit. Fishery management costs born
by the public may be reduced because there are fewer units
to manage, and limited entry may render some existing
regulations unnecessary, thus allowing their repeal.
Sociological objectives may include establishment of
secure tenure in the fishery, reduction in the burden of
management regulations on fishermen, establishment of an
equitable distributions of benefits from the fishery, and
protection of the fishery from other commercial or non-
commercial interests. 55 Tenure may be secured through
increases in fishermens' profits combined with reduced
entry, deletion of state imposed performance requirements,
and long term benefit from sacrifices made to conserve
stocks. Reduction in management regulations obviously
improves the conditions under which fishermen operate.
Equity may be addressed through adequate grandfathering ,
that minimizes dislocation when limited entry is
implemented. Specific entry requirements and careful
design may protect the fishery from attacks by non-
commercial interests such as recreational fishermen, or by
large company attempts to control the fishery.
Limited entry may help to conserve stocks either
directly, through shares or quota systems, or indirectly by
reducing the input aspect of effort in all forms of limited
entry. It must be stressed, however, that this goal cannot
be achieved in license-type limited entry without controls
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on individual fisherman effort.
Limited entry feasibility
In addition to these goals, the political and
administrative feasibility should be considered carefully
in the design of limited entry schemes. As one fisherman
puts it, limited entry should reduce fishing mortality
while maintaining economic vi.ability and simplifying
management and enforcement. 56
Overall, three areas of administrative feasibility must
be explored. First, there must be the likelihood of
adequate enforcement. This can be addressed either by
strengthening enforcement agencies or by minimizing the
need for additional enforcement by designing regulations
that the fishermen are more likely to obey. Second,
organizational adjustments that will be necessary with the
new program must be anticipated. For example, with
licensing systems, adjustments have to be made to
accommodate license renewal, license transfer and decisions
relating to hardship applications in order to mitigate
administrative difficulties that can occur with these types
of systems. Third, the matter of costs and who will bear
them needs to be addressed. Under traditional forms of
fisheries management, costs are born by the fishermen and
by the taxpayer. Limited entry programs should be designed
to ensure that the costs to both of these groups are
reduced. 57
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Elements of a limited entry program
Regardless of the type of limited entry scheme
proposed, there are certain basic elements of the plan that
should be carefully considered. By basic it is meant that
whether or not plan designers consider each one of these
elements , it is likely they will be considered somewhere
along the line, by legislative or regulatory reaction to
political pressure, and sometimes to the detriment of the
plan's original. goals. This unsavory event has occurred
with both versions of the Massachusetts inshore lobster
fishery limited entry plan. 58
These elements of a limited entry plan can be
considered decision categories since each one requires
making policy decisions. 59 Some of the major elements are
as follows: The scope of the fishing activity to be
restricted, the type of limited entry to use, the initial
allocation of harvest rights, the transferability of
harvest rights, the longevity of harvest rights, mechanisms
required for adjusting the number of harvest rights, and
how to handle disputes regarding issuance and transfer of
rights. 60
Also the degree of hardness or softness of a limited
entry plan's provisions must be calculated. The harder the
program is in terms of how stringent the measures are and
how rigorously they are enforced, the more likely it will
create administrative and political difficulties,
especially regarding equity. The softer the program in
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terms of accommodating everyone's needs, the less likely it
will achieve economic, sociological or biological gains. 61
Consequences of limited entry
There are many consequences of limited entry systems,
all of which may be divided into five categories: economic,
sociological, biological, political and administrative.
Maj or economic consequences may be expected with the
implementation of a limited entry system, since the primary
effect of limited entry is improvement of the economic well
being of those who are left in the fishery. However, with
the creation of economic benefit for some, there is the
imposition of economic hardship on others. Issues raised
by the economic consequences include appropriation and
dissipation of wealth, inequality, overcapitalization and
technological externalities, low labor productivity, no
incentives for crucial technological development and
increasing administrative cost. 62 All of these issues have
proved important in existing u.s. limited entry programs,
and mechanisms for dealing with them should be incorporated
into the design of any program.
The sociological consequences of limited entry may also
be profound. Fishermen fish for many reasons aside from
economic gain. These reasons include way of life,
historical family involvement and geography.63 This theory
supports the idea that fewer people in a fishery, who are
secure from the consequences of common property, will feel
obliged to husband the resource.
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Voluntary effort
limitations, the fisheries history of the South Pacific
islands of Oceana, fishermen's associations, etc., all
support this idea.
However, the implementation of limited entry systems
implies that some people will be left out and inevitably,
some of these will be birthright members of the fisheries
institution. These are the people who will be hardest hit
by limited entry systems and it is largely because of them
that limited entry is such a contentious issue. Fishermen
feel that the most dangerous thing about limited entry is
that it attempts to solve fishery management problems by
limiting individual freedom. 64
Both the economic and sociological consequences of
limited entry raise the issue of equity. First there are
those who are included versus those who are left out. From
an economic perspective, the potential fishermen who are
left out will do everything possible to get in. This means
that agencies must decide how permits will be allocated as
they become available. Allocation must be based on
criteria, which are arbitrary, and exceptional cases always
exist. Equitable distribution of permits thus becomes
extremely difficult. The reality is that no way exists for
there to be total equity with limited entry; although there
is little question that the present system of fisheries
management lacks equity as well.
There may also be serious biological consequences of
limited entry systems. A broad consensus exists in the
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u.s. that license limitations by themselves do not
effectively prevent biological overfishing and that
traditional management measures must be applied to address
resource conservation needs. 65 In fact, moratoria often
increase the number of effectively participating fishermen.
For example, speCUlative behavior is initiated with
licensing systems because, like taxi medallions or liquor
licenses, value is placed on licenses. Also, fishermen's
concern that they will lose their licenses by not fishing
ei ther forces them to fish or to submit false catch
reports. Fishermen feeling compelled to fish increases
effort, and submission of false catch reports raises havoc
with the collection of accurate statistics.
The ultimate decline of Georges Bank fish stocks after
implementation of the Magnuson Act demonstrates this
consequence. After the number of foreign vessels was
reduced, U. s. fishermen, with the aid of U. s. government
sUbsidy programs, rapidly expanded their effort. At the
same time, the New England Fishery management Council was
unable to cap or reduce effort on Georges Bank stocks.
This has resulted in the continued poor condition of the
haddock stocks, and the rapidly deteriorating condition of
other important finfish stocks.
Abridging the freedom of entry or exit also has
political consequences. In evaluating a limited entry
proposal, legislators look for provisions that preserve
free enterprise. If freedom of entry and exit has not been
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adequately addressed, it is likely that legislative
committees will add appropriate provisions regardless of
their effect on the rest of the scheme's design. Also,
those that are left out will inevitably confront their
legislators. If the system has been well designed, with
effective entry criteria and appropriate mechanisms for
dealing with disputes, then politicians can tell their
constituents as much. However, if the system is poorly
designed or administered, legislators will react to
criticism about the scheme and act to change or repeal
't 661. •
Given the administrative theory behind limited entry
which is that the costs of regulation are higher with many
fishing units than they are with fewer units, virtually any
fishery that has a high number of participants with respect
to the available fish will be difficult and expensive to
manage. 67 Ideally, therefore, limited entry systems will
aid management. However, there are consequences to limited
entry systems that can have profound affects on management.
For example, with licensing systems criteria for hardship
and transfer applications must be set by the management
agency. Provision must also be made for grievances of the
hardship and transfer procedures. with stock certificate
programs or with individual fisherman's quotas, the quotas
themselves must be designed and administered. In fact, any
type of limited entry scheme, not to mention any new
management policy at all, will create a new set of
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administrative problems.
Another administrative consequence of limited entry
programs is the seepage effect. 68 If controls are put on
inputs into a fishery such as total number of boats, then
licenses may be transfered to larger vessels, or if there
is a limit on the size of vessels, then more efficient nets
may be employed. In other words, fishermen are motivated
to get around the intent of regulations by increasing their
individual efficiency. Administratively, this causes the
implementation of regulations designed to counter these
increases in efficiency. The resulting regulatory move is
countered by an industry move which, in turn is countered
by another regulatory move; thus the seepage effect.
The seepage effect has occurred in the British Columbia
limited entry program. Original limits on the number of
vessels were replaced by tonnage limits when fishermen
transfered licenses to larger vessels. Reductions in the
number of vessels imposed by regUlation were then countered
by increases in seine gear efficiency. 69 Similar events
occurred when limited entry and other regUlations were
imposed on the mid-Atlantic surf clam fishery.70 In short,
when limitations on inputs into a fishery are contemplated
in limited entry, it is necessary to be aware of, and
attempt to counter, the seepage effect.
Conclusions
This chapter reviewed limited entry and compared it
wi th traditional management, thus establishing where
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limited entry lies in the scheme of fisheries management.
New fishery management methods are sought only when there
are clear indications that current systems are deficient in
their ability to conserve fish stocks and maintain an
economically secure environment for fishermen; these
indications are prevalent in modern fisheries management.
Is is because of this that limited entry should be
reviewed carefully as an alternative fishery management
policy, and applied where necessary.
Limited entry is probably the most drastic of the
alternatives to the traditional fisheries management system
because it calls for a change in attitude for managers and
users alike. By limiting entry, government is proclaiming
that resource use is a privilege and no longer a right.
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CHAPTER II
LIMITED ENTRY PROGRAMS IN THE UNITED STATES
Introduction
Limited entry programs for the management of marine and
inland fisheries are presently in effect in nine states.
In addition, the Mid-Atlantic Fisheries Management Council
utilizes limited entry as one tool in its surf clam and
ocean quahog fisheries management plan.
The states which have limited entry in their fisheries
are Alaska, Washington, Oregon, California, Minnesota,
Wisconsin, Michigan, Ohio and Massachusetts. This chapter
will summarize each one of these programs but certain
common elements should be noted in advance. First, each of
these plans is license type limited entry that started as a
moratorium on entry. Second, all of these plans were
implemented within ten years of one another, and most were
implemented between 1973 and 1979.
This chapter summarizes each of the aforementioned
programs. An important conclusion. is that these programs
demonstrate that I imited entry, by i tsel f, does not
conserve fisheries resources.
Alaska
Three attempts were made to pass limited entry
legislation in Alaska before a law was finally enacted.
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The first two attempts were in the 1960' s and were both
found unconstitutional by federal courts because they
discriminated against non-Alaskan U.S. citizens.
There were several reasons why Alaska wanted to
implement limited entry management in its fisheries. In
the 1960's Alaska began to experience increased numbers of
commercial fishermen and rapidly decreasing resource
levels. This resulted in a decline in the health of the
Alaskan fishing industry. The state was also very
concerned about the depressed condition of its salmon runs
which, in many areas, were reduced to critical low levels,
threatening the continuation of the salmon industry.
Another important reason was the desire to preserve fishing
opportunities for Alaska's rural residents who were slowly
being pushed out of the fishing industry by larger
commercial operations. As a result of these concerns,
Alaskan fishery managers believed that effective resource
management had become essential, and limited entry had to
be utilized. 1
In August of 1972, Alaskans voted to amend the state
constitution to allow the state "to limit entry into any
fishery for purposes of resource conservation, to prevent
economic stress among fishermen and those dependent upon
them for a livelihood, and to promote the efficient
development of aquaculture." The stated purpose of the law
was to promote "the conservation and sustained yield
management of Alaska's fishery resource and the economic
43
health and stability of commercial fishing in Alaska by
regulating and controlling entry into the commercial
fisheries in the pUblic interest and without unjust
discrimination. "2 Passage of this law created the first
comprehens i ve 1 imited entry program in the U. s .. It was
carefully designed to avoid explicit discrimination against
non-Alaskan U. S . residents and the creation of a closed
class of fishermen.
The limited entry act created the Alaskan Commercial
Fisheries Entry Commission, consisting of three full time
members, and acting as a quasi-j udicial regulatory body.
The Commission is in charge of implementing and
administering the limited entry program and its primary
responsibility is the adjudication of license applications.
The Commission has specific authority to limit the amount
of gear in each fishery (through the limitation of licenses
as opposed to using traditional methods) so as to stabilize
each fishery thereby providing reasonable economic returns
for fishermen. The Commission also aids in effective
fishery management and promotes the development of
professional and diversified commercial fisheries. 3
The program is a license type limited entry program
with licenses being assigned to vessel skippers. The
Commission lacks authority to implement traditional effort
limitation programs to supplement limited entry. Fisheries
may be limited by the Commission whenever it concludes that
such action will serve the purpose of the statute. For
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purposes of limiting entry, fisheries are defined by
species, gear type and area. As a result, licensing
systems are set up for different species, for the same
species by different gear type, and for the same species by
area.
License limitation is a two stage process. In the
first stage, the Commission looks at a fishery to assess
recent participation levels and determine the economic
dependence of fishermen. Based on this information, it
will declare the maximum number of gear units (licenses) to
be allowed. This maximum number of gear units usually
corresponds to a significant reduction in the number of
potential
provisions
participants because
of this law are quite
the grandfathering
strict. Permits are
issued based on a point system where points are assigned
using degree of economic dependence on the fishery and
extent of past participation as criteria. Licenses are
freely transferable for fishermen who rank high on this
point system. However, licenses are not transferable for
fishermen who are awarded less than a certain point value.
That is, fishermen who rank as having minor economic
dependence on a fishery cannot transfer their licenses. 4
The second stage of this system consists of reducing
the number of fishermen in a fishery through a vessel bUY-
back program. To do this, the Commission determines the
optimum number of gear units. If this optimum number of
gear units is less than the actual number of gear units, a
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buy-back program is implemented so that the optimum number
of vessels is reached in ten years. Vessel buy-back
programs are funded by a tax of up to seven percent of each
permit holders gross earnings. The Commission is directed
to pay the fair market value for permits, vessels and gear.
The second stage of the Alaskan limited entry system has
never been implemented because the AlaskQn Attorney General
determined that parts of this program are
unconstitutional. 5
There are 37 regional fisheries in Alaska presently
under the limited entry system. These include all of the
salmon fisheries, most herring fisheries, the northern and
southeast sable-fish fishery, the southeast king crab
fishery and the southeast tanner crab fishery.
Proponents of the limited entry program believe that it
has decreased harvest and management costs. They also
claim that the program has stabilized entry into the salmon
fishery as salmon runs have returned and the fishery has
become increasingly profitable. Valuable stocks have been
protected without the need for harvest closure. Economic
benefits to fishermen have increased, in part because of
value that has accrued to the permits themselves. There is
a decrease in regulatory uncertainty due to stable numbers
of harvesters. Concerns for the gradual transfer of
fishing rights from Alaskans to non-Alaskans have been
unfounded.
Opponents of the Alaskan limited entry program believe
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that it has been expensive to implement and administer.
They also feel that it has failed to hal t growth in
excessive fishing effort and that it allows excess profits
to go to the original permit holders. The costs associated
wi th allocation of fishing rights have exceeded net
economic benefits. The law promotes vessel specialization
and is against free enterprise. They also believe that
there has been a shift of licenses from rural to urban
areas and from Alaskan natives to non-natives.
The program is well established now and is undergoing
rapid growth and change in response to the changing needs
of Alaska's fisheries. However there are basic changes
that need to be made in the program especially in the
second stage. These changes would make this portion of the
law constitutional so that buy-back programs may proceed.
It is also believed that further changes in the law may be
necessary before it expands into other fisheries. 6
Washington
The state of Washington has long realized that its
fisheries are overcapitalized and has used, or attempted to
use, limited entry in several of them. Controls for
entrance into the oyster and subtidal hardshell clam
fisheries have existed for some time although an attempt to
limit entry into other Washington fisheries in 1934 was
found unconstitutional by the state Supreme Court. The
Washington Department of Fisheries began, in 1965, to work
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full time for the implementation of a limited entry
program, and by 1971 had received substantial industry
support for this type of management. In 1973, a license
moratorium was initiated in the Puget Sound herring
fishery. In this program, transferable I icenses were
assigned to vessel operators. 7
In 1976, a licensing moratorium. was implemented for
salmon. The primary impetus for this program was the first
in a series of federal court decisions allocating fishery
resources to the Indians. As a result, local authorities
were required to increase fishing opportunities to treaty
Indians with SUbsequent regUlations causing economic
dislocation to non-treaty Indian and non-Indian fishermen.
This decision placed the already overcapitalized salmon
fishery in a crisis situation with extreme overfishing. 8
The 1976 moratorium began with the licensing of new
salmon vessels. All existing salmon I icenses were
transferable and a separate buy-back program was initiated.
In contrast to the Alaska program, initial qualifications
for entrance into the fishery were quite permissive with
virtually anyone who had caught one fish during the
previous year being eligible to obtain a license.
The program's objectives were to improve the economic
health of the salmon fishery, and eventually, all other
fisheries to be placed under limited entry. Fishery
conservation commitments had to be met. The program also
sought to stabilize fleet size and to mitigate increasing
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catch potential. Compliance with Indian salmon allocations
was also of concern. An implicit goal of all Washington
limited entry programs was always one of equity.9
The program began with the establishment of a
moratorium on the issuance of new licenses based on a
previously determined upper limit. This limit could not be
exceeded, and reduction of the number of licenses was to be
achieved through attrition. In addition, a license would
be lost if it was not used. The moratorium began the
process of fleet reduction and the process was continued
through a federally funded vessel buy-back program.
Realizing that fleet reduction would be a gradual
process, the state implemented indirect management
regUlations to conserve salmon stocks. These measures
included limited seasons, gear restrictions, seasonal
quotas and, when necessary, season closures. These
measures were also necessary because the license system did
not address vessel size and catch capacity. The process of
fleet reduction through vessel buy-backs still continues.
All licenses are freely transferable within each gear group
and area.
Other fisheries placed under license limitation schemes
were commercial geoduck clams in 1979 and the dungeness
crab fishery in 1980. 10
During the past decade, the salmon fleet has been
reduced by 23.4% using 20 million dollars in federal funds.
However, the need for further limitation is evident. Also,
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fears by some managers that producers from the
overcapitalized salmon fisheries would move into the chub
and bottomfish fisheries have been unfounded. On the other
hand, the number of licensed fishermen rose during the
first year of the program because of the lenient
grandfathering restrictions, and the vessel buy-back
programs have had no apparent impact on conservation or
economic efficiency despite the 20 million dollars spent
(one can only imagine the public outrage at this
expenditure). It is also believed that the drastic decline
in fleet size has been more due to decreased salmon market
prices, increased operating costs and limited fishing
opportunities than to the vessel buy-back programs. 11
Oregon
Impetus for limiting entry in Oregon came from a number
of sources. The Boldt decision allocating salmon resources
to treaty Indians in Washington raised fears that displaced
Washington fishermen would move south to Oregon. There was
concern by state fishery managers that the federal
government would impose limited entry if it did not act
first. Oregon salmon fishermen were already experiencing
economic troubles, and there was concern that more
fishermen, regardless of the source, would worsen the
situation. There was also concern that displaced Gulf of
Mexico shrimpers would move to Oregon en masse. In
addition to these fears, overcapitalization in the
fisheries coupled with decreasing stocks and the need to
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accommodate Indians helped to trigger limited entry
legislation. The main objective of the Oregon limited
entry system was to improve the economic health of its
fisheries while meeting its conservation goals. 12
The Oregon limited entry system consists of vessel
license moratoria, called restricted participation systems.
The first of these moratoria on the issuance of new
licenses occured in 1979 in the ocean troll salmon fishery,
the Colombia River gillnet salmon fisheries and the pink
shrimp fishery. Since then, moratoria have been
implemented in the scallop and roe herring fisheries.
Licenses are freely transferable in all limited fisheries
except the ocean troll salmon fishery and the pink shrimp
fishery. In 1984, restrictions were placed on transfering
licenses to vessels of larger size in the ocean troll
salmon fishery. In the pink shrimp fishery, permits may be
transferred to replacement vessels or to the purchaser of a
permitted vessel. All of these limited entry programs had
liberal grandfather clause provisions so that, initiallY,
the number of licensed fishermen increased. Eligibility to
renew licenses is maintained by proof of landings. This
requirement may be waived in the salmon fisheries to avoid
intense fishing on stocks when abundance is low.
When these license limitations systems were
implemented, a special fishing permit commission was
created to adjudicate license eligibility appeals. The
decisions of this board may not be reviewed by the Oregon
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Department of Fish and Wildlife. 13
A modest buy-back program for salmon gillnetters was
also implemented. This attempt to reduce the number of
fishermen was due to a long historical decline in the river
gillnet fishery. This decline was attributed to
overfishing, the Indian treaty court decisions and
environmental factors. The buy-back program worked by the
reverse auction process using sealed bids from license
holders. Licenses therefore, were bought back by the
Fishing Permit Commission from the lowest bidders. A
ceiling was placed on what the Commission was willing to
pay. While this buy-back program was in effect, 170 offers
were made by the Fishing Permit Commission, and 118 permits
were purchased and retired. The buy-back program is now
inactive. 14
Some of the consequences of limited entry in Oregon are
as follows. Effort increased after implementation of these
moratoria because of liberal grandfathering provisions.
For the salmon troll fishery, there were approximately 3127
licenses when the license moratorium was implemented. This
number increased to 4314 because of the grandfathering
provisions. From 1980-84, the number of permits in this
fishery decreased from 4314 to 3201. In the pink shrimp
fishery, the number of permits decreased from 373 to 134
from 1980-84. In the scallop fishery, the number of
permits decreased from 196 to 134 from 1981-84. A lottery
for issuance of new licenses is available in the scallop
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fishery but has not been used because the number of new
permits to be issued cannot exceed 118. In 1988, there
will be a lottery for new entrants into the ocean troll
salmon fishery, but new permits cannot be issued to exceed
3158. In the pink shrimp fishery lottery, new permits
cannot be issued to exceed 187. The roe herring moratorium
was implemented in 1983. Eleven harvesters qualified for
this fishery in 1984-85.
Stated benefits of these programs include reduction of
competition among harvesters, a more orderly conduct of the
fisheries, and a closer relationship between effort and the
available resource. Those against these programs complain
that they forclose free access to the fisheries and that
market prices should be allowed to provide an indirect
control over the number of harvesters. 15
California
There are numerous reasons why the state of California
implemented limited entry legislation in the early 1970's.
Initially, pUblic disturbance over the sudden emergence of
a significant roe herring fishery in San Francisco and
Tomalas Bays raised the fear that if this fishery was not
regulated, it would be legislated out altogether. Late in
the 1970's, a similar situation occurred when a drift
gillnet fishery for marlin was introduced. Like other
Pacific coastal states, California was in need of restoring
depleted stocks especially in the abalone, salmon, shark
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and swordfish fisheries. Likewise, effort was on the rise
in all of these fisheries and particularly in the abalone
fishery. Also in the abalone fishery, there were excessive
numbers of inexperienced divers who tended to disregard
effort controls such as size limits that were intended to
conserve the stocks. The Pacific Fisheries Management
Council recommended in the early 1970's that Pacific coast
state's limit entry into the salmon fisheries to counter a
long term decrease in the salmon stocks, and to halt steady
increases in effort in the salmon fisheries. California
also felt regulation of entry into the gillnet fisheries
would be one way of reducing marine mammal mortality from
this gear type. Finally, limited entry was seen as a way
to increase access in an experimental drift gillnet
swordfish fishery.16
The objectives of all California limited entry programs
can be summarized as follows. Their primary purpose is to
enhance conservation and protect the commercial fishing
industry. They are supposed to: aid in reducing the kill
of marine mammals and birds, in particular by the gillnet
fisheries; reduce the conflict between all fishing groups,
commercial and recreational; and enhance the economic
efficiency of the fisheries. Physical conservation and
equitable allocation of all fish stocks are central to the
state's conception of its role in managing the fisheries.
There are three types of limited entry programs in
California. The first is called qualified entry. This
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type is designed to make sure that all applicants are
experienced in a fishery before they can operate a vessel
in that fishery. The second is called entry moratorium.
This type of entry control is designed to stop all new
entry into a fishery and is viewed as a temporary step to
setting up a limited entry program. The third type is
limited entry itself. These programs set specific
procedures and conditions for licensing new fishermen. For
example, some limited entry programs set goals for the
total number of fishermen or vessels to be allowed to
participate.
other programs control the conditions of entry. For
example, no numerical goals were provided for by the
California Legislature for the commercial salmon industry,
but the Commercial Salmon Fishing Review Board and the Fish
and Game Commission determine the number of salmon permits
issued annually. In the abalone fishery, the Fish and Game
Commission set a goal of 100 operator licenses. 1?
All California limited entry programs are licensing
systems. within all systems, virtually no transfer of
licenses is allowed. The California Department of Fish and
Game is against license transfer for several reasons. It
is felt that when value accrues to a license, requiring
substantial investment, resistance to regUlations will
develop. The tendency for windfall gains through the
selling of licenses is also deemed undesirable by the
State. High values to licenses create a discriminating
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barrier to new entrants in that, only those who can afford
the high priced licenses can enter the fisheries. within
these systems, however, license transfer is allowed to
heirs and working partners. License trans fer is also
possible in the troll salmon fishery because licenses are
attached to the vessels and therefore are transferred when
the vessel is sold. 18
with the exception mentioned above, all licensing
programs attach the licenses to the fishermen. Eligibility
for them is based on past participation and evidence of
substantial investment in vessel and gear prior to
enactment of limited entry legislation. In the first year
of a new limited entry program, fishermen become eligible
for a license if they have twenty years of experience as a
fisherman and at least one year in the specific fishery to
be limited. Permits are renewed annually, and renewal is
contingent on continued participation in the fishery.
Permits may not be held by corporations or partnerships.
As a limited entry program continues, allocation of permits
occurs as they become available to applicants showing
necessary past participation and experience qualifications.
Selection for permits among equally qualified applicants is
done through a drawing. Finally, licenses are limited by
gear (general gillnet) or species/gear combination (salmon
troll, abalone diver), or gear and area (drift gillnet).19
There are currently seven fisheries administered with
limited entry programs in California. These include the
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herring roe fishery, the commercial abalone fishery, the
salmon fishery, the general gillnet fishery, the drift
gillnet fishery for shark and swordfish, the experimental
drift gillnet fishery for swordfish off central California
and the nearshore set gillnet and trammel net fishery off
central California. 20
Proponents of limited entry in California feel that the
programs are adaptable to a wide range of circumstances,
they can be implemented with various other regulations, and
they can be tailored to each fishery. In addition, all of
the limited entry systems provide means for new entry when
permits become available while bureaucratic mechanisms for
maintaining entry at desired levels has been established.
Equi ty concerns are also addressed through generous
grandfathering which allows virtually all past participants
in with the initial allocations.
Detractors of the programs cite their use as political
solutions to social conflicts as occurred with the herring
roe fishery. There is also concern expressed about the
effect of these systems on free enterprise and equity.
Finally, there is concern that reluctance on the part of
the California Legislature to consider economic efficiency
in limited entry serves to the detriment of the programs.
Michigan, Minnesota, Wisconsin, Ohio
These four mid-western states are placed together
because their limited entry programs share several common
aspects. During the 19th century, the Great Lakes provided
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a valuable fish harvest to the U.S. However, this fishery
declined dramatically in the early and mid 20th century
because of environmental degradation, invasion of the sea
lamprey, pressures to reallocate fisheries resources to
recreational fishermen and the assertion of Indian fishing
rights. 21
In the 1960's, substantial cooperative efforts between
the Great Lakes States and Canada led to rej uvenation of
the Great Lakes fisheries with dramatic increases in
commercial regulations. These cooperative efforts were
used to shift a declining labor force towards increased
participation by professional, fulltime fishermen with the
hope of attracting qualified young people into the
fisheries. 22
Each state implemented limited entry programs at
different times and places. Wisconsin imposed limited
entry on Lake Superior in 1967, and on Lake Michigan in
1978. Minnesota implemented its Lake Superior limited
entry program in 1977. Michigan began limited entry on
Lake Michigan in 1968 and has since expanded the program to
include Lake Superior, Lake Huron and Lake Erie. Ohio
introduced limited entry to its Lake Erie fisheries in
1974. What follows is a detailed description of each
state's limited entry programs.
Michigan
Michigan's primary objective in implementing limited
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entry was to reduce fishing effort. In 1978, a ceiling of
188 licenses was placed on fishing licenses partly with the
intention of eliminating part-time fishermen over several
years. Currently all licenses are tied to vessels with
specif ic ownership stipulations. License transfer is
allowed and is administered by the fisheries management
agency. Effort reduction is achieved by attaching the
right to harvest fish and the provisions for harvest to
individual harvester licenses rather than through general
regulations and laws. Limited entry programs only effect
non tribal fishermen - tribal harvests are not restricted
by these programs. In 1975 a modified quota system for
Lake Superior was implemented in which one half of the
catch was allocated under the quota and one half was left
open for competitive harvest. Also, in 1975, a quota
shares system was set up for chub. By early 1986, there
were only 110 commercial licenses issued. 23
Following the imposition of limited entry, commercial
fish stocks have improved to almost historically high
numbers. In addition, individual harvester profits have
returned to more reasonable levels and license control
appears to enhance effective management. Limited entry has
reduced commercial versus sport fishing conflict.
On the other hand, there have been enforcement problems
because of the lack of laws and regulations aimed at effort
reduction. Since stipulations are only attached to
licenses, violators cannot be arrested.
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Also, it is
believed that limited entry helped to precipitate the
Indian fishing rights crisis by displacing Indian
harvesters in the early 1970's. This resulted in fifteen
years of litigation which ended in favor of the Indians.
Now the state must reduce the number of commercial harvest
licenses by an additional thirty operators to accommodate
the tribal harvest. In addition, there is a reporting
problem with the Indians in that, of the 500 fishing cards
issued, only 60-70 report on a monthly basis. 24
Minnesota
In Minnesota, licenses are available to those who
possess more than a minimum amount of gear, have fished
more than a set number of days during the previous season
and have sold fish exceeding a certain value during the
preceeding year. New entrants are allowed into the
fisheries only if proof of purchase or inheritance of gear
and facilities from an existing license is provided.
Entrance can also be achieved if an applicant has two or
more years of experience as a helper to an existing permit
holder. Additional restrictions are also in effect. These
regulate the total amount of gear which may be fished for
herring, cisco and chub. For example, the total footage of
gillnet allowed is less than or equal to 100,000 feet for
herring and less than or equal to 120,000 feet for cisco
and chub. The total footage of gillnet that an individual
operator may use is less than or equal to 2,000 feet for
herring and less than or equal to 12,000 feet for cisco and
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chub. 25
Wisconsin
The Wisconsin limited entry program was designed to
establish equity and for resource conservation sUbject to
constraints on administrative feasibility. Economic
efficiency was not defined as an important goal by the
state. Limited entry was implemented in 1968 for lake
trout and five other species. Initially, sixty-eight non-
transferable licenses were authorized. These
authorizations were based on residency requirements, past
fishing record, fishing and navigation ability and the
quantity and quality of the equipment possessed. The
number of licenses authorized was reduced to 58 in 1970 and
further reduced to 21 in 1972. The number of licenses was
again reduced to 19 in 1977. Licenses are tied to vessels
in this program with specif ic ownership stipulations
attached. A similar program was implemented for Lake
Michigan in 1978. This program was accompanied by sharply
increased license fees to remove part time fishermen from
the fisheries. There seems to be a consensus of opinion
that both the Minnesota and Wisconsin programs have
enhanced effective management and reduced commercial and
commercial versus recreational conflicts. 26
Ohio
In Ohio, equity and resource conservation were stated
goals of the limited entry program and, again, economic
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efficiency was not stated as an important goal. In 1974,
four fish species were place under limited entry. They
were walleye pike, yellow perch, white bass and channel
catfish. Permits were awarded to fishermen based on passed
experience in the fishery, and permit and royalty fees were
dramatically increased. For example, in the trap-net
fishery, the license fee increased from $80 to $800 per
year. The purpose of these increased fees was to aid in
reducing the number of harvesters from approximately 350 to
150. Permits are transferable through the Ohio fisheries
management agency.
In 1980, the Lake Erie fisheries were further
restricted. At this time, legislation mandated that the
state buy-back all commercial gillnet licenses.
Gillnetting was then made illegal. Limited entry appears
to have improved the recreational fisheries harvest in Lake
Erie, and there appears to have been some stock recovery
for yellow perch due to the absence of gillnets. There
also seem to be reduced gear conflicts between commercial
and sports fishermen. On the other hand, some contend that
elimination of the gillnet fishery prevents full
utilization of Lake Erie resources. 27
Mid-Atlantic Surf Clams
The mid-Atlantic surf clam management plan includes a
license moratorium and, as such, is the only plan
promUlgated at the regional level that employs limited
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entry. During the mid 1970's there was a biological crisis
in surf clams due to excessive fishing capacity in this
fishery. In addition to this, the surf clam stocks off the
New Jersey coast had suffered from anoxic conditions during
1976. It was estimated that 25% of New Jersey's offshore
stocks were destroyed by this condition. Concurrent with
these events was the passage of the Magnuson Act in 1976,
and the creation of regional fishery management councils.
The Magnuson Act thus created an appropriate avenue for
regional management of mid Atlantic surf clams at a time
when all parties agreed that recovery of the stocks would
fishingover excessivecontrolrequire effective
capacity. 28
The Mid-Atlantic Fisheries Management Council chose a
wide range of management tools to fulfill three objectives.
These objectives were to: 1, rebuild surf clam populations
to MSY levels (at that time MSY was considered to be 50
million pounds), 2, minimize short term economic
dislocation and 3, prevent continued excessive harvest of
ocean quahogs. The tools to be used included a moratorium
on entry into the two fisheries, quotas, time and area
closures, licensing of fishermen, record keeping systems
for fishermen and processors and vessel marking
requirements. Limited entry, through the license
moratorium, was considered because of the major management
problems facing the Mid-Atlantic Council which required the
use of just about every management option available at the
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time. Limited entry was also considered because excess
capacity in the fleet was so pronounced that economists
predicted the annual yield in the surf clam fishery could
be achieved by the fleet in fifteen days.29
The initial mid-Atlantic surf clam management plan did,
in fact, make use of most all the tools mentioned above.
Licensing was established for all vessels taking surf clams
and ocean quahogs. A moratorium on entry into the surf
clam fishery was implemented with licenses attached to
vessels. other effort restrictions were also put in place.
These included quotas, shortened work weeks, adjustments in
the number of fishing days to be allowed, area closures to
protect small clams, reports and record keeping for
fishermen and processors and vessel marking. This plan had
a two year duration. The vessel license moratorium for the
surf clam fishery had a duration of one year but could be
extended for an additional year. 30 In 1978, the first full
year of the plan, a regulatory amendment was made that,
among other things, extended the vessel license moratorium
for an additional year.
In 1979, Amendment I for the entire plan was enacted.
This amendment included New England in the vessel
moratorium for surf clams. The New England Council and
other New England fisheries interests expressed great
concern over this provision of the plan since the original
plan had appeared to exempt the New England area from this
measure. As a result, the moratorium was lifted for New
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England in Amendment II, implemented in 1981. In addition,
revisions were made to the moratorium to make it less
difficult to sell licenses to new operators and to leave
the fishery.
Amendment III added three additional objectives to the
plan. These were to provide greater freedom and
flexibili ty to harvesters, to optimize yield per recruit
and to increase the understanding of the stocks and the
fishery. Amendment III also presented, for the first time,
a full fledged limited entry program that would work
through vessel allocations. This amendment included a five
year program to reduce the number of licenses by allowing
only one permit to be issued for every four that were
retired. In addition, there would be minimum landing
requirements necessary to keep licenses from being retired.
The I imited entry, vessel reduction and minimum landing
requirement provisions of this amendment were not approved.
No further attempts to modify the vessel license moratorium
or change it into a permanent I imited entry system were
made in amendments IV-VI. 31
with the exception of the vessel replacement provision,
the moratorium has not been difficult to administer. The
vessel replacement provision requires an administrative
determination that a vessel left the fishery involuntarily
during the moratorium, that the replacement vessel was
essentially of the same harvesting capacity as the vessel
it replaced and that the owner of the replacement vessel
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owned the vessel that was lost. Unfortunately, all three
of these requirements are SUbject to interpretation which
is why this provision has been difficult to administer. 32
other difficulties with the vessel license moratorium
are as follows. The license program created a new demand
for licenses as illustrated by the New England surf clam
industry. When the perndt program was extended to this
area, hundreds of permits were issued even though only a
handful of operators actually participated. The licensing
program, by itself, has no direct effect on conservation.
The vessel moratorium was initially intended to last only
one year with the possibility for a one year extension. At
that time, the conventional wisdom from industry, NMFS, and
other management agencies was that the moratorium would
quickly be replaced by a more permanent limited entry
system, most likely in the form of vessel allocations.
This initial optimism was obviously misplaced since over
eight years have passed since initial implementation and
the moratorium is still in place. 33
Massachusetts
There are presently three I imited entry programs in
effect in Massachusetts. They are the commercial inshore
lobster fishery, the bluefin tuna purse seine fishery and
the trawl fisheries for winter flounder in bays and
esuaries. All of these programs incorporated provisions to
grandfather established harvesters while limiting the
number of new entrants. However, there were no buy-back
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provisions for any of the programs and, with the exception
of the lobster licensing program, transfer of permits was
not allowed. This latter provision was designed to prevent
permits from "accruing value. Effort in all of these
fisheries, with the exception of the commercial inshore
lobster fishery, has successfully been reduced, partly as a
result of these programs. 34
The Massachusetts inshore lobster fishery license
moratorium was first implemented in July of 1975 and placed
a cap of approximately 1300 on the number of fishermen in
the inshore lobster fishery. Inshore is defined as
anywhere within the three mile state, Fez boundary line.
It was intended that this moratorium be temporary, and
studies on the feasibility of different limited entry
options were mandated by law during the moratorium's first
year. The long term objectives of this law were to improve
the economic efficiency of the inshore lobster fishery by
stabilizing the number of lobstermen who operated inshore,
to reduce the number of part time lobstermen, and to
promote conservation of inshore lobster stocks. The study
never reached any useful conclusions and the moratorium
remained in place until 1980.
In 1980, the original moratorium was repealed and
replaced with a more permanent limited entry-type scheme
which remains in effect today. The new law serves to
reduce the rate at which the number of licenses increases
in the inshore lobster fishery rather than to actually cap
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or reduce the total number of licenses. Under the new law,
eighty permits may be issued by the Director of the
Division of Marine Fisheries per year to those applicants
who are considered to be experienced and qualified to enter
the coastal lobster fishery. An additional twenty, so
called, special additional licenses may be issued per year
to those who can demonstrate substantial hardship by not
obtaining a lobster permit. There are now 1865 commercial
inshore lobster permits.
Many problems were created for all concerned by the
implementation of these two laws. Most of the problems in
the inshore lobster fishery that these laws were supposed
to remedy are as severe today as they were in 1975. In
brief, the Massachusetts inshore lobster fishery is
severely overcapitalized, and the lobster resource is fUlly
exploited. The remainder of this thesis will focus on and
analyze every aspect of these two laws. These analyses
will reveal directions that management may take to improve
this difficult situation.
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CHAPTER III
THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE INSHORE LOBSTER
FISHERY LIMITED ENTRY PLAN
Introduction
This chapter reviews the legislative history of the
Massachusetts lobster license moratorium without any of the
complicating factors that are inherent in a description of
the politics of the law. A detailed overview of the
politics that led to each action will follow in chapter IV.
The purpose of writing a "bare-bones" history of this
legislation is twofold. First, it is hoped that a prior
familiarity with what happened with this legislation will
aid in sorting out the political history that follows in
chapter IV. Second, this chapter will provide a reference
for those who need only to obtain a quick overview of the
law.
Up to 1975
As will be seen in chapter IV, the lobster license
moratorium legislation was filed and passed in a very short
period of time. Evidence to this effect appears in a memo
by then DMF Director Frank Grice on proposed legislation
for 1975. In this document, the only reference to limited
entry occurs in the statement that legislation should be
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filed "to allow the Director of the Division of Marine
Fisheries to restrict the number of commercial fishing
permits issued annually in order to protect the resource
and provide for adequate economic benefits to the involved
fishermen". 1 The lobster moratorium bill evolved from this
proposed legislation in combination with a perenial bill,
filed by the Massachusetts Lobstermen's Association, that
would I imit the number of commercial permits issued to
1000. 2
1975
During the first week in July 1975, the original
inshore lobster license moratorium, House 5677 (H-5677),
"An Act Further Regulating the Issuance of Commercial
Fishermen Permits for the Taking of Lobster in Coastal
waters," was enacted by the legislature. Prior to July 10,
a Request for position on enacted legislation regarding H-
5677 was submitted to DMF by the Governor's legislative
office for review and comment. DMF Director, Frank Grice,
prepared this report and concluded with the Agency
recommendation that the Governor sign H-5677 into law.
H-5677 was approved and implemented by Governor Dukakis
on July 14, 1975. The lobster license moratorium law
appeared as Chapter 484 in the Acts and Resolves of
Massachusetts, 1975 and amended Chapter 130 of the General
Laws of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts by adding section
38B. There was also an emergency preamble in Chapter 484
that waived the normal ninety day waiting period between
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enactment and implementation; the law went into effect
immediately (see Appendix A).
Chapter 484 restricted the number of commercial lobster
permits that the DMF director could issue per year to 1300
but gave him the discretionary power to issue up to 130
additional permits. These 130 additional so-called
"hardship" permits were to be granted, sUbject to the
approval of the Marine Fisheries Advisory commission, to
commercial lobstermen who had been issued a license since
1970 but for some reason had not renewed, or to applicants
who would suffer substantial hardship if they did not
receive a permit.
In addition, the law allowed for the transfer of
licenses held by an individual, partnership or corporation
to another qualified individual, partnership or corporation
if the director determined that the transfer was in the
public interest. An applicant who was denied a transfer or
hardship could appeal to MFAC whose decision on the matter
was final. In case of death, the executor or administrator
was given authority over the permit until it expired.
Chapter 484 also directed DMF to investigate regulatory
methodology for the development of a limited entry system
and for the development of a gear limitation system. The
Division was further directed to report to the general
court its recommendations and the results of the
investigation and study by the first Wednesday of December,
1975. Chapter 484 therefore established a lobster license
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moratorium and directed that DMF conduct a study in order
to determine how best to implement a permanent limited
entry and gear limitation system for the coastal lobster
industry.
Immediately upon implementation of Chapter 484, a major
problem arose in that there was no provision within the law
that specifically protected currently licensed commercial
lobstermen from losing their licenses at years end. That
is, there was no "grandfather-clause". As the law read,
the DMF Director was required to issue 1300 hundred
licenses per year with no guidance or restrictions on who
those permits would be issued to. Therefore, he could
issue the 1300 licenses to whomever he wished regardless of
whether or not they had held a license during the preceding
year.
As a reSUlt, emergency legislation to amend Chapter 484
was filed in the fall of 1975 as H-6755 "An Act Further
RegUlating The Issuance Of Commercial Fisherman Permits For
The Taking of Lobsters In Coastal Waters". Legislative
committee hearings for this amendment took place on
November 4 and on December 8, 1975 the new bill, Chapter
729, was signed by Governor Dukakis.
Specifically, the amendment provided that the director
may give priority to applicants who held a lobster permit
and who had fished for lobsters during the preceding year
(see Appendix A). Note that the use of the word "may" in
the amendment gave the director discretionary power over
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the issuance of the 1300 licenses. Note also the phrase
"who had also fished." This came to be known as the "must
fish provision" of the moratorium. Again, because of an
emergency preamble, this law went into effect immediately.
1976-1979
Al though a great deal did occur administratively over
the period from 1976-1978, very little legislative action
took place concerning the lobster license moratorium and no
action was taken by the legislature to either repeal the
law or to formalize a limited entry system. During this
period, three lobster license bills seeking to repeal the
moratorium were written. The first of these was filed in
1976 as H-3081 "An Act Repealing The Law Limiting
Commercial Lobster Permits". H-3081 was given an
unfavorable review by DMF and was not passed by the
legislature. The other two bills were filed in 1977, one
as Senate 859 (S-859), "An Act Eliminating The Numerical
Limit On Commercial Fisherman Permits For The Taking of
Lobsters," and the other, H-4321, "An Act Prohibiting A
Limi tation On The Amount Of Permits To Be Issued To
Commercial Fishermen For The Taking Of Lobsters In Coastal
waters". These bills were also given an adverse report by
DMF and neither bill was passed by the legislature.
One common element to these three attempts to repeal
the lobster licensing moratorium was that the petitions for
each of these bills came from one or two people. Such
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bills are rarely given as much credence by the legislature
as bills that result from large petitions or that are filed
by state bureau's.3
One other bill was filed in 1977. This was H-2030, a
bill to provide for a study of the lobster license
moratorium issue, which was given a favorable report by
DMF. No legislation concerning the lobster license
moratorium was filed in 1978.
In 1979, several lobster licensing bills were brought
before the legislature. The first of these was H-4600, "An
Act Restoring A Measure Of Free Enterprise To The Lobster
Industry", which was another attempt to repeal the
moratorium. This bill was given an adverse report by the
committee on Natural Resources and Agriculture (CNRA).
In early 1979, H-3345, "An Act Providing For A More
Limited Distribution Of Commercial Lobster Permits," was
filed by Representatives Silva and Gillette for the
Massachusetts Lobstermen's Association (MLA). H-3345
provided that the first paragraph of section 38B as amended
by Chapter 729 of the acts of 1975 be struck out and
replaced with the following: The 1300 permits issued would
be reduced by 75% of the unrenewed commercial licenses each
year. The 25% of unrenewed licenses remaining would then
be made available to new applicants. MFAC ould be given
the responsibility for distributing this 25%.
This act sought to place more stringent provisions into
the lobster license moratorium relative to the conditions
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and requirements for the issuance of commercial lobster
permits. H-3345 was an MLA attempt to reduce the number of
lobster licenses to approximately 1000 over several years. 4
The bill was opposed by DMF and killed by CNRA.
In May, 1979 H-6352, "An Act Providing For certain
categories Of Permits For The Commercial Taking Of
Lobsters," was filed by Representative MacLean for DMF.
This was the first DMF proposal for a major revision of the
lobster license law since the implementation of the
original moratorium.
H-6352 called for striking out section 38B as amended
by Chapter 729 of the acts of 1975, and replacing it with a
two-tiered licensing system. Under the new section 38B
proposed by H-6352, the DMF Director could issue a class A
lobster license to any person who demonstrated that he had
caught at least 5000 pounds of lobster in any of the three
years prior to implementation. All other lobstermen would
be eligible for a class B permit. After the first year,
the Director could issue a class A permit to any class B
permit holder who demonstrated that he had caught at least
3000 pounds of lobster during the previous year. Under
both circumstances, the Director would be given
discretionary power over the issuance of permits.
Class A permit holders would be able to transfer their
licenses only to class B holders who had held their license
for at least one year. Class A licenses would be renewed
only if a fisherman could prove he had caught at least 5000
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pounds of lobster during anyone of two preceding years.
All class A and B license holders would be required to
submit yearly catch reports and would be subject to having
their licenses temporarily revoked if it was discovered,
through random audit, that their catch report had been
falsified. Lobster buyers would also lose their dealers
license if they falsified weigh-out slips.
The DMF Director would have been required to implement
regulations limiting the number of traps that could be used
by class A and B permit holders. Violators of the
provisions of H-6352 would be punished by fines. The law
would have taken effect on 1 January, 1980.
H-6352 generated a great deal of controversy in both
the fisheries management community and the lobster
industry. This resulted in the introduction of a plan to
gradually phase the lobster license moratorium out.
Nevertheless, H-6352 was scheduled to go before pUblic
hearing with CNRA on June 5. Prior to June 5, DMF
submitted a redraft of H-6352 to CNRA which proposed a
phaseout of the moratorium on lobster licenses. A CNRA
researcher stated that the redraft did propose a phaseout
of the lobster license moratorium and that the Commonwealth
would be back to a free entry system in the next five or
six years. 5
On June 7, CNRA reviewed H-6352 and recommended that an
accompanying order, H-6426 ought to be adopted. H-6426
authorized CNRA to study the SUbject matter in H-6352 and,
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if necessary, to hold pUblic hearings concerning the
lobster licensing issue. CNRA was to report its findings
and recommendations to the House of Representatives by 1
August, 1979. This action effectively killed H-6352 and
allowed CNRA to research a new bill.
In preparation for an August 1 deadline imposed by H-
6426, the CNRA subcommittee assigned to study the lobster
licensing issue met on July 30 "to draft a new bill on the
methodology to be used for the distribution of commercial
lobster permits. ,,6 This study produced drafts of a new
bill, still numbered H-6426, which was never formally
submitted to the legislature. H-6426 called for a gradual
phaseout of the license moratorium and was entitled: "An
Act Providing For The Distribution Of Commercial Fishermen
Permits For The Taking Of Lobsters In Coastal Waters" .
study, debate and compromise relative to H-64 26 consumed
the remainder of 1979.
19S0
In February of 1980, the redraft of H-6352 was re-filed
as H-2077. The change in bill number indicates that the
bill was re-submitted to the General Court during the next
year. 7 DMF described H-2077 as, "the old compromise
lobster licensing bill that was a late file by the Division
last year."S The bill had, in 1979, been the Division
replacement for the two-tier system of lobster licensing
(H-6352), and called for the gradual phaseout of the
moratorium by issuing 150 new permits per year off a random
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catch reports or applications. The bill was given a
favorable review by DMF, and was supported by the
Massachusetts Lobsterman' s Association. DMF recommended
that this bill become effective on January 1, 1981.
For the next several weeks, CNRA reviewed both H-2077
and H-5211, and on May 21, 1980, recommended that a new
bill ought to pass. This bill was _ H-6544, "An Act
Providing for the Distribution of Commercial Fishermen
Permits for the Taking of Lobsters in Coastal Waters". H-
6544 was passed by the legislature and was enacted by
Governor Dukakis on July 10, 1980 as Chapter 444 of the
Acts of 1980. (see Appendix A) Chapter 729 of the Acts of
1975 had been repealed and was replaced by a gradual
phaseout of the lobster license moratorium.
Chapter 444 was enacted with an emergency preamble that
indicated that the law would go into effect immediately,
although section 2 of the Act was to go into effect on
December 1, 1980. The law amended Chapter 130 of the
General Laws of Massachusetts by striking out section 38B
as amended by Chapter 729 of the acts of 1975 and replacing
it with the following provisions.
During the period from December 1 to March 1 of each
year, the DMF director was instructed to renew existing
commercial coastal lobster permits to those who had held
them during the previous year. From January 1 to March 1,
1981, new appl icants could apply for permits. These
applications were to be made by registered mail to the
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division and then were to be acted upon, in order of
receipt, by the director.
The director then was to separate the unqualified
applicants from those who were qualified, by experience, to
enter the coastal lobster fishery. The qualified
applicants would be placed on a list by random selection,
then the unqualified applicants would be placed randomly on
the same list. Future applicants would be placed on the
list in consecutive order following the unqualified
applicants. This list was to be maintained by the director
and updated as necessary.
The director was further instructed to issue no more
than 100 permits for 1981 and no more than 80 permits for
each sQbsequent year to applicants (from the list) who were
determined to be experienced and qualified to enter the
coastal lobster fishery. The criteria for determining
qualified applicants were: 6 months experience in the
coastal lobster fishery or 12 months full time experience
in other fisheries or a combination thereof, and applicants
must show a commitment to participate in the coastal
lobster fishery.
The director was then allowed to issue, "the director
may issue," up to 30 permits in 1981 and up to 20
additional permits for each sUbsequent year to so called
special additional cases. These were individuals who could
demonstrate previous emploYlnent as a commercial coastal
lobster fisherman, that most of their income had come from
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this profession, and who could show compelling reasons why
they had not renewed their permits on time. Criteria for
making these determinations were to be made by MFAC.
Appeals for special additional and transfer decisions
were to be made to the commissioner of the Department of
Fisheries, wildlife and Natural Resources whose decision
would be governed by the MFAC criteria and would be final.
All commercial coastal lobster fishermen were to document
their catch and supply this information to DMF. These
catch reports were to be kept confidential. Fines would be
imposed on those who either filed incomplete catch reports
or falsified their reports.
Commercial coastal lobster license holders could
transfer their permits to members of their immediate
families or to lawful members of any other type of business
enterprise or legal entity provided the entity had been in
a lawful partnership with the license holder for more than
one calendar year. The entity to which the permit would go
had to be experienced and qualified to enter the commercial
coastal lobster fishery. The directer was allowed to
develop transfer criteria. Section 2 of Chapter 444, which
was the lobster licensing section described above, was to
take effect on 1 December, 1980.
1981 - Present
In January, 1981, Chapter 444 of the Acts of 1980 was
amended by the enactment of S-2431. This bill became
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Chapter 769 of the acts of 1981. (See Appendix A) Chapter
769 deleted the word 'additional' from the special
additional provision of the law. In Chapter 444, the
second paragraph read: "The Director may issue up to thirty
permits in nineteen hundred and eighty-one, and twenty
additional permits for each year thereafter, to those
individuals who have been previously engaged in commercial
fishing •• " This meant that in 1981, the Director could
issue thirty special additional licenses and that for each
sUbsequent year, he could issue fifty special additional
licenses. Deletion of the word "additional" from the
second paragraph limited the Director to issuing only
twenty special additional licenses for each sUbsequent year
as was originally intended. This was the only amendment to
Chapter 444.
Over the next six years, several attempts to change or
repeal the new coastal lobster licensing law were made. In
1981, four additional bills were filed in the House of
Representatives. The first, H-1587, "An Act Repealing the
Moratorium on Issue of Commercial Lobster Permits," was
another attempt to repeal the lobster license moratorium.
DMF opposed this bill because it sought to repeal a law
that had already been repealed.
The second, H-3248, "An Act Providing for the
Distribution of Commercial Fishermen Permits for the Taking
of Lobsters in Coastal Waters," attempted to eliminate the
requirement established in chapter 444 that applicants must
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have prior experience in order to be eligible for a
commercial lobster license. Since DMF considered past
experience a necessary factor in ranking applicants it
opposed this amendment.
The third, H-2352, "An Act Providing for the Issuance
of Commercial Lobster Licenses," would have amended Chapter
444 by requiring that substantial hardship or need for a
permit be determined by MFAC. According to DMF, this would
have perpetuated one of the main administrative problems of
the original moratorium, namely, that the MFAC had been
required to spend too much of its time evaluating hardship
applications.
The fourth bill, H-4742, "An Act Providing for Two
Hundred Additional Permits for the Taking of Lobsters in
Coastal waters," would have amended Chapter 444 by
allowing for the issuance of 200 permits in 1981 rather
than the original 100 called for by the law. The Division
was against all legislation, other than corrective
legislation, that would substantially amend Chapter 444 and
thus opposed this bill.
There were three attempts to amend Chapter 444 in 1982.
The first of these, H-1196, "An Act Further Regulating the
Provisions for the Issuance of Commercial Lobster
Licenses," was submitted by MLA and attempted to make
Chapter 444 more exacting in several ways. There was
provision for prohibiting the leasing of licenses, and for
making it admissible as evidence in court that money had
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been paid to induce a permit holder into tranferring his
license. In the event that a commercial lobster license
was suspended or revoked, no other type of commercial
fishing license could be issued as a replacement.
Of the 80 new permits per year to be issued after 1981,
50 would go to applicants from the qualified portion of the
list and 30 would go to applicants from the unqualified
portion of the list. The criteria for qualification in the
inshore lobster fishery would be changed to 6 months as a
full time lobsterman or 12 months as a commercial fisherman
or a combination thereof, possession of a non-commercial
permit for over one year, and a commitment to participate
in the coastal lobster fishery.
Special additional licenses would also be given to
appl icants who had held a seasonal student permit for 4
consecutive years. Appeals of transfer or application
decisions would go to MFAC rather than to the commissioner
as called for in Chapter 444.
Finally, the transfer provision would be changed to
call for the existence of a partnership to be two years
before a license could be transfered. H-1196 was an
unsuccessful attempt to close some of the loopholes in the
new lobster license law, as well to make the law more
equitable.
The second bill to amend Chapter 444 was H-1197, "An
Act Further Regulating The Provisions for the Issuance of
Commercial Lobster Licenses," This was another attempt to
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make MFAC the arbiter of appeals for transfer and license
application disputes. Chapter 444 stated that all appeals
shall be addressed the the commissioner of the Department
of Fisheries Wildlife and Natural Resources. Making MFAC
the appeals body would have placed the Commission in the
same predicament regarding special additional licenses, as
it had been with hardship licenses under the moratorium.
Finally, H-2457, "An Act Relative to the Issuance of
Commercial Lobster Licenses," was an attempt to delete the
special additional provisions that pertained to documented
personal medical incapacity, or other unforseen
circumstances or Acts of God.
In 1983, the only bill filed with the legislature to
amend Chapter 444 was H-1158. This bill was a refile of H-
1196 from 1982. In 1984, H-1196 was again refiled as H-
369.
Two Senate bills were also filed in 1984. The first of
these, S-1277, called for the addition of a new paragraph
to Chapter 444 which would have compelled the DMF Director
to issue a commercial lobster license to any resident of
the Commonwealth who is a Vietnam Veteran. The second, S-
1278, would have compelled the DMF Director to issue a
commercial lobster permit to any person who had maintained
continuous residence in the Commonwealth since July 14,
1975. Both of these bills were re-filed, as S-1201 and S-
1202, respectively, in 1985. No legislation to amend
Chapter 444 was filed in 1986.
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In the fall of 1987, proposals to tighten the transfer
and special additional provisions of Chapter 444 were given
by DMF to CNRA. As of the end of 1987 the Division was
still waiting for these proposals to be filed as a bill.
In the meantime, the Director prepared to use his
administrative authority to freeze the total number of
commercial inshore lobster licenses at their 1987 level,
effective January 1, 1988.
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CHAPTER IV
THE POLITICAL HISTORY OF THE INSHORE LOBSTER FISHERY
LIMITED ENTRY PLAN
Introduction
This chapter places flesh on the bones described in
chapter III by providing motivation for the legislative
actions that were taken, and by recounting the evolution
leading to each action in terms of the major players
involved and concurrent events. As such, chapter IV is the
heart of this thesis for buried wi thin the following
description are the reasons why this limited entry program
has or has not lived up to the expectations placed upon it
by management and industry. In addition, buried within
this discourse lie many pUblic policy lessons for planners
of fisheries policy.
The information in this chapter comes from three
sources: 1) published federal and state documents 2)
unpublished reports and documents from the Division of
Marine Fisheries, the Marine Fisheries Advisory Commission,
the Massachusetts Lobstermen's Association and the
Massachusetts Legislature 3) interviews with legislators,
pOlicy makers and commercial lobster fishery
representatives who played a key role in the design,
implementation and administration of the limited entry law.
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Before 1975
Events leading to limited entry
Several events took place in the 14 years preceding
1975 that have bearing on the implementation of the lobster
license moratorium. The Marine Fisheries Advisory
Commission (MFAC) was formed by the Governor in 1960 to
serve as an advisory board to the Division of Marine
Fisheries in the formation of marine fisheries policy, and
to implement regulations and emergency actions. The MFAC
consisted of citizens who were knowledgeable of the
Commonwealth's marine fisheries. In 1969, the power of
MFAC to decide regulations and to override special acts of
the Governor was established by the then Attorney General.
This gave MFAC substantial power in the implementation of
marine fisheries regulations and the design of fisheries
policy. In practice, the Division of Marine Fisheries has
since served as advisor to the Commission, whose decisions
are final in the implementation of marine fisheries
regulations. Most of Massachusetts marine fisheries policy
has been designed and implemented since formation of the
MFAC. 1
During the 1960's, there were three lobstermen's
associations in Massachusetts. The South Shore
Lobstermen's Association, the Massachusetts Lobstermen's
Association and the Cape Ann Lobstermen's Association. Of
these three organizations, only one, the South Shore
Lobstermen's Association, enj oyed cordial relations with
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the Division of Marine Fisheries. In addition, the
Division considered the South Shore Lobstermen's
Association to be the most progressive of the three. 2
In the late 1960's, the Cape Ann Lobstermen's
Association folded and the Massachusetts Lobstermen's
Association was "infiltrated" by members of the South Shore
Lobstermen's Association. This action provided stimulus
for two events. First, the Massachusetts Lobstermen' s
Association (MLA) became a coast-wide organization with a
majority of the Commonwealth's lobstermen as members. This
meant that Massachusetts now had a lobstermen's
organization that truly represented the majority view of
Massachusetts lobstermen. Second, MLA became much more
friendly to DMF and DMF representatives regularly began to
attend MLA meetings. A close working relationship then
evolved between the two organizations, which exists to this
day.3
In 1968, a new DMF director, Frank Grice, was
appointed. Mr. Grice supported limited entry as a method
of marine fisheries management. His support for limited
entry was instrumental in the promulgation of the 1975
lobster license moratorium. 4
During the late 60's and early 70's there was a steady
rise in the amount of gear being used in the inshore
commercial lobster fishery. In addition, long-time
lobstermen who had traditionally done well enough to take
time off in the winter could no longer do so.
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Many were
forced to commence fishing year-round. Full time lobster
fishermen perceived that this increase in gear was coming
from an influx of new fishermen, and a large, and growing
number of part time lobster fishermen. The so-called full
time lobster fishermen believed that the industry's main
problem was the "part-timers."S
In late 1969, MLA attempted to reduce entry into the
lobster fishery by introducing legislation to increase
commercial inshore lobster license fees from 10 to 100
dollars. In the meantime, DMF worked with a special
legislative commission to look at the entire marine
fisheries licensing issue. One result of these efforts was
that the commercial inshore lobster license became the
highest priced marine fisheries license in the marine
fisheries when the marine fisheries licensing bill was
passed in 1970. 6
The next step taken by MLA in the early 70' s was to
attempt to restrict non-commercial lobstering by
prohibiting non-commercial fishing during the weekend. DMF
strongly opposed this action because of its policy that
pUblic right of access to the resource must be maintained.
The agency also attempted to get the commercial lobstermen
off the tack of complaining about family lobstermen. 7
All of these efforts were symptomatic of the larger
overall problem of increasing effort in the commercial
inshore lobster industry. Division lobster biologists
believed that part time and recreational lobstermen were
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not the primary problem, but rather that the
tremendousnumber of people fishing commercially, both full
and part time, was placing too much effort on the resource.
In addition, the number of traps being used was increasing
at an alarming rate. Both MLA and DMF realized that
something soon would have to be done to curb effort in the
inshore lobster fishery. DMF felt that something
specifically had to be done to reduce commercial effort. 8
The belief by Division administrators that effort
controls were necessary was intensified by reports from the
lobster committee for the Atlantic states Marine Fisheries
Commission which was then attempting to develop a state
federal lobster management plan. The committee declared
that the lobster resource was one of the most highly
exploited of all marine resources in the northeast, and
detailed the need to increase the minimum size of lobsters
to 3 1/2 inches on a regional basis. They also felt that
poor fishing practices, such as V-notching and mutilation,
had to be stopped. The committee concluded that a real
potential existed for a collapse of the lobster fishery.9
The Division agreed with this overall assessment for
they believed that lobsters were being fished at a knife
edge in that most lobsters were caught as soon as they
reached the legal minimum size. Indeed, some biologists
fel t that the only reason the resource had not yet
collapsed was because of the minimum size law combined with
a new regulation mandating the installation of escape vents
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in all lobster traps and protection of egg bearing
females. 10
However, this agreement on the nature of the problem
did not lead to immediate agreement on how to address
improving the condition of the Massachusetts lobster
resource. After some debate within the Division and the
MFAC, it was decided that the best way to approach the
problem was through a trap limitation program similar to
the trap tagging system then being implemented in the
Canadian Maritime Provinces. 11
MLA agreed with the need for gear reductions, but
expressed stro~g concern about newcomers to the lobster
fishery taking up the slack created by fishermen reducing
their effort. As a result, MLA decided to go along with
trap limitations only if the state reciprocated by limiting
the number of fishermen in the industry, specifically,
through a license limitation program. DMF agreed that
license limitation was appropriate to mitigate entry along
with reducing the number of traps. They proposed that a
joint DMF, MLA committee be formed to address the issue of
limiting entry into the fishery and then reducing the
amount of gear that could be fished. The formation of this
committee in 1974 was the start of the real thrust to get
limi ted entry legislation for the inshore commercial
lobster fishery.12
Note that, already, the emphasis had shifted from
reducing effort first and then limiting entry, to limiting
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entry first and then considering effort limitations. Part
of the reason for this was a lack of agreement among
lobstermen about how to equitably reduce the number of
traps fished on a state-wide basis. 'The problem was simple
to define. Massachusetts' 1500 mile coast is divided into
five inshore lobstering regions: Cape Ann, Boston Harbor,
Cape Cod Bay, the lower Cape and Buzzards Bay. Each of
these regions is distinct from the others in terms of the
method employed in lobstering, and the number of traps
used. This difference in the number of traps used
regionally, coupled with concerns by industry and
management about the enforceability of trap limitations
precluded consensus on how to go about reducing the overall
number of traps.
These issues left the Massachusetts Legislature with an
interesting problem when they began to consider ways to
protect the lobster resource. On the one hand, they were
receiving considerable pressure from MLA to reduce effort
by limiting the number of fishermen. On the other hand,
DMF had legitimate concerns to protect the lobster fishery
and the resource itself. It was also clear that to do
nothing was a mistake. A minimum legal size increase was
not a viable option without interstate cooperation
(something that would not be forthcoming), landing taxes
were out of the question, and there was no way to gain
consensus by the lobster fishermen on how to go about
limiting gear. As a result, license limitations became the
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only politically viable option open to the legislature in
early 1975. They concluded that it was easier to limit
licenses than to limit gear, and more politically feasible
to limit licenses than to increase the minimum size. 13
1975
A new licensing system
Al though the proposal to placing a moratorium on
licenses was agreed to by both industry and DMF, at least
until a better system could be devised, the actual lobster
moratorium bill "evolved as a compromise between a
perennial bill filed by MLA seeking to limit the number of
permits to 1,000, and a bill filed by DMF to increase the
Director's power to include authority to limit effort in a
fishery. ,,14
As a result, the license moratorium bill designed by
the Committee on Natural Resources and AgricUlture (CNRA) ,
and was filed by them as H-5677. with joint industry and
management support. Once the bill was in the legislature,
the process under which it was passed was e)Ctraordinary.
Never, before or since, had state fisheries managers seen a
bill go through the legislature so fast. There are three
likely reasons for this. First, as mentioned above, the
least offensive of the available options to improve
management of the lobster resource was some form of license
limitation system. Second, partly because of this and
partly due to the lobbying efforts of MLA, coastal
legislators united in support of the bill. Third, the
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House ot Representatives majority whip, Robert (Bitt)
MacLain, of New Bedford, had a powerful influence on the
legislature. This meant that once the bill gained his
support, the non-coastal legislators readily went along. 15
The Legislature also perceived that something had to be
done to protect the lobster resource despite the likelihood
that this particular action would not achieve that goal.
As is evidenced by the phrase, "endangered food species",
in the preamble to Chapter 484, the legislature thought
that the American lobster, Homarus americanus, was an
endangered species. Therefore, H-5677 was passed primarily
because the legislature believed they had to start
somewhere. However, it was hoped that the continued
economic plight of the commercial inshore lobster fishermen
would make them realize that they must eventually make some
compromises to arrive at a trap limit. 16
Additions to H-5677
Even with the limited benefits forecast by the
legislature with passage of this bill, three maj or
additions were made to it. The first of these was the
inclusion of a study into the design of a more permanent
limited entry system, complete with trap limits, to be
undertaken over the first year after passage. This
provision was added partly because of information provided
in a booklet by Francis X. Cameron of the University of
Rhode Island Marine Affairs Program entitled ConstitutiDnal
Impediments to Limited Entry Fisheries Legislation.
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Legislation. Cameron indicated that arbitrary passage of a
license moratorium without a study of more permanent ways
of managing entry would be unconstitutional. The study was
therefore added primarily to protect the law from court
challenges. Including the phrase "endangered food species"
in the preamble of Chapter 484 may also have served this
purpose. 17
The second major addition to the legislation was the
hardship and transfer provisions, which were designed to
allow some entry under the moratorium. The hardship
provision allowed people who could prove dependency on the
lobster fishery as their only source of income to obtain
licenses. This provision added 130, or 10%, additional
licenses to the cap of 1300 per year and placed
responsibility for approval of these licenses on MFAC. In
addition, if the Director decided to turn down a hardship
license application, appeals could be made to MFAC whose
decision would be final. No set of criteria for making
jUdgements on hardship applications was included in the
legislation. The transfer provision allowed transfers
among individuals, partnerships or corporations if the DMF
Director deemed such transfers in the pUblic interest. As
we shall see, these provisions caused fits at both DMF and
MFAC, and became the single most contentious, time
consuming, arbitrary and laborious aspect of this piece of
legislation. 18
The third addition to the bill was the number of
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licenses to be issued every year. While it was clear that
some cap must be achieved with the license moratorium, the
actual cap of 1300 licenses per year was derived as a
matter of political expediency. No legislator at that
time, regardless of where he was from, was going to take
licenses away from existing fishermen, which is what MIA
wanted them to do. As a result, the 1300 license maximum
was formulated by taking the 35-45 applications that were
being received each year and adding that number to the
total number of licenses issued in 1974. Since that number
was just under 1300, the cap was rounded off to 1300
licenses per year. 19
with these provisions incorporated into the bill, H-
5677 was by both the House and Senate in July 1975, and
enacted by the Governor as Chapter 484 of the Acts of 1975.
A request for position on enacted legislation was sent to
DMF Director Grice by the Governor's Legislative Office in
early July, and some of his comments provide insight as to
the DMF view of this legislation. In providing a summary
of the bill, Grice stated that "the general purpose of the
bill is to begin to regulate the rapidly expanding coastal
lobster fishery so as to protect the lobster resource and
reduce the excessive number of traps now being employed to
harvest this limited resource." When asked what the
positive and negative effects of this bill would be, Grice
replied: "This bill would start the process of limiting
entry into this over-capitalized and over-exploited fishery
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and therefore lead to better resource management. On the
negative side, the bill could preclude new opportunities to
those who might wish to fish commercially for lobsters in
our coastal waters.,,20
The Director was then asked whether the bill should be
enacted in its present form. To this he replied: "The bill
should be enacted in its present form. Timing is critical
in this instance since the Division has already issued
close to the maximum number of permits listed in the bill."
Finally, when asked how important this bill was relative to
other bills the Division had filed that year, Grice
replied: "This is the most important piece of legislation
for this session.,,21
It is clear from these comments, that the Division
considered this bill a first step in improving management
of the inshore lobster resource. The moratorium was to
start the process of both limiting entry into the fishery
and reducing the number of traps employed by the fishery.
In fact, the Division felt so strongly of the need for
effort controls that it did not believe a license
limitation scheme could be maintained unless it led to trap
limitations. DMF also believed that the moratorium would
geartowardsworktoincentivegive MLA added
limitations. 22
Once H-5677 was implemented as Chapter 484, on July 14,
1975, a major problem immediately arose. The commercial
lobster fishery raised a row because no grandfathering
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provision had been incorporated into the law. As was
discussed in Chapter 3, a new bill was submitted and passed
by the legislature in late 1975 that added this provision
plus the so-called "must fish" provision prior to the 1976
licensing season. (See Appendix A, Chapter 729)
1976 - 1979
The change in demand for licenses
During the last three days before the end of the
license renewal period in 1976, over 200 licenses were
passed out, on a first-come, first-served basis, to bring
the total number of licenses issued to 1300. During the
renewal period in 1977, 201 licenses were issued in two
days, primarily because of inclement weather. In 1978,
there was chaos at the Sal tonstall Building with the
license line forming the night before they were to be
passed out, and crowds being kept by the police in the
second floor lobby while small groups at a time were
allowed up to the 19th floor DMF offices. Over 400 people
appeared for the 154 licenses available that year. In
1979, DMF was forced to go to a lottery system and received
1041 applications for 48 available licenses. As each year
went by, more and more people wanted licenses while fewer
licenses became available. The demand for lobster licenses
was clearly increasing, and fishermen were ceasing to
retire their licenses. 23
In addition to increasing numbers of people interested
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in obtaining licenses, DMF officials noticed that the
character of people changed each year. In the first year,
most of the available licenses went to fishermen (from
other fisheries) who straggled in to renew their licenses
and picked up a lobster license when they were informed of
their availability. These people then passed the word on
to their associates, and so the available licenses went.
By 1977, the word was out, and three piece suits mixed in
with the fishermen waiting in line indicated that
speculators were also interested in lobster licenses. 24
By 1978, it was clear that the licenses were accruing
value as evidenced by drastic increase in demand and very
few licenses being retired. The reason for this value
being placed on licenses was because licenses could be
transfered, although sUbj ect to the approval of the
Director. It was believed that some license holders were
selling $5000 boats and gear for as much as $15000 with
license. Neither this increase in demand for licenses, nor
the subsequent accrual of value to licenses through the
transfer loophole was anticipated by MIA or by the DMF
staff. 25
The Chapter 484 hardship provision
A second problem with the lobster license moratorium
was the matter of adjudicating hardship applications.
Chapter 484 was interpreted in a very literal sense during
the last year and a half of Frank Grice's tenure as DMF
Director. As a result, during 1975 and 1976, hardship
103
applications were dealt with by MFAC on a case by case
basis. At that time, each applicant's name was known by
MFAC members, and with no criteria to follow, the
proceedings became very subjective. For example, the
Advisory Commission had to decide who should and who should
not be considered a hardship case, and learn to decide when
people were telling the truth and when they were lying, all
on a case by case basis. 26
In addition, the hardship process began to demand an
increasing amount of MFAC business meeting time because
individual hardship applications often took over an hour to
decide. DMF estimated that over 80% of the· Commission's
time in 1976 and 1977 was spent deciding upon hardship
applications. 27
Not long after Allen Peterson became the new DMF
Director in July of 1976, he told the MFAC to design a set
of criteria against which hardship applications could be
jUdged. This was done because the hardship system was
becoming a nightmare for everyone involved. Not only were
huge amounts of MFAC and Division staff time being taken up
by hardship applications, but both DMF and MFAC were facing
increasing allegations that the distribution of hardship
licenses was a political process. The hardship aspect of
the lobster license moratorium thus became politically
controversial. Indeed, members of the legislature place
great pressure on the Division to get hardship licenses for
constituents who were ineligible to get a license. 28
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In addition to this, when new hardship criteria were
implemented, it became apparent that there were always
extenuating circumstances. MFAC reacted to this by
attempting to add methods to address extenuating
circumstances into the hardship criteria. As a result, the
hardship criteria evolved over time. 29
Another concern of Peterson's was that of conflict of
interest by MFAC members in deciding hardship applications.
First, he became anxious about Commission members knowing
the names of applicants prior to deciding on whether or not
they should receive hardship licenses. This resulted in
the names of applicants being deleted from applications so
that circumstances rather than personalities dictated the
distribution of licenses. Second, the Director felt that
conflict of interest may exist when MFAC members who were
in the lobster industry voted on hardship applications. As
a result, the two lobster industry representatives on the
Commission were told not to vote on hardship
applications. 30
In the meantime, Director Peterson became frustrated
with the amount of time the Commission was spending on
hardship applications and appeals. Peterson realized that
the inordinate amount of time being spent on hardships was
undermining the purpose of the Commission and would
eventually destroy that body. He therefore attempted to
expedite the process by establishing categories of
hardships and having the Commission approve them in blocks.
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The Director would then come to Commission meetings with
his hardship recommendations, and the Commission would
essentially rubber stamp the Director's recommendations.
As a result, the Director took a much stronger role in the
hardship decision process thus freeing the Commission to
perform its other functions. The Commission thereafter
only became involved in the initial decision process when
there were hardship applications that the Director could
not decide upon. This process did succeed in reducing the
work load at MFAC meetings leaving more time for matters
other than lobster license hardship applications and
appeals. 31
In pursuit of the elusive effort controls
According to one legislator, the study to develop a
more permanent system for the issuance of permits and the
development of a gear limitation program was added to
Chapter 484 for three reasons. First, to determine the
overall effect of the 1300 license limit on the commercial
for the moratorium.
inshore lobster fishery.
of continued support
Second, to determine the degree
Third, as
mentioned earlier, to address the u.S. Supreme Court edict
that license moratoriums are constitutional so long as a
concurrent study is taking place to figure out ways of
preserving an endangered fishery.32
In any case, MLA and DMF took the study seriously for
both organizations had agreed, in late 1975 and early 1976,
that a permanent limited entry system with gear limitations
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was essential for the continued vitality of the inshore
lobster fishery; that the moratorium, taken alone, was
inadequate to conserve the resource. 33
In the summer of 1976, questionnaires were distributed
to coastal lobstermen, and a series of public meetings were
held to hammer out a I imited entry program with a trap
limitation scheme. During this period, MIA and DMF were
able to generate a great deal of support for the overall
concept of trap limitations for full-time commercial
lobstermen. The idea was if all concerned could settle on
a reasonable trap limit initially, say 400 traps, then each
fisherman's total number of traps could be reduced by 10%
per year t the point where there were enough traps for the
perceived size of the resource. 34
One issue that came up during these meetings was the
matter of part-time fishermen. Full-time lobstermen
believed that effort could be reduced also by limiting the
number of part-timers. They proposed that the total number
of part-timers be reduced to 50, and then reduce them
further by a percentage each year, much in the same way as
traps were to be reduced.
DMF responded negatively to this proposal for two
reasons. First, they believed that elimination of part-
time fishermen from the inshore commercial fishery was not
sociologically or politically justifiable. Second,
reducing or eliminating part-timers raised the specter of
defining part-time versus full-time lobster fishermen. It
107
should be noted that DMF considered the commercial inshore
lobster fishery a part-time fishery because such a large
percentage of commercial lobstermen had some additional
source of income. 35
'l'he two maj or sticking points of the trap reduction
scheme were how to equitably conduct the reduction of traps
on a regional basis, and how to enforce a trap limitation.
The former problem was a maj or bone of contention to the
Boston lobster fishery because they were already fishing 4-
600 traps, far more than in any other region, and therefore
stood to lose the most with the scheme. As a result,
although agreement was reached on the process of reducing
traps by most coastal lobstermen, there was no way that
anyone was able to get the Boston fishermen to agree. This
group was adamant about realizing their own needs despite
the pressure applied to them by other coastal fishermen.
The Boston fishery could not justify immediate initial
reductions from 600 to 400 traps.36
This problem was addressed by a proposal to initially
limit the number of traps statewide to 400, or the average
number of traps a lobsterman had fished in the last three
years. Therefore, if one could prove that he had fished an
average of over 400 traps in the preceding three years, he
could then start at this average and reduce the number by a
percentage each year. Many Boston lobstermen felt that
this might work. 3?
The latter problem was how to enforce a trap limit. In
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was achieved. Trap tags would be required for all traps,
and a closed season would be imposed for all but class A
permit holders. Agency hearings would be used to determine
violations of lobster laws, and suspension or revocation of
fishing privileges would be used for punishment. 40
DMF hoped that this proposal would serve as basis for
discussion at the pUblic meetings and that a variation on
its theme would be incorporated into their report to the
Legislature which was due in December, 1976. DMF conceded
that if agreement on the type of system to be used could
not be reached, the December report would not recommend any
drastic changes to the law. Unfortunately, the latter case
is what occurred, so the December report to the Legislature
indeed recommended a continuation of the present system. 41
This is where the issue of effort controls was left
when Frank Grice left the Division in late 1976. In fact,
this is where the issue of effort controls was left until
1979, when revisions to the lobster moratorium were first
considered. The lack of further attempts to implement
effort restrictions between 1976 and 1979 appears to have
occurred for two reasons: time constraints placed on DMF
and MFAC because of the hardship process, and philosophical
changes in the Division. In the former case, so much time
and emphasis was demanded of MFAC and DMF in determining
hardship application and appeals cases, that it was the
only aspect of the moratorium either organization had the
resources to deal with. In particular, the hardship
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provision of Chapter 484 was forced into priority status
over other provisions because of the sheer numbers of
hardship cases. Other provisions of the law were relegated
to secondary status, at least, until Director Peterson
commenced the block method of determining hardship
applications in 1978. 42
The philosophical change occurred with the Division
when Frank Grice was replaced as DMF Director by his
Assistant Director for Recreational Fisheries, Allan
Peterson. Allan Peterson was philosophically opposed to
limited entry on the basis of the inequities such systems
created for the user groups involved. However, despite his
own misgivings about limited entry, Mr. Peterson did his
best to implement the moratorium, and always felt that the
problems with the law were more in implementing it rather
than problems with limited entry itself. Although it can
be argued that the hardship situation precluded serious
further consideration of effort limitations, there are
those who believe they would have been pursued had Peterson
been of a different philosophical bent. In any case, effort
limitations were not pursued during Allen Peterson's tenure
as DMF Director. 43
With no constraints on effort, the number of traps
being used in the lobster fishery continued to grow during
the late 1970's. That is, those who were left in the
fishery increased their effort by increasing the amount of
gear they were fishing. In addition, because of the
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hardship provision, this was not a true moratorium on the
issuance of licenses. The rate of increase of licenses had
been reduced, but the number of fishermen, and additional
gear associated with those fishermen, continued to mount. 44
There was also another reason for this gear increase.
Chapter 729 gave the DMF Director power to give priority in
issuing licenses to applicants who had held permits and
fished during the preceeding year. This meant that the
grandfather clause was qualified by a potential fishing
requirement (subject to the Directors discretion). As a
result, the perception grew among fishermen that a certain
number of pounds of lobster had to be caught to retain a
commercial inshore lobster permit. This resulted in actual
increases in effort and false catch reporting, where people
exaggerated their effort. 45
Matters were made even worse when the Division began to
audi t catch reports in in 1977 to improve the overall
accuracy of statistical information on the lobster fishery.
Many fishermen, incorrectly interpreting the meaning of the
term "audit", thought that the catch report audits had
something to do with the U. S. Internal Revenue Service.
This resulted in many of the more successful fishermen
under-reporting their catch in order to minimize their tax
burden. The so-called "must fish" provision and the catch
report audits thus compounded the unreliability of the
catch report system because marginal fishermen over-
reported their catch in order to retain their commercial
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licenses, and successful fishermen under-reported their
catch for fear of the IRS. 46
Simultaneous issues
In 1976, the Magnuson Fishery Conservation and
Management Act was passed by the Federal Government, and a
new 200 mile limit law thus was implemented. Besides
reducing the number of foreign ships fishing off u.s.
shores, the Act caused a tremendous resurgence in interest
in fishing by u.S. citizens. People became interested in
fishing because of the increased availability of federal
capital for building boats and outfitting fishing
operations. They also realized that competition for
offshore fisheries resources had been substantially
reduced. This favorable environment prompted people to
obtain commercial licenses, and the most accessible means
of fishing was lobstering since it was a coastal fishery
that required less capital and less past experience than
the offshore fisheries. This situation caused a second
increase in demand for lobster licenses, the first having
been created by the license transfer provision, thus
placing a great deal of added pressure on the system.
Newcomers could only get licenses through the hardship
process, and only a small number of hardship licenses were
distributed by MFAC each year. 47
This resulted in an increase in the number of
complaints being received by the State. People who were
unable to get permits were very unhappy with the moratorium
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and voiced their complaints in no uncertain terms, with
many would be lobstermen stating that the system was
inherently unfair and, perhaps, even fixed. By early 1979,
the State was receiving complaints also by existing
commercial lobstermen who were concerned that they would
not be able to transfer their licenses to their children.
other fishermen, who had traditionally fished in several
fisheries but who had let their lobster licenses lapse,
also complained about the system's lack of fairness. In
addition, the moratorium was only supposed to have been in
place for a year or two while a more permanent licensing
system was designed. Many people began asking why the
moratorium continued in 1979 when it was supposed to have
been replaced by 1977. 48
The system was also stressed by enforcement problems.
It seems that people unable to get inshore licenses were
issued offshore lobster licenses (which were not limited)
and fished inside. Also, during the life of the moratorium
(1975-1980) the number of inshore commercial permits
increased by 3% while the number of recreational 10-pot
permits increased by over 50%. Recreational licenses may
therefore have been used by part time commercial fishermen
who sold their catch illegally or fished more than 10
pots. 49
The Legislature was very concerned about this public
discontent, and was particularly concerned about the length
of time the moratorium and study had been in place without
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any proposals for a more permanent system. They felt that
if the study and moratorium continued beyond five years,
the likelihood of successful challenges to the
constitutionality of the law would increase dramatically.
In fact, a constitutional challenge to the moratorium had
already taken place in 1978 with the court ruling against
the plaintiff. The legislative perception in early 1979
was that the inshore lobster fishery was in as bad shape as
it had been in 1974, and that the time was ripe for a
change. In addition, the sUbject of limited entry was a
political hot potato because many members were adamantly
opposed to any form of limited entry. These legislators
felt that licenses should be issued to anyone who wanted to
enter the fishery, and then the market place should
determine success and failure. Coastal legislators
therefore approached MLA telling them to do something about
effort controls, and applied pressure to DMF to design a
more permanent system. 50
As a result of this growing unrest by both
permitholders and non permit holders, combined with
administrative problems with the hardship provision, and
compounded by enforcement problems, legislative pressure on
DMF to change the system intensified in late 1978 and early
1979. As a result, one of the most pressing items on the
agenda was to overhaul the inshore commercial lobster
licensing system when Phil Coates became DMF Director in
July of that year. 51
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1979 - 1980
The need for new legislation
A document written by the DMF staff to the Committee on
Natural Resources and Agriculture in March, 1979, entitled
"Review of the Lobster License Moratorium" summarized the
Division experience and assessment of the lobster license
moratorium. The document commenced with a statement that
the moratorium had largely failed to accomplish its primary
goals to "establish an equitable system which provided
economic relief while further protecting and enhancing the
resource.", and went on to say "Despite concerted efforts
by Division personnel, organized lobstermen, and members of
the legislature a more comprehensive system has not been
developed, and the moratorium has persisted for nearly four
years.,,52
From an administrative standpoint, the report concluded
that the Act was "unwieldy and time-consuming," that the
"requirement that the individual applying for renewal must
have 'fished' has further complicated the process" because
of the increased tendency to falsify catch reports, and
that there was a substantial increase in demand for lobster
licenses. The document went on to relate how the lack of
criteria in the legislation for either the transfer
provision, or the hardship provision further confounded the
process. 53
From an economic standpoint, the Division concluded
that the moratorium had "failed largely because it limits
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only the number of fishermen, not actual effort in the
fishery, and ignores the factors which determine the level
of exploitation, including stock abundance, ex-vessel
prices, and harvesting costs." The economic assessment
went on to say that effort in the fishery had continued to
increase despite the moratorium. To illustrate this, the
average number of pots fished in the four years preceding
the moratorium (1970-1974) was compared with the average
number of pots fished in the four years after the
moratorium (1975-1978). It was determined from this that
the number of pots fished had increased 46%, and the
reported catch had increased 52%. The report added that
the main economic impact of the moratorium had been to
"change the pattern of income distribution, without
increasing the amount of benefits from the fishery.,,54
The report concluded that it was difficult to determine
whether increases in effort in the fishery had been slowed,
as was the original intent of the moratorium, or if the
large numbers of people who were not allowed licenses (4-
500 individuals in 1979) would not have been interested in
a lobster license in the first place had there been no
moratorium. In this regard, the report stated "it must be
recognized that the phenomena of limited entry itself has
artificially increased the desire of people to enter the
fishery. If there were no limited entry, it is probable
that there would not be such an intense intent in obtaining
a license.,,55
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The report stated that, although the moratorium had not
fulfilled any of the original goals anticipated by both the
Division and industry, it was clear that complete
elimination of limited entry would cause severe economic
disruption. For this reason, the Division concluded with:
"We emphasize that the current moratorium and any
legislation that would perpetuate a more restrictive
moratorium must be rigorously examined by all concerned
parties and that a more equitable system must be developed
as rapidly as possible." It is therefore evident that the
Division also realized, in early 1979, that the time had
come for new legislation, and this summary document was
used as the foundation upon which the new legislation would
rest. 56
House 3345
The document "Review of Lobster License Moratorium" was
written to the committee on Natural Resources and
Agriculture (CNRA) in response to House bill 3345, An Act
Providing for a More Limited Distribution of Commercial
Lobster Permits which was prepared and submitted by MLA.
In the cover letter to the document, Allen Peterson stated
that "We are greatly concerned about . . this proposed
legislation since, in our opinion, it perpetuates a
licensing scheme that has clearly fallen short of hoped-for
goals to achieve stability in the lobster industry, and
affords some control of effort in the fishery.1I57
On the other hand, H-3345 was considered the most
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important piece of pending legislation on the lobster
licensing issue by MIA. MIA felt strongly that economic
stabilization in the lobster fishery should be accompanied
by reduction of pressure on the lobster stocks. However,
they were concerned about the Canadian realization that a
mistake had been made, in the Maritime Provinces lobster
limited entry program, by first limiting effort through
gear restrictions and then limiting entry. The Canadian
advice was to stabilize entry first, and then seek measures
to reduce effort. H-3345 was designed to do this by
reducing the number of licenses renewed by a percentage
each year until a goal of 1000 licenses was achieved. 58
In a document supporting H-3345 for CNRA hearings
scheduled for March 20th, MIA itself advised that entry
into the lobster fishery be further restricted, that the
moratorium not be lifted as this would result in a
"horrendous situation", and that this legislation could
serve as an interim conservation measure until an increase
in the minimum legal size of female lobsters was achieved
on a regional basis. MIA concluded their statement with
the suggestion that trap limits be discussed within the
framework of H-3345. Unfortunately for MIA, CNRA took the
Division's advice and tabled H-3345 after its hearings on
March 20. 59
H-6352, The two-tier licensing system
The first action the Division took in 1979 to replace
the moratorium was to dust off Frank Grice's two-tier
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licensing system which had been developed in 1975-1976.
This system was then brought up to date by using other
systems, such as Alaska's. The Division viewpoint, as
expressed to the Commissioner of the Department of
Fisheries, Wildlife and Recreational Vehicles in early
April, was that: "if we must have limited entry, the two
class or two tiered system still looks like the most
equitable way to provide access to the lobster fishery for
part-timers and still provide restricted entry and thus
protection for fishermen with a substantial commitment to
the lobster fishery.,,60
The two-tier system was then brought to pUblic meetings
where it was severely criticized by part-time lobstermen
who felt discriminated against by the legislation. In
addition, seasonal full time fishermen objected because
classification as a class B fisherman forced them to fish a
limited number of traps regardless of their past catch.
These fishermen were very concernedbecause they fished
intensely, and no matter how one cut the legislation, they
would no longer be able to fish intensely.61
Nevertheless, H-6352 was filed by Representative
MacLain, in May, despite his own misgivings about the
potential effects a two-tiered system would have on the
lobster industry • MacLain filed the bill to help the
Division in its efforts to replace the moratorium, and to
induce action on the moratorium by the legislature and MLA.
This latter case is an illustration of legislators filing
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legislation to make a point or to induce action. 62
It was because of this action that a falling out
occurred between Biff MacLain and the Executive Director of
MLA, Bob Barlow. Apparently, Barlow and MacLain discussed
the two-tier system and Barlow deferred judgement on this
approach until he could obtain a vote from the MLA
delegates. However, MacLain was left with the impression
that Barlow supported the two-tier approach and that MIA
would also proffer its support, and was livid when Barlow
returned with a negative vote from the MLA delegates.
MacLain felt that Barlow had double-crossed him. The
initial result of this was that the legislature gave MIA an
ultimatum that either the lobstermen accept the two-tier
system, or they would repeal the moratorium. According to
some observers, the latter result of this was that Bob
Barlow lost his seat on MFAC for three years. 63
In the meantime, in late May, one of the most
significant changes in direction of this whole process took
place at a public meeting on the two-tier system in
Plymouth. During heated debate on the two-tier system, a
lobsterman suggested replacing the entire limited entry
system with a yearly increase in the number of licenses
issued based on the perceived rate of lobster license
attr i tion. In this way, current lobstermen would be
protected from being classified part-time versus fUll-time,
and those interested in obtaining licenses would be placed
on a list by lottery. MLA looked at this as a continuation
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of limited entry since the number of new entrants would
base itself on the attrition rate. On the other hand, DMF
saw this as a phase-out of the moratorium, and estimated
that the lobster fishery would eventually return to free
entry. 64
The problem with the new phase-out approach was that H-
6352 had already been filed for DMF by aiff MacLain. Now
DMF had turned against the two-tier system. At the CNRA
public hearing on H-6352, Biff MacLain spoke in favor of
the two-tier system, while both DMF and MLA spoke against
it. MacLain now fel t deceived by both DMF and MLA. In
fact, DMF submitted a redraft of H-6352 to CNRA prior to
this hearing calling for a phase-out of the present
moratorium. This hearing resulted in H-6426 which ordered
that H-6352 go into a study, thus killing the two-tier
proposal. Also, recommendations for new legislation were
made, allowing for the development of a moratorium phase-
out. 65
The remainder of 1979 was spent by CNRA, MLA and DMF,
developing the new phase-out approach. Great emphasis was
placed on the development of new legislation because of the
continued perception, by industry and the Division, that
lack of appropriate sUbstitute legislation would result in
the moratorium simply being repealed. DMF therefore
strongly supported H-6426, which became the initial draft
of the phase-out legislation.
However, this does not mean that development of the
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phase-out approach lacked controversy. For example, in
August MIA wrote the Chairman of CNRA expressing extreme
concern for a paragraph that had been added to the
legislation, which would allow permits to be transfered
between any individual, partnership, or corporation. In
MIA's view, this provision would destroy the intent of the
phase-out because no permits would be retired, value would
be added to permits, speculation would be encouraged, and
large corporations could conceivably buy up permits. CNRA
allayed MIA's concerns and deleted the paragraph from the
legislation, albeit temporarily.66
Also, in November, the new DMF Director, Phil Coates,
wrote the Division legal counsel asking him to draft new
legislation based on a compromise, acceptable to all
parties concerned, that had just been hammered out. This
compromise was submitted as H-5211 in 1980. In the
meantime, the moratorium continued for the 1980 license
renewal period. 67
Chapter 444 of the Acts of 1980
1980 commenced with CNRA hearings relative to H-2077,
which was the compromise phase-out bill, mentioned above,
that was late-filed with the legislature by DMF in
November, 1979. This bill called for the issuance of 150
new licenses in 1980 and restricted license transfer to
members of immediate families, sUbject to the approval of
the Director. In February, 1980, the Division gave H-2077
an adverse report because it was already working on a new
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draft of the phase-out legislation; H-5211.
H-5211 was filed with the legislature by Biff MacLain
in January, 1979, and went before pUblic hearing with CNRA
in April, 1980. H-5211 called for the issuance of 130 new
permits in 1980, and 100 new permits in every year
thereafter. This legislation would allow permits to be
transfered, sUbj ect to the approval of the Director,
between members of the immediate family, and between
members of partnerships or corporations when such
partnerships or corporations were dissolved.
H-5211 was supported by MLA, which, at this time
expressed the belief that the bill had a greater chance of
passage if it contained a hardship provision. 68 CNRA
reviewed both H-5211 and H-2077 together and, as near as
can be determined from the draft bills of H-5211 and H-
5211/2077, the final version of the transfer provision was
added in late April. In addition, the number of new
licenses to be allowed was reduced to 100 during 1980, and
80 thereafter. Also, a hardship provision was added to the
bill in late April that allowed the Director to issue up to
30 additional permits in 1980, and 20 additional permits
thereafter to so-called "special additional" applicants.
This final draft of the phase-out legislation was filed as
H-6544 in late May, 1980. Shortly thereafter, it was
passed by the Legislature, and on July 10, 1980, was signed
into law as Chapter 444 of the Acts of 1980.
The reason time was spent in reviewing the evolution of
124
the transfer and hardship provisions of Chapter 444 is that
these two provisions, especially the transfer provision,
have since caused the greatest controversy with the law.
All of the people interviewed, in industry, the legislature
and DMF, related the surprise and consternation expressed
by DMF and MLA that the transfer provision had been added
at the last minute, presumably by a disgruntled legislator,
wi thout the prior knOWledge of either organization.
However, the record shows that the transfer provision, in
its final form, was on drafts of the bill a month before it
was filed with the legislature.
It appears that either DMF and MLA did not review the
bill in late April, which is highly unlikely since the
draft copies of the legislation reviewed by the author were
DMF copies, or the ramifications of the transfer provision
simply were not anticipated. It is likely that the latter
case is true, and this is supported by an analysis of
Chapter 444, written by the DMF General Counsel, David
Hoover, on July 31. In this document, Hoover merely
describes the transfer provision. No comments are offered
on its possible effects on the limited entry law. In any
case, the transfer provision, first, and later the special
additional provision caused a great deal of difficulty in
administering the new limited entry law. 69
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1980 - 1987
The first year
The original phase-out bill, as envisioned by DMF, was
a bare bones increase in the numbers of licenses each year,
itwas hoped, with an equivalent reduction in the number of
licenses through attrition. There was provision only for
transfers among family members, or upon termination of a
partnership or corporation. 70 What emerged from the
legislature in July, 1980 was quite different. First,
there was a provision for hardship cases, the so-called
"special additional" clause, second, rather than carrying
over the transfer provision of the moratorium, a formal
transfer process was included and third, a provision was
added to address experienced versus inexperienced
lobstermen for the list licenses issued each year.
At the time of the bill's signing, DMF had just
finished issuing the last group of licenses under the
moratorium. Now they had a new law to work with, and
therefore met to set up applications for experienced and
inexperienced license applicants. Since applicants
placement on the list was to be determined by lottery, a
drawing was held in the large second floor lobby of the
Saltonstall State Office building. At this drawing, a list
of approximately 500 experienced applicants followed by 600
inexperienced applicants was drawn up. The list was then,
as required by law, time stamped, registered and published
by the Secretary of Commerce, and distributed to all
126
coastal communities, harbor masters and town governments.
This process made the list pUblic, and therefore immune to
tampering.?l
The role of the Advisory Commission was also changed by
the law, for now they were only required to devise criteria
on issuance of special additional licenses; what came to be
termed "super hardships" by MFAC and DMF. Decisions on
hardship cases were left to the DMF Director. 72
DMF then went about the business of administering the
law, planning to issue 100 licenses off the list and 30
special additionals during the first year (Section 2 of
Chapter 444 took effect on December 1, 1980), and issuing
80 list licenses and 20 special additional licenses for
each year thereafter. However, a language interpretation
problem with this provision induced the need for an
immediate change. The Chapter 444 special additional
provision read: "The director may issue up to 30 permits in
1981, and 20 additional permits for each year thereafter."
Literal translation of the word "additional" dictated that
from 1982 on, 50 special additional licenses be issued; 30
plus 20. This was not the intent of the law, so corrective
legislation deleting the word "additional" from the special
additional provision was passed as Chapter 769, of the Acts
of 1981.
Another problem was with the provision stating that
appeals for special additional decisions made by the
Director could be taken to the Commissioner of the
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Department of Fish, Wildlife and Environmental Law
Enforcement. This raised Division concern, that the
Commissioner would use the hardship appeals process as an
avenue to gain political favor, thus destroying the system
through political wheeling and dealing. Phil Coates
responded to this situation by approaching then
Commissioner steven Chmura, 120 hardship applications in
hand for the 30 available in 1981, and telling him that DMF
and MFAC were going to circumvent the appeals provision by
reviewing hardship applications and issuing licenses all in
one day. As a result, no one would be able to appeal. On
the other hand, if only a few of the thirty available
hardship licenses were issued, Chmura would receive an
avalanche of hardship appeals. Chmura weighed the
potential benefits of the provision against the cons of
having a series of heated appeals hearings and decided to
go along with this process. The hardship process has been
conducted in this way ever since. 73
The experience requirement
As mentioned earlier, DMF did not anticipate the
addition of the experience provision. However, when
confronted with it, DMF reacted by following through with
its administration. It took 6 years for the 500 people on
the experienced list to be offered licenses. 1987 was the
first year that licenses were offered to applicants off the
original inexperienced list, provided they had received the
required experience prior to their name coming up.74
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On the other hand, MLA was furious with the addition of
this provision because of the high potential for abuse.
For example, all one needed to obtain experience were false
affidavits. The MLA assessment of this provision was that
it did nothing to improve the character of the fishery or
reduce entry into the fishery, and therefore was a waste of
time and money. MLA believed that the provision came about
as a watering down of a proposal to provide an
apprenticeship clause whereby potential lobstermen would
have to go through schooling and pass a test to obtain a
lobster permit. 75
The transfer provision
The one aspect of Chapter 444 that was the most fraught
with misunderstanding was the transfer provision. It seems
that no one wanted this provision except the Legislature.
However, the Legislature wanted this provision very much.
To many legislators, operation in a free enterprise society
required the ability to transfer licenses. One senator put
it this way. If a lobster fisherman has $40,000 in gear,
and can no longer go fishing because he has had a heart
attaCk, and there is no mechanism for him to transfer his
license with his equipment, then the license just goes by
the wayside. However, with the transfer provision, the
fisherman has the option of forming a cooperative agreement
Whereby he can transfer his license after the partnership
has been in existence for more than one year. The senator
gave a second example of a dragger fisherman, too old to
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continue fishing offshore, who wishes to move inside.
Obtaining an inshore lobster license would, perhaps require
several years effort using the hardship provision.
Therefore, with the transfer provision, a free enterprise
mechanism exists that allows the older fisherman to join a
partnership, and get a commercial inshore lobster license
in just over a year. 76
Another legislator suggested that, although free
enterprise was the argument used for adding the transfer
provision, it was not entire reason. Part of the reason
was that the provision placed a value on the license thus
allowing a buyer with the highest bid to enter the fishery.
He added that the ramifications of this, in terms of the
original intent of the law, would not likely have been seen
in 1980, especially with this provision being added during
the last month prior to the bill's passage. 77
DMF and MFAC staff have since suggested that the
transfer provision may have been added by legislators who
knew of the value of licenses, or who knew lobstermen who
wanted to attach licenses to their other assets. That is,
the provision was added to provide a loophole for
constituents. They also insinuated the possibility that
Representative MacLain engineered the transfer provision in
reaction ~o having been misled by DMF and MLA in 1979. In
any case, the Division and MFAC did not think the transfer
provision was too important a factor, at first, because
they looked at the law as a gradual phase-out of the
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moratorium. On the other hand, MLA was upset because they
thought the transfer provision would preclude entry from
actually being limited. 78
Although it took a year or two for licenses holders to
realize the benefits of the transfer loophole, especially
with the value it gave to licenses, by 1983, very few were
retiring their license. The number of licenses retired
since that date can, perhaps, be counted on the fingers of
one hand. with this provision, anyone who wishes to enter
the fishery who has savvy and money can do so. And anyone
would be a fool to give up a license that is worth as much
as $15,000. This phenomenon has resulted in an escalation
in the number of people fishing in the inshore lobster
fishery. Few, if any licenses are retired, 80 fishermen
are added from the 1 ist each year, and 20 spec ial
additional licenses are added each year. Some contend that
now, in 1987, Massachusetts does not really have a limited
entry system in it's inshore lobster fishery because, with
the transfer loophole, it is unable to limit the number of
people entering the system. At best, the scheme is slowing
down the rate of entry.79
Current considerations
As evidenced by the effect of the transfer provision,
effort continued to increase in the lobster fishery through
the early eighties. By 1986, lobster industry statistics
were showing that transfers were affecting the system by
adding effort at an unacceptable rate. This escalating
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rate of increase in numbers of licenses coupled with
technological improvements, such as new trap types, and the
strong economy in Massachusetts thus exerted ever more
pressure on the lobster resource. In addition, more and
more cases came to the Division's attention of people
intentionally manipulating the transfer provision to their
own benefit, and making it clear that they had made money
on their licenses. Finally, although, the lobster harvest
continued to increase, the Division decided that something
was going to happen to the resource if they did not act.
As a result, DMF began to tighten it's restrictions on
transfer and special additional licenses, deciding that too
many licenses were being issued. 80
The new regulations stated that any license in
existence at the end of 1986 could be transferred once. No
licenses issued after January 1, 1987 could be transferred,
and no hardship licenses could be transferred. To DMF and
MFAC these regulations meant that transfers would become
less of a factor in the future. However, critics in MLA
felt that by the time all present license holders
transferred their licenses, there would be no resource
left. In addition, they felt that tightening the transfer
provision would not cause license attrition because of
their premium value. 81
Another perennial problem that was greatly intensified
by the rapid escalation of inshore commercial lobster
permits, was an increase in intra-industry and inter-
132
industry gear conflicts. The intra-industry gear conflicts
occurred because lobsters are only in certain places at
certain times, and because new fishermen tended to set
trawls where the older successful fishermen were. The
inter-industry gear conflicts began to occur because more
offshore draggers were being forced to fish closer inshore
due to the World court Canadian boundary dispute outcome,
fewer fish, and because lobstermen were increasingly
fishing on traditional dragger ground.
Preemption of dragger bottom occurred for two reasons.
First, lobstermen were fishing longer seasons (or were
storing traps for the winter in inshore waters) and thus
had gear in waters used by draggers during the winter
months. Second, the incredible amounts of gear being used
by lobster fishermen forced many lobster fishermen to seek
alternate areas to set their gear. This often turned out
to betraditional dragger bottom. To make matters worse,
lobstermen's suspicion that draggers were conducting a
directed fishery for lobsters in inshore waters, which is
illegal in Massachusetts, exacerbated the growing tensions
between these two fisheries. 82
The gear conflict issue, combined with the Division's
current realization of the problems with the lobster
licensing system, prompted it to begin consideration of
legislative changes to the limited entry law. In 1987, a
gear conflict resolution working group was convened, with
joint lobster fishery, mobile gear fishery, DMF and MFAC
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membership. The purpose of the group was to hammer out
regulatory and legislative methods to reduce gear conflicts
between the two groups, and to reduce pressure on the
lobster stocks by both groups. out of this process came a
legislative package that was submitted to the legislature
in late summer, 1987. Included in the package were
proposals to make changes in the inshore lobster fishery
limited entry law. All transfers would be prohibited
except between immediate family. Also, MFAC would
determine the number of list and special additional
licenses to be issued annually based on the condition of
the lobster resource. 83
The status of effort controls
Another question is why in the 1980's the lobster
fishery still lacks effort controls. The answers to this
question are hauntingly similar to the ones given during
the 70's. From the DMF and Division of Law Enforcement
perspective, there remained questions about whether a trap
limitation system could be adequately administered and
enforced. From the MLA perspective, to have a trap limit
without some adequate curb on entrance into the lobster
fishery would not be fair. To MLA it was wrong to demand
that those in the industry, who have already made the
investment, give up a percentage of their fishing inventory
to newcomers.
In addition, both management and industry may well have
been lulled into complacency, especially on so contentious
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an issue as trap limits, by the continued high harvest of
the lobster resource through 1986. However, in 1987, the
lobster harvest dropped dramatically, especially north of
Cape Cod. Fisheries managers were unsure whether this
decrease was due to over-fishing or because of
environmental factors (water temperatures for the 1987
season were exceptionally cold, and the spring was
extremely stormy). Regardless of what caused this decrease
in harvest, the need for effort reduction again came to the
fore. A new working group made up of industry and
management representatives was formed in early fall, 1987
wi th the intent of designing effort controls for the
inshore commercial lobster fishery, including trap limits.
This was the first time since 1976 that a working group had
been convened for this purpose.
Conclusion
In reviewing the political history of the Massachusetts
commercial inshore lobster fishery, the most striking
revelation has been the incredible power that social and
economic factors have over the course of events in a social
and political system. What matters most seems not to be
the biological health of a fishery, or even what will be
left for our children. But rather, what seems to supercede
all concerns are the current political, economic and social
needs of the actors in this extremely complicated game.
This is an observation, not a condemnation, for the purpose
of this thesis is to approach a better understanding of how
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the system we have invented works, with the idealistic
notion that such understanding will make the author a more
effective fisheries manager.
At the end of his interview, DMF Director Phil Coates
stated that he now felt that lobster management is in much
the same situation as it was in 1974, with the level of
fishing effort at at a point where the lobster fishery
stands on a recruitment razor-blade (rather than a knife
edge), and it is about to go over the top. What makes this
situation all the more scary is that no one yet knows how
much more pressure the lobster stocks can take. The next
chapter will seek to relate the events of the inshore
lobster limited entry program to established limited entry
goals and criteria.
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CHAPTER V
ANALYSIS
Introduction
To determine whether or not the Massachusetts inshore
commercial lobster fishery limited entry program has been
successful, the logical progression is to analyze what
should happen with a theoretical limited entry scheme in
comparison with what actually did happen with this scheme.
To achieve this, relevant elements of Chapter 1 are
extracted for comparison with the events described in
Chapters 3 and 4. Essential elements of I imited entry
theory are first summarized, and then are compared with the
actual inshore commercial lobster fishery license
moratorium and limited entry schemes.
Events through 1975
The type of system
As derived in Chapter I, it is recommended that all
bases be covered in designing a limited entry plan. The
first step in doing this, once the need for some form of
entry limitations system is established, is to determine
what form of limited entry is needed. This decision was
made by DMF and MLA simultaneously with the realization of
the need for limited entry. That is, MLA responded to
DMF's proposal for effort controls through a trap
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limitation program by demanding that entry into the fishery
be controlled through a license limitation system.
There is no evidence that any other type of limited
entry system was considered. However, there is evidence
that license limitations had been the primary approach for
some time. For example, the initial DMF bill in 1975 would
have given the Director power to limit licenses throughout
the commercial fisheries. Also, in 1975, MLA filed a bill
to reduce the number of commercial permits issued to 1000.
These two bills evolved in the legislature into a
compromise lobster license limitation bill.
The scope of the plan
The next step is to determine the scope of the plan.
There was never serious consideration for extending either
trap limits or license limits to the entire inshore lobster
fishery; only the inshore commercial fishery was included.
Although some consideration was given by MLA to reduce part
time fishermen, and to limit the effort of recreational
fishermen, these efforts met with only partial success
because of the DMF concern for equity.
Who would be allowed in
The determination of who would be allowed in the
fishery once the scheme was implemented was only partially
considered. The record indicates, that little, if any,
consideration was given for grandfathering before the
moratorium was implemented, as evidenced by the industry's
shock at having no guarantee of license renewal in 1976.
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This resulted in the implementation of a grandfather clause
amendment in December, 1975, which was almost a foregone
conclusion since it went through with so little difficulty.
What was not predicted was the addition of the potential
requirement that renewal applicants must have fished during
the preceding season.
Conditions of entry and exit
Adequate consideration was not given to the conditions
of entry and exit. This resulted in the legislature adding
its own transfer provision and the notorious hardship
provision to the bill.
Total allowable harvest
The total allowable harvest, or effort controls was a
major consideration in the design of the license limitation
scheme as the need for effort controls was the initial
concern that started the whole process. However, rather
than keeping effort controls as the primary goal of the
process, license limitation was allowed to become the major
emphasis. This resulted in the license moratorium being
implemented without effort controls.
Longevity of harvest rights
Longevity of harvest rights had already been
established, in part, by the commercial fisheries licensing
law. All fishermen, including coastal commercial
lobstermen, were required to renew their licenses annually.
However, the lack of a grandfather provision in Chapter
484, followed by the addition of the fishing requirement
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clause in Chapter 729 indicates lack of consideration for
other aspects of harvest rights longevity.
Administrative framework
No specific administrative framework for the moratorium
was designed prior to passage of the bill. DMF felt that
the necessary administrative framework already existed
through the licensing bureaucracy. A license limitation
program therefore would only effect how the licenses were
to be distributed within the existing system. However, the
legislature had different ideas and created the need for a
whole new bureaucracy by adding the hardship and transfer
provisions. DMF and MFAC had no prior warning of this
which SUbsequently forced them to design an administrative
framework for the hardship provision while they
administered that aspect of the law.
Goals of the plan
Throughout the entire design of a limited entry scheme,
the goals of the program must be kept in mind. The goals
of the license moratorium were to establish an equitable
system that provided economic relief while also limiting
effort. While there is no question that these goals were
always on the agenda, not all of them came to pass. No
effort limitations and no permanent limited entry plan came
about as a result of this program despite the study that
was supposed to lead to their implementation. Note that
the study was supposed to occur during the first year only,
but ended up lasting four years. The chronic lack of
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success in implementing effort controls that continues to
this day demonstrates how keeping goals in mind is not all
that is required to get those goals implemented.
Administrative and political feasibility
The administrative and political feasibility of a plan
must be determined before the plan is submitted for
legislative approval. Administrative feasibility requires
consideration of enforcement needs, necessary
organizational adjustments and an idea of the costs
involved in implementing and administering the plan.
Enforcement was not a primary concern with the license
moratori urn because very few, if any, lobstermen fish
commercially without a license. Peer pressure keeps this
from happening. As for organizational adjustments and
costs, DMF had little idea what would be required because
the changes to the bill that most effected these areas
occurred while it was in the legislature.
The political feasibility of the plan is the key to
what actually happened in passing the lobster license
moratorium because the moratorium was designed while it was
in the legislature, not before it was submitted. What went
to the legislature were two different bills, the MLA bill
calling for the distribution of 1000 licenses, and the DMF
bill giving the Director the power to limit licenses. The
lobster licenses moratorium evolved as a compromise between
these two bills while in the committee on Natural Resources
and Agriculture. This meant that, although a great deal of
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input was provided by DMF and MLA, the true moratorium
architect was CNRA.
with CNRA designing the plan, political feasibility
became a primary concern. This is why the moratorium
became the only politically expedient measure of the three
that were before CNRA during this process. CNRA therefore
considered neither the 1000 license limitation for
commercial lobster permits, nor the DMF commercial license
limitation proposal politically feasible. Political
feasibility, as seen by members of CNRA, is also why the
transfer and hardship provisions were added to the law.
Summary
The most critical difference when the moratorium was
passed, between what the theorists say is supposed to
happen in designing a limited entry plan and what actually
did happen, is that the moratorium was designed by
legislators in CNRA rather than by DMF itself. There was
no formal inshore commercial lobster fishery limited entry
plan submitted to CNRA.
1975 - 1979
Effects of the measure once implemented
Once a limited entry scheme is implemented certain
economic, administrative and biological events
theoretically are supposed to occur. For example, the
economic health of the fishery will improve because
fishermen enjoy stable and secure tenure in the fishery,
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there will be reduced loss of economic rent, profitability
will stabilize, and the consumer will enjoy enhanced
product value. Administrative benefits include fewer
fishermen to regulate, decreased management costs,
increased management efficiency, and increased concern for
the resource by fishermen due to their having acquired
vested interest. Biological benefits accrue because
fishermen have greater interest in conserving the resource
which thus induces effective effort control measures.
Limited entry will also reduce entry into the fishery once
effort controls produce stock recovery. This provides
biological, administrative and economic benefits.
Economic effects
The economic effects of the license moratorium were
somewhat different from the above description. First, the
moratorium did not place a cap on the number of fishermen.
The hardship provision precluded a strict 1300 fisherman
limit. It did, however, come very close to this goal. The
number of licenses increased from 1,397 in 1975 to 1,438 in
1980; a 3% increase over five years. Second, value began
to accrue to the licenses, partly due to the transfer
provision, and partly due to entrepreneurial meddling.
Third, demand for licenses increased, which placed a great
deal of pressure on the system to let new-comers in.
However, the most significant economic effect of the
moratorium was that it placed entry restrictions on the
fishery without controlling effort. As a result, it did
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not decrease dissipation of economic rent. This same
conclusion was reached by DMF as evidenced by statements in
their 1979 review of the lobster license moratorium.
Administrative effects
Administratively, the moratorium did not live up to
theoretical expectations either. Although the law did
essentially cap entry, which reduced the total number of
people to be regulated over time, other factors militated
against reducing management costs and increasing management
efficiency. These factors included change in license
demand, the hardship provision, the transfer provision,
increases in license value, and false catch reporting.
Change in demand for licenses caused both
administrative and political pressures. Administrative
pressure was created because the only recourse open to most
applicants was through the hardship provision. Between
1976 and 1978, an average of 160 applications for hardships
were received while an average of 67 were approved by MFAC.
Pol i tical pressure was created when people des ir ing
hardship licenses asked for sponsorship by legislators who
often were not pleased when their requests were turned
down. Further political pressure was placed on the system
by those who were denied permits and claimed that the
system was fixed.
The hardship provision was an administrative nightmare.
This provision, as well as the transfer provision, left DMF
and MFAC without qualifying criteria. In the former case,
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determination of eligibility and definition of "substantial
hardship" was left to the DMF Director and MFAC. A
combination of MFAC being forced to define criteria, a
function that this unpaid citizen body was not designed to
do, and the heavy work load placed upon it by the demand
for hardships and transfers caused it to devote 60-80% of
its time to this issue. This constituted a severe decrease
in MFAC's administrative efficiency because it could spend
so little time on other fisheries issues.
DMF also suffered a loss in administrative efficiency.
As evidenced by its involvement in determining criteria, it
was the recipient of the lion's share of political
pressure, and was forced to work with long lines of
applicants at license renewal time. Both of these cases
translate to increased management costs due to the
inability of administrators to spend adequate time managing
other fisheries.
Increased license value affected administrative
efficiency by further increasing demand for licenses.
False catch reporting reduced DMF's efficiency in
administering the commercial inshore lobster fishery
because of the must fish provision of Chapter 729.
Fishermen's concerns about IRS audits when DMF started to
audit catch reports in 1977 compounded this problem. It is
small wonder in 1979, that DMF felt that the moratorium was
administratively unwieldy and time consuming.
Biological effects
149
The moratorium did not meet theoretical expectations of
how a successful limited entry program should benefit the
resource primarily because effort limitations were not put
in place. This caused effort to continue growing
throughout the life of the moratorium. DMF believed, in
1979, that excess capacity in the lobster fishery was
roughly twice that necessary to harvest the available
lobsters. To DMF the major biological rationale behind
limited entry was simply to keep fishing mortality from
increasing, or at least slow the increase. In this case,
the prediction of the theorists came to pass: limited
entry, and in particular license limitation, taken alone,
will do nothing to slow or reduce effort. The moratorium
had no effort controls and effort thus increased
dramatically during its five year life.
Summary
The factors most responsible for driving the license
moratorium after its implementation were unforeseen
circumstances. Two types of unforeseen circumstances
occurred. The first were those that manifested themselves
as unanticipated provisions of the legislation. These were
exemplified by the transfer and hardship provisions, and
the must-fish provision of the December amendment. The
second were those that occurred in reaction to the
moratorium or because of simultaneous events. Change in
license demand, increase in license value and increase in
entrepreneur acquisition of licenses occurred in reaction
150
to the moratorium. simultaneous events that effected the
outcome of the scheme included increased demand due to
government subsidies resulting from the Magnuson Act,
continually increasing effort on the lobster resource, and
the lobster resource's ability to withstand this added
pressure.
1979 - 1980
Elements of the initial plan
By 1979, DMF was most displeased with the moratorium,
and expressed its intention to explore ways to improve the
system in its document "Review of the Lobster License
Moratorium." CNRA and MIA also reached the same conclusion
and 1979 through early 1980 was spent by these three
organizations, in some cases working together and in some
cases not, hammering out a new system. To review this
process, the theoretical points of consideration for the
initial planning of a limited entry system from Chapter I
will be used.
The type of system
The type of limited entry to use was not determined
early on, as it had been in 1975. Instead, although there
was still agreement on the use of a license limitation
system, DMF and MFAC took different tacks. MIA returned to
its initial proposal of the early 1970's to limit the
number of licenses to 1000. DMF dusted off the two tier
system that had been designed in 1976 and then was tabled.
In this case, the compromise legislation whereby the number
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of new licenses issued would be balanced with the license
attrition rate was decided upon by DMF and MLA before the
bill was proposed to CNRA. However, this does not mean
that the process went smoothly.
First, MLA's further restriction bill was tabled by
CNRA before DMF reintroduced the two tier system.
Therefore, MLA knew that a measure further restricting the
number of licenses issued would not fly. This caused them
to at least consider the two-tier approach (before they
decisively rejected it), which set them up for political
problems with the legislature.
Second, DMF already had submitted the two-tier system
to CNRA before the compromise moratorium phase-out was
accepted by DMF and MLA. This set DMF up for political
problems as well because the House majority whip, MacLean,
decided to sponsor the bill only to help DMF and to spur
discussion on the subject. When CNRA held public hearings
on the two-tier proposal, DMF had not told MacLean that
they had rejected the bill and were proposing alternate
legislation. In addition, MacLean thought MLA would
support the two-tier bill. As a result, MacLean was left
feeling deceived by both DMF and MLA when he discovered
that he was the only one who supported the legislation when
it went before CNRA. Mr. MacLean was not pleased with this
outcome, and the repercussions of his displeasure affected
the outcome of the final bill in 1980.
Third, DMF and MLA represented two differing schools of
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thought on what balancing the number of new licenses with
the license attrition rate meant. To MLA, this meant that
the limited entry system would continue, only with less
bureaucracy and fewer of the problems that existed with the
moratorium. To DMF, the new compromise was a phase-out of
the moratorium. DMF predicted that eventually the
licensing system would return to what it had been prior to
1975. As it turned out, both of these predictions were
dead wrong.
The scope of the plan
There was never any question about what the new
licensing system should cover by any of the parties
involved in the negotiation. DMF, MLA and the Legislature
all looked at the new system only in terms of its affect on
the commercial inshore lobster fishery.
Who would be allowed in
A great deal of concern was expressed for how licenses
were to be distributed in the new system. First, a
grandfather provision was put into the bill, thus avoiding
one problem that occurred in 1975. Second, an elaborate
system was developed for placing qualified applicants
first, unqualified applicants second, and, after the first
year, all other applicants third on a single list.
Inherent in this process was the need for experience before
being allowed a commercial inshore permit. This whole
process occurred while the bill was in CNRA, rather than
before it was submitted.
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Conditions of entry and exit
The determination of conditions for entry and exit took
place at CNRA, and was the most controversial portion of
the planning of this bill. It was at this stage that the
transfer provision was added to the bill. It was also at
this stage that the special additional, or new hardship,
provision was added to the bill. Neither DMF or MLA wanted
a transfer provision or a hardship provision in the phase-
out Bill.
The transfer provision first appeared in an early
version of the phase-out in 1979, not long after the two-
tier bill had been tabled by CNRA. MLA was incensed by
this provision and had it deleted from the final 1979
compromise that carried over into 1980. However, the
transfer provision was again added in May, 1980, and
managed to survive to become a provision in the final bill,
Chapter 444 of the Acts of 1980.
DMF and MLA both believed that a transfer provision
would eliminate license retirement because no one would
retire their license when they could sell it through a
transfer. The transfer provision therefore would allow
licenses to be sold at a profit and would preclude their
being returned to DMF when lobstermen retired. As a
result, both DMF and MLA were adamantly against the
inclusion of this provision in the legislation. DMF and
MLA both felt that this provision was added at the last
minute, and some strong beliefs have been expressed that
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the provision was added by legislators on Representative
MacLean's behalf.
The official reason given by legislator's for addition
of this provision was to preserve free enterprise.
However, even they allowed that free enterprise was not the
whole reason for its inclusion.
The special additional provision was a carry-over of
the hardship provision of the original license moratorium.
This also was added by CNRA, was opposed by MLA and DMF,
and has since caused administrative problems. However,
this provision was not anywhere near as controversial as
the transfer provision.
Total allowable harvest
Limited entry theory requires that effort controls be
included in the original limited entry plan. There was no
planning done in 1979-80, by any of the parties involved,
to incorporate effort limitations into the new licensing
system. The focus was solely on replacing the moratorium
with a more permanent system.
Longevity of harvest rights
Longevity of harvest rights, again, carried over from
the old system, with licenses being renewed every year, and
inclusion of a grandfather clause to protect existing
fishermen.
Administrative framework
As with the moratorium, the administrative framework
for implementing the new law was partially designed in
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CNRA, and partially left for DMF and MFAC to work out. For
example, criteria for the special additional provision were
left to be worked out by MFAC, and criteria for the
transfer provision were left to be worked out by the DMF
Director. All transfer and special additional grievances
could be appealed to the Commissioner of the Department of
Fish, Wildlife and Environmental Law Enforcement. As
mentioned earlier, Director Phil Coates managed to avoid
the political implications of the Commissioner deciding
these appeals by having MFAC vote on the special additional
applications in blocks.
Administrative and political feasibility
Little concern was expressed by DMF for organizational
adjustments, enforcement and costs before Chapter 444 was
passed. The reason for this was that the original bill, as
filed with CNRA would have simplified the system
considerably over the moratorium. Therefore, costs would
have been reduced both in terms of time and money, and
organizational adjustments would have been minimal.
Enforcement requirements for this legislation rested
primarily on MFAC and DMF. Again, since this new
legislation was considered a simplification over the
original moratorium, enforcement requirements in terms of
devising criteria and deciding on applications, should have
been reduced.
The phase-out bill, as it was introduced to CNRA, was
not politically feasible. At least this can be said in
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20/20 hindsight. Primarily because of the transfer and
special additional provisions of the legislation, what went
into CNRA and what came out as Chapter 444 were two very
different things. Regardless of whether the changes made
were because of irate legislators or because of the need to
preserve free enterprise, the fact remains that the final
version of the bill evolved within the Legislature as a
matter of political feasibility.
Summary
Review of the maj or steps required in formulating a
limited entry plan shows that, for the most part, DMF, MLA
and CNRA conducted a fairly careful planning process.
However, two maj or omissions to this process took place.
First, no effort limitation provision was added to the
legislation. Second, adequate consideration for the
political feasibility of the plan, under the political
circumstances that existed in 1979-1980 did not take place
at the planning stage. As a result, major changes that had
significant impact on the resulting legislation took place
within the Legislature. In effect, DMF and MLA submitted
one bill, and a completely different bill emerged.
1980 - 1987
Effects of the measure once implemented
To determine the consequences of Chapter 444 on the
inshore commercial lobster fishery, it is again necessary
to refer bach to the predicted outcome described in Chapter
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I . To rehash, outcome can be divided into three parts:
economic, administrative and biological. A good economic
outcome in limited entry will be reduced loss of economic
rent, stable and secure tenure in the fishery, stabilized
profitability, and enhanced value of the product to the
consumer. An administratively good outcome occurs because
there are fewer people to regulate, decreased management
costs, increased management efficiency" increased vested
interest in the fishery by fishermen, increased concern for
the resource by fishermen, and improved cooperation between
management and industry. The needs of the resource are
fulfilled because effort controls are far more likely when
there are fewer fishermen, with vested interest in the
resource, who are protected from new-comers should effort
controls be successful in improving the resource.
Likewise, management becomes more effective, again because
of fewer fishermen, but also because of increased
cooperation between management and industry. Additionally,
protection from new entry when effort limitations are
successful is of benefit to the resource.
Economic affects
The most serious economic affect of Chapter 444 in
terms of what is supposed to happen with limited entry was
the transfer provision. It is ironic that this provision
was added, ostensibly to preserve free enterprise, when
limited entry is primarily an economic move to improve the
economic conditions within a fishery. Therefore, the
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transfer provision, which was added to conserve the
economic well-being of the fishery by maintaining free
enterprise, in fact crippled the economic well-being of the
fishery by short circuiting the potential economic affects
of limited entry.
Specifically, over the period from 1980 to 1987, there
was no reduction in loss of economic rent. In fact,
because of the transfer provision, each lobsterman's share
of the pie was reduced. The only event that has tended to
mitigate this effect, at least up to the 1987 season, is
the continued stability of the resource.
In addition, the continued increase in the numbers of
lobstermen, with no retirement of licenses has reduced the
long-term stability and security of tenure in the fishery.
While it is true that a measure of security exists in
knowing that no one will take one's license away (unless
they commit a crime), the security ends there. There can
be no stability for fishermen working a stressed resource
when they know that the numbers of fishermen, and the
amount of gear is continually increasing. Gear conflicts,
both between lobstermen and between lobstermen and
draggermen dramatically illustrate this point. In
addition, although the resource has been, up to now, able
to withstand the increasing pressure placed on it by
industry, there is real concern about how long this can
last. When a fishery is severely stressed, the likelihood
of recruitment failure increases.
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Profitability of fishermen is supposed to be stabilized
by successful limited entry. This has not occurred either.
Again, increased effort, fishermen and gear conflicts works
part and parcel with reduced profitability. Add to this
the questionable ability of the resource to withstand much
additional pressure, and the safe prediction is that the
inshore commercial lobster fishery will become less
profitable in the next years. It will become dramatically
less profitable if the resource crashes.
It is also difficult to believe that the value of the
product can possibly be enhanced with the scenario
described above. Increased gear conflict, increased
numbers of fishermen and gear, increasingly marginal
profits and realization that laws can be circumvented
through interstate commerce all serve to reduce the value
of the product supplied to the consumer.
Administrative effects
Limited entry is supposed to reduce or at least cap the
number of people coming into a fishery, thereby reducing or
stabilizing the number of fishermen to be regulated. At
least it can be said of the moratorium that it essentially
capped the number of inshore commercial lobster fishermen.
Chapter 444 rendered mute any discussion of how caps or
reductions in the number of fishermen would affect
administration because it allowed the number of fishermen
to increase at a steady and significant rate. Perhaps it
can be argued that the rate of increase is less than it
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would have been without the law.
be argued successfully, there is
all.
In fact, unless this can
no limited entry law at
Perhaps the law did reduce management costs and
increase management efficiency for MFAC because the MFAC
role in administrating lobster licensing was significantly
reduced. However, for DMF lobster licensing continued to
be an administrative thorn in the side. Now, however, the
problem was not so much with hardship cases (or special
additionals, as they were now called) but with the transfer
provision.
Like the initial moratorium, it took a couple of years
before people caught on to the fact that something worth
getting in on was afoot. In fact a couple of lobstermen
retired their licenses in 1981. However, by 1983, no one
was retiring their license, and the number of transfers
increased significantly. In addition, the number of cases
where people intentionally manipulating the system for
personal advantage began to increase. DMF was forced to
react to this on a case by case basis until 1986, when they
began to tighten the transfer provision through regulation.
In 1987, DMF is continuing its attempt to tighten the
transfer provision through legislation. All of this cost
DMF a great deal more in terms of time, money, and
decreased management efficiency than should have been the
case with a successful limited entry system.
Unfortunately, license transfer was not the only thing
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fishery, who will be favorably disposed to effort controls.
This is especially true when they know that their reduced
capacity (through effort controls) will not be taken up by
new-comers. However, this argument is also rendered mute
by Chapter 444 because the number of fishermen was allowed
to increase, and the amount of effort in the fishery
continued to increase.
The matter of effort controls was not considered when
the phase-out bill was was written into law. Once Chapter
444 was implemented, much of the Division's time was spent
administering the transfer provision, hardships and gear
conflicts. As a result, effort controls were again placed
on the back burner. Effort controls have been discussed
for the lobster fishery since 1970, but have never been
implemented.
Summary
The two major problems with Chapter 444, as illustrated
by the description of the effects of the law on the lobster
fishery management and economics, were the transfer
provision and the lack of effort controls. with the
transfer provision, no attrition of licenses took place.
with no licenses being retired, and an additional 100
licenses being added every year, the industry continued to
grow. This was reduced entry, not limited entry.
The lack of effort controls allowed for continued
increases in effort, which was compounded by increased
numbers of inshore commercial lobster fishermen.
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Increasing numbers of fishermen who are vying for an
increasingly limited resource react by increasing the
number of traps they're fishing. Chapter 444 has therefore
perpetuated a vicious cycle of growing amounts of gear that
may end either when the resource collapses, or as a result
of violence due to gear conflicts. It is hoped that,
responsible changes to the law in response to the problems
it has created will improve management of the lobster
resource.
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CHAPTER VI
THE EFFECT OF LIMITED ENTRY ON CATCH PER UNIT OF EFFORT
Introduction
One of the primary functions of a fisheries management
agency is to formulate policy that is based on the best
available scientific, economic and sociological
information. Once a management plan has been implemented,
it is desirable to assess the impact of that plan on the
fishery in question, evaluate its degree of success and
then to formulate future policy based on these findings.
Such an idealistic chain of events is rife with
difficulties, not the least of which is the evaluation of
the scientific information which is available concerning a
particular fishery. Since the advent of computers, it has
become feasible to employ mathematical models in the
analysis of data, and several of these models can be of
value to fisheries managers when the proper type of data is
available. It is of particular value to policy experts to
be able to assess the impact of policy as well as to be
able to predict, with some degree of precision, future
trends in effort, mortality, recruitment and other
parameters. The former allows managers to determine the
degree of success of implemented policy, and the latter
aids in the search for viable future policy. One class of
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models that is useful to this end is empirical forecasting
models which utilize time-series data to make short-term
predictions about the future trend of a particular
future
policyof
cannot only
effect
parameter. With forecasting models,
trends be predicted, but also the
decisions on a fishery can be evaluated.
A BASIC language time series analysis package called
FORCST 1 was utilized to assess whether or not the
implementation of the limited entry law in the
Massachusetts inshore lobster industry had any effect on
catch per unit of effort in this fishery. The program
FORCST contains nine forecasting models, each of which
produces five year predictions based on the time-series
data entered into the program. This package enables the
user to determine which of the nine models best fits the
data, thus allowing for the predictions to be made based on
a model which has been selected as most appropriate. Also,
relatively short time-series can be used with FORCST.
Procedure
The procedure for using and interpreting FORCST is
straightforward. First, the observations for the parameter
to be tested are entered and basic statistics, such as the
minimum and maximum observations, mean and standard
deviation are printed out. Next an autocorrelation
function is calculated to determine how much correlation
there is between adjacent data points. If there is a trend,
whether or not that trend is seasonal can be determined
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using first difference. As will become clear later, trends
in the data can be useful in determining which data set
best fits the biology of the animal under study. Following
these steps, the program is set for suppressed outputs
where no tables or graphs are printed out, and the data set
is checked for fit with each of the nine forcasting models
in the program. Once this step is completed, the model
that best fits the data is determined by finding the result
that shows the lowest mean squared error. The program is
then reset for lengthy output and run using only the model
that carried the lowest mean squared error. The output is
then printed in tabular and graph form showing each
observed value with its corresponding predicted value as
well as showing the predicted values for the five years
following the last observed value.
Analysis
The analysis was divided into three parts. First, a
determination was made as to which of three data-sets best
fits the fishery. Second, using the best data-set, the
effect of the limited entry law on catch per unit of effort
was analyzed. Third, a look was taken at the future trend
in catch per unit of effort if the present limited entry
scheme continues.
Initially, three data sets were used, all of which were
obtained from the Massachusetts Division of Marine
Fisheries Lobster Assessment project2 . The first of these
data sets was for catch per unit of effort (C.P.U.E.) as
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determined by the average number of pounds of lobster
caught per trap per year and covered the years 1960-1984.
The second data set showed catch per unit of effort in
average number of pounds of lobster caught per fisherman
per year and covered the years 1967-1984. Both of these
data sets were obtained from the annual Massachusetts
lobster fishery statistics compiled by the Massachusetts
Division of Marine Fisheries3 . The third data set used
catch per unit of effort as determined by the average legal
lobster catch per pot haul per month using the seasonal
mean and covered the years 1970-1984. This data set came
from an on-going impact assessment of the effects of
Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station on the marine fisheries of
western Cape Cod Bay4.
Each data set was divided into three segments. First,
the periOd from the beginning of the data set through 1984
was analyzed, which gave a prediction for the years 1985-
1989. Second, the period from the beginning of the data
set through 1974, the last year before the license law went
into effect, was analyzed producing a prediction for the
years 1975-1979. Finally, for comparison with the 1985-
1989 prediction produced with the entire data set, the
period from 1975-1984 was analyzed. Suppressed analysis
was used to determine which model best fit each subdivided
data set and lengthy I'
ana YSl.S was used to print out the
results for each model (see Appendix B).
From this procedure it was determined that, for the
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overall analysis, the best data set was catch per unit of
effort as determined by average number of pounds of lobster
caught per trap per year. There are three reasons why this
data set was chosen. First, this time line was the longest
of the three and was therefore the most suitable for
determining what effect limited entry had on catch per unit
of effort when the law was implemented in 1975. Second,
the six year cyclic trend displayed in the autocorrelation
function seemed to follow the recruitment time for the
American lobster more closely than the trends displayed in
the other two data sets. Third, the forecasts for 1985-
1989 from the 1960-1984 and the 1975-1984 segments of the
data set are almost exactly the same. This result is not
the case in either of the other data sets.
It was also decided that since the most sophisticated
determination of catch per unit of effort carne from the
Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station impact assessment the
prediction for this entire time line, from 1970-1984 might
also be of value.
Results and Discussion
In the full length analysis of the 1960-1984 number of
pounds of lobster per trap C.P.U.E. data, the double
exponential smoothing model was used for both the 1960-1984
and the 1960-1974 periods. For the period from 1975-1984
the single moving average model was used. The results of
the analysis for both the 1961-1984 and 1975-1984 periods
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showed that the predicted catch per unit of effort would
remain the same from 1986-1989, (see Appendix B, table 1
and 2). The result of the analysis for the 1960-1974
period shows a predicted decrease in catch per unit of
effort from the years 1976-1979, (see Appendix B, table 3).
The full length analysis of the Pilgrim Nuclear Power
station C. P. U. E. data required the use of the double
exponential smoothing model. The result of this analysis
showed a prediction that catch per unit of effort should
decrease from a high in 1983 to a low in 1988. The 1988
and 1989 predictions showed catch per unit of effort
remaining the same, (see Appendix B, table 4).
The most important conclusion that can be drawn from
the pounds of lobster per trap C.P.U.E. data is that the
prediction for 1975-1979 from the 1960-1974 segment shows a
decrease in catch per unit of effort while the actual
observations of catch per unit of effort from 1975-1979
show that this parameter stays approximately the same.
This indicates that some event or events that took place in
1974 or at the beginning of 1975 may have acted to keep
catch per unit of effort at the same level rather than
declining. The predictions for 1985-1989 from the entire
data set and the 1975-1984 segment both showed that
C.P.U.E. stayed the same from 1986-1989. This result
served as an indication of the re1iabil i ty of this
particular data set.
Although the pilgrim Nuclear Power station data set was
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too short to allow for reliable analysis of changes in
C.P.U.E. around 1984, it was concluded that given the more
sophisticated measure of C. P. U. E. that was used in this
assessment, the prediction for the years 1985-1989 would be
more reliable than that of the pounds of lobster per trap
data set. This conclusion appears to have been supported
by actual events. In 1985, lobster landings were higher
than in previous years while, during the first several
months in 1986, landings have declined5 . The prediction
for the Pilgrim Nuclear Power station data using FORCST
shows a peak in C.P.U.E. in 1983 followed by five years of
decl ine (figure 1). Should the observed decl ine in
landings persist for the rest of this year and continue
over the next few years, catch per unit of effort will also
decline and the prediction made using the Pilgrim Nuclear
Power station data set will be supported. Of course the
timing of the predicted peak in C. P. U. E. is off by two
years but perhaps this can be improved by using a better
measure of C.P.U.E ..
It should be stated that although changes in trends of
catch per unit of effort can be seen, the best one can do
is speculate as to their causes. Therefore, all one can
say is that these changes in the trend in catch per unit of
effort may be the result of the implementation of limited
access in the Massachusetts inshore lobster industry. Two
additional qualifications must also be kept in mind while
reviewing these analysis'. First, in 1984, lobstermen were
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aware that lobster licensing would commence in 1985 and
that obtaining a first year license was contingent on their
filing a detailed catch report for 1984. Second, V-
notching egger females in Massachusetts was discontinued in
1984. As a result of these two events, the landings
statistics for the industry that year showed a substantial
increase in the number of pounds of lobster caught6 •
It is believed that the reliability of this modeling
tool can be increased dramatically under two conditions.
First, there is a need for good time-line data. That is,
the data must have been collected without any breaks for a
minimum of ten observation points prior to the period to be
analyzed. In this case, ten years of data without any
breaks was needed. Second, the measurement of the
parameter being used in the analysis should be reliable.
The determination of catch per unit of effort on a yearly
basis by dividing the total number of pounds of legal
lobster landed by the number of traps is crude to the
extreme and therefore decreases the reliability of the
forecasts significantly.
Presently, the Massachusetts Division of Marine
Fisheries Lobster Assessment Project is collecting time-
line data using all lobsters caught in a trap instead of
just the legal sized animals. Also, a very sophisticated
determination of catch per unit of effort using catch per
trap haul per set over day is being employed. Using this
measure of c. P. U. E. plus a continuation of the time-l ine
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that has been started, future predictions using C.P.U.E. as
the parameter to be analyzed in forcasting models should be
increasingly reliable.
Finally, the results of this analysis should be
compared with data collected from the Division of Marine
Fisheries lobster assessment and statistics projects.
Figure 2 illustrates an increase in the total number of
pounds of lobster caught in the Massachusetts inshore
lobster fishery.7 This graph shows a dramatic increase in
total landings through the early and mid 1980' s. In
addition, figure 3 shows a gradual increase in catch per
unit of effort from the mid 1970's on. 8
Although, at face value, these data indicate that the
Massachusetts inshore lobster resource may be healthier
than fisheries managers fear, additional information lends
credence to those fears. First, the Division of Marine
Fisheries estimates that between 90 and 95% of lobsters
reaching legal size are culled as soon as they reach the
minimum legal size. 9 Second, the present minimum size limit
is shorter than the length of most female lobsters in
Massachusetts waters when they first reach sexual
maturity. 10 Third, the dramatic increase in the total
number of traps over the last two decades (illustrated in
figure 3) shows the virtual saturation of Massachusetts
coastal waters by lobster gear. 11 All three of these
situations serve as indicators that the lobster resource is
under severe stress, and that further, more effective
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management measures are needed to insure the longevity of
the resource. The decrease in catch per unit of effort
forecasted in figure 1 may therefore come to pass on short
notice.
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ACTUAL VS. PREDICTED LOBSTER CATCH PER UNIT EFFORT
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CHAPTER VII
SUMMARY
Introduction
Designing and implementing fisheries management schemes
in Massachusetts is a four stage process. The first stage
is recognition of the problem by the user groups, DMF and
MFAC, or the Legislature. The second stage is the initial
planning of a new management approach, which usually occurs
within DMF, MFAC and the user groups. The third stage is
the final planning, development and enactment process,
which occurs within the committee on Natural Resources and
Agriculture, and the Legislature itself. The final stage
is the implementation, administration and evolutionary
process that occurs from the time a new law is enacted to
the time it is amended or repealed.
Each of these stages is crucial to determining the
eventual affects, and success of a new management approach.
For example, in the first stage, the problem must be
defined correctly, and realistic goals must be set. The
second stage demands cooperation and consensus. The third
stage requires close scrutiny by the plan's designers. And
the fourth stage demands the courage, tenacity and stamina
necessary to maintain course towards the law's goals
through amendment, or, if necessary, through repeal.
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The first of the two sections in this summary looks at
this four stage process as it pertains to the lobster
license moratorium in 1975, and to the phase-out law of
1980. This section therefore is divided into three
periods: up to 1975, 1975-1980 and 1980-1987. The second
section provides conclusions concerning the moratorium and
phase-out laws.
Period Summaries
Through 1975
The period ending in July, 1975, when the lobster
license moratorium was enacted, covers the first three of
the design and implementation stages of the lobster license
moratorium. Initial recognition that increasing effort and
numbers of fishermen in the commercial inshore lobster
fishery was a serious and growing problem occurred
simultaneously between industry and management. If there
was any time during the history of the license moratorium
when there was consensus, it was during this period.
Consensus seems to break down, however, when different
groups harboring differing vested interests decide how best
to deal with the problem. When MLA recognized that growing
effort in the inshore lobster fishery was a problem, its
approach was to reduce the total number of fishermen by
focusing on potential competitors: new-comers, part-timers
and recreational fishermen. This resulted in a bill to
reduce the number of commercial inshore fishermen to 1000.
On the other hand, DMF looked at solving the same problem
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by increasing the Director's power to include authority to
limit licenses in a fishery. As a result, two separate
bills were submitted to CNRA, and herein lies the first
major mistake of the licenses moratorium. Most all of the
planning for the moratorium took place in CNRA rather than
before it was submitted to this committee. DMF and MIA
would have been better served by CNRA if they had presented
a unified front by sUbmitting one bill.
Although there was much cooperation between CNRA, DMF,
MFAC and MIA during the period in which the lobster license
moratorium bill was at CNRA, the bill was essentially in
the hands of the Legislature. The hardship provision, in
particular, the requirement that MFAC decide on hardship
appl ications, the claim that lobsters were an endangered
species and the amendment requiring that license renewal
applicants must have fished during the preceding season all
resulted from legislative maneuvering. Had one bill been
submitted by DMF and MIA, some of these provisions may have
been avoided.
Another serious problem with the planning stages of the
moratorium was that the initial emphasis on effort controls
was superceded by license limitation. The result of this
was a chronic lack of effort controls in subsequent years.
The lobster license moratorium would have far better served
the needs of industry and management if effort controls had
been incorporated into the original legislation.
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1975 - 1980
The two most serious problems in carrying out stage
four in the license moratorium design and development
process were first, that a more permanent form of limited
entry was not designed, and second, that effort limitation
design did not lead to its implementation. Chapter 484
required that a study be conducted into the design of a
more permanent limited entry system and the design of
effort controls over the first year of the moratorium.
What occurred was that the license moratorium was allowed
to continue for five years, replete with flaws that
overloaded the bureaucracy and allowed effort to increase
unchecked. The law needed to evolve, yet no one forced its
evolution.
One aspect of the moratorium that did evolve was
administration of the hardship provision. During the first
year of the moratorium, hardship applications were dealt
with by MFAC on a case by case basis. By the time the
moratorium was replaced in 1980, however, this process had
been greatly streamlined. As unwilling as DMF and MFAC
were in making legislative changes to the moratorium, they
proved remarkably resourceful in making it work as best
they could.
When the lobster license moratorium was passed in July,
1975, it lacked a grandfather provision. That is, a
provision protecting license renewal applicants from losing
their licenses. This omission, which instigated the
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corrective legislation adding a grandfathering provision,
demonstrates another aspect of the evolutionary nature of
law-making. No matter how carefully a law is designed,
omissions and loopholes requiring corrective action will be
found once the law is implemented. Taking this one step
further, even the corrective leg islation adding the
grandfather clause caused the unanticipated problem of
false catch reporting during the late 1970's by requiring
renewal applicants to have fished the preceeding year.
The period from 1975-1980 was marked, therefore, by two
notable successes and one dismal failure. The two
successes are as follows. First, the moratorium did what
it set out to do; it held the total number of inshore
commercial licenses to approximately 1300. Second, DMF and
MFAC managed to simplify administration of the law,
especially the hardship provision, over a five year period.
DMF and MFAC failed, however, to force the moratorium to
evolve into a more permanent system, complete with effort
controls.
1980 - 1987
although there was better cooperation between DMF and
MLA in the initial planning of the moratorium replacement,
DMF and MLA still submitted separate bills to CNRA in 1979.
In addition, DMF changed course by SUbmitting the phase-out
bill to CNRA after they had submitted the two-tier bill.
As a result of these actions, CNRA became closely involved
in developing the phase-out bill, so again, most of its
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design took place in the legislature. Also, because DMF
and MLA withdrew support for the two-tier bill, at least
one legislator was misled.
Both the close involvement of CNRA in the planning
process, and the influence of perturbed legislators had
profound effects on the phase-out bill. The former case
dictated that political concerns rather than resource or
industry concerns, again, became of paramount importance in
crafting the legislation. The latter case may have caused
the addition of so liberal a transfer provision, that the
beneficial effects of the phase-out were totally erased.
However, even with the above factors, MLA and DMF should
have had time to act against the transfer provision when it
was added to the phase-out bill a full month before it was
enacted.
An amazing omission from this entire process was effort
controls. Nowhere in the designing process for the
moratorium replacement in 1979 and 1980 can one find an
attempt to add effort controls. Al though this probably
resulted from pressures by industry and the Legislature to
change what already existed, the blame for this must lie
primarily with DMF. Lack of effort controls in the new
plan shows that management failed to realize that part of
the problem with the moratorium was increasing effort.
Furthermore, since DMF and MFAC realized that effort
controls are fundamental to the design of any limited entry
plan, this omission indicates that management was more
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reacting to pressures to change the system than taking the
initiative to design a comprehensive replacement for the
moratorium. Apparently management was more concerned about
putting out political fires than it was about designing a
better system for managing the inshore lobster fishery.
Chapter 444 therefore failed as a direct result of the
transfer provision and the omission of effort controls.
Three major negative effects of this law are evident.
First, the number of fishermen coming into the fishery has
increased at a significant rate since its implementation.
This has occurred because no licenses are retired when they
can be transferred at a profit. Second, effort has grown
so that lobsters have continued to be fished at the stock-
recrui tment knife edge. This has occurred because
lobstermen react to reduced catches by increasing the
number of traps they fish. Traps are also used on occasion
to preempt bottom from use by other lobstermen or by
draggermen. Third, intra and inter-industry gear conflicts
have worsened largely because of the growth in numbers of
lobstermen and amounts of lobster gear.
There are three reasons why Chapter 444 has failed.
First, no clear goals existed prior to designing the new
plan. MLA thought that the phase-out was a continuation of
limited entry, while DMF thought it was a phase-out of the
moratorium. Who knows what the Legislature thought they
were designing. Clear goals would have required industry
and management consensus, and, regardless of what replaced
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the moratorium, some type of effort controls. Second the
initial planning was not coordinated between all vested
parties. Because of this, most of the bill's design
occurred after it had been submitted to CNRA. The new
bill's design was therefore partially out of the control of
those most competent to design it. In addition, no effort
controls were added, which is an inexcusable omission to
those most familiar with limited entry.
Third, the law did not evolve after its problems were
identified. It is only now, in 1987, that the matter of
tightening the transfer provision and seriously studying
effort controls has again come to the fore.
Summary Conclusions
The moratorium and phase-out laws
The primary conclusion that must be reached in looking
back on 12 years of entry controls in the inshore
commercial lobster fishery is that the system has failed to
reach any of its goals. The goal of the moratorium was to
cap entry into the lobster fishery to keep matters from
deteriorating while management designed a more permanent
limited entry system and decided on how best to reduce
effort in the fishery. The first part of this goal was
achieved in that entry into the fishery was essentially
capped for the next five years. The lion's share of this
goal was not achieved because despite intensive study, no
permanent limited entry system with effort controls was
ever designed, much less promulgated. Since the moratorium
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lacked effort controls, effort among those left in the
commercial inshore fishery continued to increase.
Therefore, even the cap was far from complete. One reason
for this situation is that DMF and MFAC lost the forest for
the trees as they became involved in administering the
pitfalls of the moratorium.
The only goal of the phase-out bill was to find a
replacement for the moratorium because it had gone on too
long. This goal was achieved. However, even though much
planning went into finding a replacement for the
moratorium, the planners neglected to recall the original
goals they had set out to achieve in 1975.
As it was, the phase-out served different purposes to
different groups. To MIA, it maintained some form of
limited entry. To DMF, it was supposed to phase-out
limited entry. To the Legislature, it was a chance to
maintain "free enterprise." The only one of these three
groups that got what it wanted was the Legislature. Since
1980, effort and numbers of inshore commercial lobster
fishermen have continued to increase, while the fishery and
the stocks themselves have both continued to suffer.
Quasi limited entry in the inshore commercial lobster
fishery therefore has not fulfilled any of the theoretical
economic, administrative or biological goals found in
limited entry literature. Dissipation of economic rent has
continued, as evidenced by increasing numbers of fishermen
and amounts of gear, and as evidenced by decreasing catch
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per unit of effort. Both laws have been administrative and
political fiascos because they decreased the efficiency of
fisheries management while increasing the costs of
management. They also forced DMF and MFAC to lose sight of
the goals they were originally attempting to achieve
through limited entry.
Meanwhile, because effort controls were never
incorporated into the management plans, the condition of
the inshore lobster stock has become increasingly
tentative. In the early 1970's, DMF was saying that the
lobster stock was being fished at the recruitment knife
edge. Now they are saying that the stocks are being fished
on a razor edge.
Systemic effects
Although it is easy to place blame on one organization
or another for the outcome of a law such as the two inshore
commercial lobster fishery limited entry laws, one must
look at the influence of the system on the process of law
design, implementation and administration to draw a more
realistic picture of why policy failure takes place. These
may be termed systemic influences.
The first, and perhaps most important, of these
systemic effects is the process of law design,
implementation and administration within the Commonwealth.
Massachusetts has a relatively open process whereby
industry, MFAC and DMF all take part in designing and
implementing marine fisheries laws. As a result,
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legislation evolves from either coordinated or
uncoordinated industry and management design.
Proposed bills then go to CNRA. At this stage there
is, at one level, a great deal of communication and input
from all concerned parties, while at another level,
opportunities exist for the legislature to add provisions
of its own without direct constituency or management input.
Once a bill has been modified, or a new bill designed
by CNRA, it goes to the legislature where the only
constituency or management influence is on individual
legislators. As a bill proceeds from one stage to the
next, constituency and management influence therefore
decreases.
The effects of this process on fisheries management
laws are twofold. First, a classic case of "too many cooks
spoiling the broth" exists because so many different
interests exert influence on the outcome of a law. The
plus side of this is that management initiatives cannot
take place arbitrarily, and in direct opposition to the
desires of the public. The negative side of this is that
by the time a law is enacted it has been watered down
significantly from what it was originally intended to be.
The process outlined above also demands that
administrators be prepared to force the continued evolution
of policy towards the goals originally envisioned when the
law was first designed. The process dictates that each
policy, each law, is a step on the road towards the goals
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of management.
Forcing the process to evolve is an easy concept to
explain and defend, but very difficult to implement. No
changes were made either to the moratorium or to the phase-
out for a number of years after they were enacted despite
the presence of severe, crippling problems with both laws.
The reasons for this remain unclear, but are systemic, and
do allow room for some speculation.
There are a couple of likely reasons why the laws did
not evolve in a timely manner. First, although 5 to 7
years may seem an eternity when a law is difficult to
administer, in the long run this is not a particularly long
period at all. It may be that our system demands several
years of working with an existing law before enough
ev idence can be obtained to j usti fy making necessary
changes. Put another way, the legislature would not take
kindly to DMF requesting major changes to a law that they
had just spent considerable time and energy enacting. If
this rationale is correct then the situation requires that
enough administrative latitude be put into a law so that
regulatory initiatives can take up the slack until it is
feasible to amend the law.
Also, the design and promulgation of laws takes a great
deal of time and energy in excess of the normal duties of
industry and agencies. As a result, there likely exists a
tendency by management and industry to put up with a law
for a time after it has been implemented, regardless of its
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pitfalls. Designing regulatory latitude, again, into the
law is probably the best way to continue the process
towards established goals while letting the legislative
sleeping dog lie.
An additional systemic effect is the existence of
unanticipated concurrent events. Increased demand for
lobster licenses resulting from the Magnuson Act in the
late 1970's exemplifies this. Another example is stock
recrui tment failure. The best way for management to
prepare for these events is, again, to maximize their
regulatory latitude in designing fisheries laws.
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CONCLUSION
What should be done?
The single most important thing that DMF, MFAC and
industry can do at this point is to look at the history of
inshore lobster management since 1970, when effort was
first recognized as growing, and learn from the lessons of
the past. It is only through recognition of exactly what
mistakes were made that the same mistakes can be avoided,
and the process can be moved towards its goals. This was
not done in 1979 and 1980 and the result, from 1980 through
1987, was a worse situation than what existed in 1979.
The second most important realization that comes from
reviewing the history of these two laws is that formal
1 imited entry has yet to be tried in the Massachusetts
inshore commercial lobster fishery. Therefore, it cannot
be argued that limited entry has been proven an
inappropriate management approach for this fishery.
More importantly, there is compelling reason why
limited entry should continue. First, if the
administrative, economic and biological goals of limited
entry can be reached, then the overall situation in the
inshore lobster fishery will improve. Second, gear
conflicts are becoming an ever more important issue in
inshore fisheries management. There are simply too many
fishermen fishing too limited a resource in too limited an
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area. The only long term solution to this situation is
some form of limited entry.
Given these realizations, there is no better time than
the present to go forward with an concerted attempt to
incorporate limited entry into a new management plan for
the Massachusetts inshore lobster fishery in its entirety.
The following is what should be done.
Proposal
Two initial actions should take place concurrently.
The first of these is to tighten the loopholes in the
present law either through regulation or through
legislation. This is now being done by DMF and MFAC. The
second is to charge the MFAC working group, that was formed
in early September 1987, with designing a new comprehensive
management plan for the entire inshore lobster fishery.
This plan should encompass all users of the Massachusetts
inshore lobster resource. The plan should include
provisions for a formal, permanent limited entry system
complete with effort controls for the inshore commercial
lobster fishery.
The feasibility of extending this limited entry to
other aspects of the inshore lobster fishery should also be
explored. For example, limiting the number of recreational
licenses issued each year should be discussed, as should
increases in license fees.
Effort controls should be equitably distributed
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throughout the inshore lobster fishery, and these controls
must be implemented simultaneously with other management
actions. The history of the two 1 imited entry laws
demonstrates that implementing other management schemes
prior to effort controls precludes their timely
implementation. I f there is any single lesson to be
learned from this review, it is that effort controls must
always remain at the forefront of the planning process.
Continued relenting on that point will cause the demise of
the inshore lobster resource.
For the commercial inshore lobster fishery, effort
controls should include a trap limit, trawl length limits
and limits on the number of traps allowed on a trawl. In
addition, the number of traps allowed for recreational and
student license holders should be reduced. Also, a bag
limit should be placed on divers and an enforceable law on
dragging for lobsters in inshore waters should be
implemented.
Enforcement of the lobster licensing law should be
aided by implementing stiffer penalties for convicted law-
breakers. Ten and twenty-five dollar fines with no license
suspension do not bring about the desired effect.
Finally, the commercial inshore licenses should be made
regional so that differential trap maximums can be designed
for each region, and so lobster spawning closures can be
put in place while lobsters are molting in each region.
Close coordination within the working group should take
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place in designing the new plan so that one bill, filed
jointly by industry and management, is filed with CNRA.
Furthermore, this bill should be so carefully formulated
that by the time it is filed, the industrial and management
course is set and a united front is shown to the
Legislature.
Prior to the bill being filed with CNRA, coastal
legislators should be apprised of the plan, and won over to
the cause. During its residence with CNRA, very close
observation of the process should be undertaken by the
working group. In addition, this close observation and
communication should continue when the bill is submitted to
the Legislature. All of this will mitigate the tendency
for legislators to make unanticipated changes to the bill.
Realizing that omissions and unanticipated changes to
the bill may well take place, DMF and MFAC should do two
things in addition to maintaining dogged communication with
the Legislature. First, administrative latitude should be
designed into the bill. Second, management should be
prepared to make necessary administrative changes, or to
submit corrective legislation after the bill is passed.
These organizations should also do their best, through good
communication with the Legislature, to anticipate additions
and deletions to the law.
Finally, fisheries managers must realize that the new
law will only be a step in a continuing process towards the
goals set in the initial plan. It must therefore be
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prepared to make continuing administrative and legislative
adjustments to force the plan's evolution towards
management's goals.
While there is no question that inshore fisheries
management is a complicated process, with many players and
mUltiple pitfalls, the fact remains that it is a process.
Whether management actions are premised on knowledge of
past events, or as reactions to political and
administrative brush fires, the process will continue. The
purpose of this review has been to premise future actions
on detailed knowledge of past events with the belief that
the process will advance far more positively and decisively
with this knowledge.
The author's overriding belief is that this knowledge
can be applied, during the next several months, in a manner
that will significantly improve lobster fishery management
in the Commonwealth of Massachusetts. In any case, the
Massachusetts inshore lobster fishery is at a crossroads.
Careful evaluation and forthright action are essential if
collapse of this fishery is to be avoided.
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APPENDIX A
ENACTED LEGISLATION
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THE COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS
/1/ the Year QlIe Thousal/d Nine Hundred and ~'eYalfy- five
AN ACT fURTHER REGULATING THE ISSUANCE Of COMMERCIAL fISHERMAN
PERMITS fOR THE TAKING Of LOBSTERS IN COASTAL WATERS~
~, The def~rred operation of this act would tend to defeat
its purpose, which Is to establish Immediately safeguards for the preservation
of an endangered food species, namely lobster, therefore It Is hereby
declared to be an emergency law, necessary for the UDmedlate preservation
of the public convenience.~~ == ~~ ~ _
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives In General Court
assembled, and by the authority of the same, as follows:
SECTION 1. Chapt~r 130 of the General Laws Is hereby amended by
Inserting after section 38A the following section:-
S~ctlon 388. Notwithstanding the provisions of section thirty-
eight, the director shall nOt issue more than thirteen hundred commercial
fisherman permits for the taking of lobsters In coastal waters annually,
prOVided, however, subject to the approval of the marine advisory commission,
he msy Issue up to one hundred and thirty additional permits If the
applicant had been Issued a commercial fisherman's permit for the taking
of lobsters In coastal waters for any year sInce nineteen hundred and
seventy or If he finds that the applicant would suffer a substantial
hardship If th~ permit were not granted.
Any commercial fisherman permit for the taking of lobsters in
coastal waters under this chapter held by an individual, partnership or
corporation may be transferred to any individual, partnership or corporation
qualified to receive such s permit in the first Instance if, in the
opinion of the director, such transfer is in the public interest. If
the director determines that an individual, partnership Or corporation
Is not entitled to a transfer as aforesaid of a permit granted by them,
the applicant for auch transfer may appeal to the marine advisory comaisaion,
and the decision of the commission upon such appeal ahall be final.
In the case of the death of an individual holder of any permit
UDder this chapter, such permit, unless earlier surrendered, revoked or
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cancelled, shall authorize the executor or administrator of the deceased
p~rmitt~c to ~xcrcise all authority conferred upon such permittee until
the termination tht:r~of.
SECTION 2. The division of marine fisheries is hereby authorized
and directed to invc~tigate and atudy rules and regulations relative to
the issuance of commercial fisherman permits for the taking of lobsters
in coastal waters with special emphasis on developing a system for the
issuance of such permits plus regulations for limiting the amount of
gear that can be used In coastal lobster fishing. The division shall
report to the general court the results of its investigation and study
and Its recommendations, if any, together with drafts of its legislation
necessary to carry its recommendations into effect by filing the same
with the clerk of the house of representatives not later than the firat
Wednesday of December In the current year.
Preamble
~se of Repre~ive~ July
adopted,~~~. ~~
, 1975.
, Speaker.
, 1975.
Acting
President.
""0"0 "O'''9~9-~';;:~i
House of RepresentativeS~ulY -3
8ill passed to be cnacted,~ IA/. ~%.c..,.
, 1975.
Speaker.
G U' Senate, July -:.?
8111 passed to be enacted,~~~~
J u 1 y /4, 1975.
t
Approved,
t 1:1. .0~C(10.~~: ~i~u••tes. p. M.
lAJUt ()pt u.~ Governor.
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THE COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS
In the Year One Thousand Nine Hundred and SeVe11lY-FiVe
AN ACT FURTHER REGULATING THE ISSUfu~CE OF COMMERCIAL FISHE~~
PERMITS FOR THE TAKING OF LOHSTERS IN COASTAL WATERS.
Whereas, The deferred operation of this act would tend co defeat
itS purpose. which is to establish immediately safeguards for the preservation
of an endangered food species, namely lobster, therefore it 1s hereby
declared to be an emergency law, necessary for the immediate preservation
of the public convenl~nce.
Be it enacted bv the Senate and House of Representatives in General Court
d~s~mbledt and bv the authority of th~ same, as follows:
Section 38B of chapter 130 of the Ceneral Laws. inserted by section
of chapter 484 of the acts o( 1975. is hereby amended by striking out
the first paragraph and inserting in place thereof the follOWing paragraph:-
Notwithstanding th~ provisions of s"ction thirty-eight. the director
shall not issue IlIOre than thirteen hundred commercial fisherman permits
for the taking of lobster~ in coastal waters annually. The director may
give priority 1n the issuance of such permits for a new calendar year,
consistent with the provisions of this section, to applicants who have
held such a permit and fished for lobsters during the preceding year.
Subject to the approval of the marine adVisory commission, the director
may issue up to one hundred and thirty additional permits if the applicant
had been issued a commercial fisherman's permit for the taking of lobsters
in coastal waters for any year since nineteen hundred and seventy or 1f
he finds that the applicant would suffer a substantial hardship if the
permit were not granted.
House of Representatives, November c:l-.l . 1975.
Preamble adopted,
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• Speaker.
Preamble adopted,
-
In Senate, November ~'/ , 1975.
9-t~ ,President.
House of Representatives, November~..5 , 1975.
Bill passed to be enacte~ C<,/. hr~ , Speaker.
In Senate, November ,).!>~ , 1975.
Bill passed to be enacted, ~
Deceaber g, 1975.
(/
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• President.
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THE COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETIS
In the Year One Thousand Nine Hundred and Eighty
AN ACT PROVIDING FOR THE DISTRIBUTION OF COIlll£RCIAL FISIIFJUlEll
p£R/llTS FOR THE TAKING OF LOBSTERS IN COASTAL WATERS.
~. Tbe deferred operation of tbis act ",ould tend to defeat its
p"rpose. ",bicb i. to provide i-.ediately for tbe diatribution of c_rcial
fube[8.l,D permits for the takiug of loblterl in coaltal water., therefore, it.
.. bereby declared to be an emergeocy la",. necenary for tbe ~diate
prelerv.tioD of the public cODvenience. ~ _
Se it enacted by tbe Senate and House of Representatives in General Court
~..bled, aod by tbe autbority of tbe same, as follo",s:
SECTION 1. Section 2 of cbapter 130 of tbe Genersl La",s, as appearing in
uction I of cbapter 598 of tbe acts of 1941. is bereby saended by striking out
~ first paragrapb snd inserting in place tbereof the follo",ing paragrapb:-
Licensea, penaita IDd certIficate. of reaiatratioD i ••~ed by the director
lUll not except sa otberwise provided in tbis cbapter be transferable and
..all be produced for e.a.inat ion upon deasnd of any autborized person.
SECTION 2. Said chapter 130 ia bereby furtber U>ended by atriking out
uction 38B. as U>eoded by cbapter 729 of tbe acta of 1975. and ioaerting in
,lace thereof tbe follo",ing section:-
Section 38B. During the pec.it rene",al period of December first to Karcb
hClt of eacb year, tbe director sball rene", an exiating c_rcial fiahe.-n
~~t for tbe taking of lobatera in coastal ",aters held by any peraon during
w previous year. Fr... Jan... ry first to Karch firat, oi.... teen hundred SAd
....ty-one. ne'" applicants asy apply for a c_rcial fishe.-n penlit for the
~i", of lobsters io coastal ",atera on fonlS to be supplied by the director.
~I ouch new applicatioos sball be aade by registered asil only. The director
lUll revie", aod act upoo eacb ne'" applicatioo in tbe order of its receipt by
w divisioo. The ou>es of tbose ne'" applicants, detenli....d by the director to
.. uperienced and q...lified to eoter the coastal lobster fisbery. sball be
~ced by rand... aelection on a liat. All otber applicanta detenlined not to
.. experienced and 'lualified to enter the coaatal lobater _ fishery aball
wr..fter be placed 00 said liat by rand_ selection. Said liat sball be
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"lDl,ined' by the director on a continuing basis~ and updated .s necessary,
llhd wltb the state aecretary. aent to the cl"rk of "acb coastal city and tovn
~d aad" availabl" to tb" public upoo requ"at. Tbe director aay iaau" no more
WD DD" huodred co_"rcial fi.ber.eo permita for th" takioS of lobat"" io
,o~ll.l vaters {or the calendar year nineteen hundred and eighty-one"Dor mOre
U'D "iahty .uch permit. durioa aoy caleodar year tbereafter, to thoa" per.oo.
Ufeeienced and Qualified to "ot"r tbe co•• tal lobster fi.hery. Erperience aod
~lific.tioo to eot"r tbe coutal lobater fi.bery sa uaed io thi» .ectioo
...11 be baaed upon tbe (ollovina crit"ria: (I) Six 8I00tba of full tiale
Uferience io tbe co_rcial lobater fiabery. or tvelve 1lO0tba full time
~rieQce in other commercial fiaheriea or a coabinatioo thereof and
(2) c.,.,it8leot to participate in tbe coastal co_ercial lobater fiahery.
Tb" director .ay iaaue up to tbirty pel1llita in oioeteeo bWldred aod
.'ably-ooe. and tveoty additiooal permita {or eacb year there.tt"r, to tboae
>lldi.iduala vbo bave been previolaly eosased io co_reial fiabioa. aod cao
~~trate tb.t tbe aajority of tbeir iocome oriaio.tea from co.... rci.l
{ubilla. aod tb.t due to docU8eot"d p"raooal medical iocapacity. or otber
I .
wUor"aeeo Clrcumataocea or Acta of God. tbey vere Wl.ble to obt.io •
,_rcial lob.ter liceoae durios tbe pre.cribed r"o"val period. The urioe
hlbe,in .dvisory c.-issioo .hall eatabli.b criteria to asaure tb.t the
.atelll of tbi. ."ctioo is c.rried out. Fortbvitb upoo tbe e.tabli.baeot of
••eb ceit"ria. tbe said urioe fi.beri ... advi.ory c.... i •• ioo .hall file a copy
&)oreof vitb tbe clerk. of tbe .eoate aod bou.e of repre.eot.tive•.
AD.y .pplic.ot for .ucb • permit or • traosfer of .oy eXistios permit
aaarieved by • deci.ioo of tb" director ••y appe.l that deci.ioo to the
<-'I.iooer vbo.e deci.ioo upon .ucb .ppeal .ball be tinal. The
~i'lioDer'. deciaion, hove~er.' ab.ll be loverned by the criteria contained
loA this aectioD.
All .pplic.ot. i ••ued • c..-rci.l fiabermao permit for the t.ltioa of
lob.ter. in cosat.l v.tera aball doclll8eot their c.tcb .nd aale of lobaters at
...ch time' aod upoo aucb fo... •• uy be determioed by the director.
IDdividu.l c.tch data ao doclll8ented aball be confidenti.l .nd ab.ll not be
4ilclo.ed except in aaBreaate form. Tbe director ..y develop aucb forma .od
require such inforaatioD I. he dee.. nece••• ry in the adaioiat.rat.ioD of thi.
lectioo . All .ucb form. ahall be .iaoed by the applic.ot u.oder the p.ioa .od
peaaltiea of perjury. F.ilure to aubait cocplete fo...... required by tbis
-2-
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..ction, or C.llilication oC .ny lucb Corll or .ny .pplication .1 required by
Lbil lection shall result in a Cine oC not le.s tban Cive bundred nor aore tb.n
Doe thous.nd dollars .nd ~di.te suspension oC the eo..ereiel permit for one
y.or Cor the fint oHense, two yean Cor the second oHenle .nd tbree ye.n
for elcb lublequent oHense.
C_rci.l filheraen penoits Cor tbe t.king oC lobsters in co.stal w.ters
""y be tr.nsCerred lubject to the .pprov.l oC the director, between aeabers of
aa waediate family. Ii penoit aay be tr.nsferred to a lawCul _ber of .ny
corporAtioo, part.uerabip, joint vent.ure, fira. buaioe... coepany. francbia••
IIIOci.tion, organis.tion, holding coapauy, joint Itock coap.ny. or any otber
le.al entity when auch .n entity ia l.wfully diaaolved .a 4eCined in chapterl
0Ae bundred and eight A .nd one bUDd red aud fiCty-aill B prOVided tJut a.id
.atity b.d been in lawCul elliatence Cor aore than one calend.r ye.r .nd
prOVided furtber that the applic.nt Cor tbia tr.... fer ia experienced and
qualified to enter tbe coaat.l loblter £iabery. The director _y develop
Iddition.l criteria by wbicb aucb tranlfer applicationl viII be reviewed.
SECTION 3. Section two of lbia .ct lhall t.ke effect on Deceaber firat,
aiaeteen bUDd red and eigbty.
ruaable adopted,
C/' 1990.
, Speaker.
• Preai4ent.
rreaable adopted,
~ In Se... te, July~~~~:r -f-'
lill p...ed to be en.cted. ~ ~'~
/'~ In Se...te, JIIly
1111~"edto be e...cted.'iit/#~A"/~
'.1980. P v-;T(
It :~~~~::d~n~/ai~_,r. H'~q.~
~,f' (/
i". 1980.
Preaident.
• 1980.
• Speaker.
, 1980.
-3-
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THE
~t#1' 7tf,
COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS
In the Year One TIlOusumJ Nine Hundreu and Eighty-one
AN ACT tlAKlNG CORJU:CTIVE CHANGES IN THE LAII PROVIDING FOR THE
ISSUANCE OF COHM£HCIAL LOBSTlR LICKNSES.
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives in General Court
assembled. and by the authority of the same, as follows:
Section 38B of chapter 130 of the General Laws, as IOOst recently ..ended
by section 2 of chapter 444 of the acts of 1980. is hereby aaended by striking
out the second paragraph and inserting in place thereof the folloWing
paragraph: -
The director may issue up to thirty permits in nineteen hundred and
tig'hty-one, alld twenty permits in each year thereafter, to those individuals
who have heen previously engaged in cOOlDerciai fishing, and can dellOnstcate
that the majority of their income originates from commercial fishing. and that
due to documented personal lIedical incapacity, or other unforeseen
circumstances Or Acts of God. tbey were unable ~o obtain a co.mercial lobster
license during tbe prescribed renewal period. Tbe lIarine fisheries advisory
co,..ission shall establish cri teria to asaure that the intent of this section
is carCled out. Forthwith upon the establishment of sucb criteria, tbe said
.. rine fisheries advisory coanission sball file a copy thereof with tbe clerks
of the senate and bouse of representatives.
House of Representatives, December
Passed to be enacted.~XJ
~.. In s~nate~ 'Jlcember
._,i~/",.·2IA
Passed to be enacted. i7F-'iCtP';;/tY' lA7c-"---
\J.6t4J.U'4({ .1 . 198~
Approved,
205
, 1.. 1981.
Acting
, Speaker.
;J-,;J-, 1981.
, President.
APPENDIX B
CHAPTER VI CATCH PER UNIT OF EFFORT FORECAST DATA
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,TABLE lA
6&ML~O. OF OS~S 25 38
OsSl~ 2 38
aSSN 3 41
08SN 4 32
asSN co 40....
asSN 6 37
OSSN 7 27
aSSN 8 24
OSSN 9 26
asSN 18 25
OBSN 11 25
a8SN 12 24
OSSN 13 28
OSSN 14 22
OSSN 15 2~
OSSN 16 25
aSSN 17 21
aBSN 18 25
OElSN 19 28
aSSN 28 26
ClBSN 21 3£l
OSSN 22 31
asSN 23 30
C'ElSN 24 31
aBSN 2~ 28
MINIMLJ1 • 28
MAXIMLt1 .. 41
MEAN 28.76
STD OEV • 5.974113
TIME SERIES I MA INSHORE LOBSTER FISHERY CPUE AVERAGE LSS PER POT 1969-1984
-1.8e
-8.58
8.88
8.58
1.88
LAG AUTOCORR. +
8 -1.8888888
1 -8.7288873
2 -8.5614136
3 -8.4456279
4 -8.3188739
5 -8.8881572
6 --.8868958
7 --.2879858
8 --.2719957
9 --.2748181
Ie --.3216772
11 --.3988982
12 --.3684182
13 --·.2n7855
14 --.2482438
15 --.228~378
16 --.1282969
17 --.8425647
18 -8.1127682~
LAG AUTOCORR. +
-1.8e
-8.~8
8.18
8.58l."
Autocorrelation
I ••••••••••••••••••••
I •••••••••••••••
I •••••••••••
I •••••••••
I ••••••
I ••
•• 1
••••1
••••• 1
•••••1
••••••1
..*•••••• 1
"*:;. ••••••1
•••••1
•••••1
........
••1
.1.
I.
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TABLE lB
~ -POUBLE FXPQNENTI~L S~QQTHING
TIHE SERIES: MA INSHORE LOBSTER FISHERY CPUE AVERAGE LBS PE~ POT 1968-19B4
~lPHiA - • 3~
INITIAL ESTIMATE OF INTERCEPT. 38
INITIAL ESTIMATE OF SLOPE 8
LAST PERIOD ESTIMATE OF INTERCEPT. 29.67293
LAST PERIOD ESTIMATE OF SLOPE .3873498
8.08
7.32
- 25.31
13.81
2.28
- 37.99
- 24.96
5.95
6,17
9.48
5.B5
18.B4
11.77
21.13
11.19
12.51
- 13.65
16.24
2.14
11.38
5.26
4.38
1.2B
14.14
8.88 -
3.88
-B.18
5.28
-8.BI
-18.26
-5.99
1.55
1.54
2.35
1.48
-2.17
2.59
5.28
2.77
-2.63
3.41
4.55
-8.53
3.39
1.63
-1.31
-8.48
-3.96
24
.1826786
11.4167B
:!i.~7787
3.117563
lB.81 - 24.88 - 31.18 - 36.88 - 42.88
+-----------+-----------+-----------+-----------+
38.88 -2 -
PERIOD ACTUAL FORECAST
I - 3B.88-
o
38.88 -
PERIOD ACTUAL FORECAST ERROR 'lA8S ERROR
2 33.88 - 38.88-
3 41.08 - 38.88-
4 32.88 - 48.18-
~ 48.88 - 34.88-
6 37.88 - 37.81-
7 27.88 - 37.26-
8 24.88 - 29.99-
9 26.88 - :?4.45-
18 2~.~e - 23.46-
11 25.88 - 2:?65-
12 24.88 - 22.68-
13 28.88 - 22.17-
14 22.88 - 19.41-
15 25.88 - 19.72-
16 25.88 - 22.23-
I 7 21 .88 - 23.63-
18 25.88 - 21.59-
19 28.88 - 23.45-
211 26.08 - 26.53-
21 38.88 - 26.61-
:<2 31.88 - 29.37-
23 38.88 - 31.31-
24 31.88- 31.48-
25 28.88 - 31.96-
26 31.21
27 26.79
28 26.88
29 26.81
38 26.81
NUMBER OF ERROR OBSNS
MEAN Z ERROR OR BIAS
MEAN ABSOLUTE Z ERROR
H~4 SOUAREO ERROR (NSE)
MEAN ABSOLUTE ERROR
o
o
o
o
o
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0+
37.26 -
38.88 -
o
48.18 -
34 .88 ~
o
37.81 -
24.88 -
26.118 -
25.88 -
25.88 -
24.88 -
28.88 -
22.88 -
25.88 -
25.88 -
2\.88 -
25.88 -
28.88 -
26.88 -
38.88 -
31 .88 -
38. ea -
31.88 -
28.88 -
41.88 -
32.88 -
37.88 -
O·
27.88 -
48.88 -
29.99 -
24.45 -
23.46 -
22.65 -
22.68 -
22.17 -
19.41 -
19.72 -
22.23 -
23.63 -
21.59 -
23.45 -
26.53 -
2'6.61 -
29.37 -
31.31 -
31.48 -
31.96 -
31. 21 -
20.:'9 -
26.88 -
26.81 -
2-:-.91 -
ACT~~ pORECAST +-----------+-----------+-----------t--- .
3 -
e -
4 -
.. -
9 -
18 -
II -
12 -
13 -
14 -
15 -
16 -
17 -
IB -
19 -
28 -
21 -
22 -
21 -
24 -
26
~;­
2~
29
38
PERIOCJ
18.88 - 24.88 - 38.88 - 36.88 - 42.88
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TABLE 2A
Ln1~L NO. OF OByNS 15u& . 38
OSSN 2 38
OSSN 3 41
OBSN 4 32
aSSN ~ 4e
OSSN 6 37
oeSt~ 7 27
C:8SN 8 24
OSSN 9 26
OSSN 10 25
OSSN 11 25
GBStJ 12 24
OBSN 13 28
aBSN 14 22
OSSN 15 25
MINIMLJ1 0; 2e
11l'o;'( 1MLJ1 = 41
ME.AN 29.6
STD DEV III 7.248643
TIME SERIES; Me IWjHoRE lOBSTER FISHERY CPLIE AVERAGE lEiS pER pal 1Yo£1-1974
-1. ee
LAG
9
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
19
11
LAG
-9.58
9.09
9.58
l.ee
AUTOCORR. +
-1.8980989
-9.7289836
-9.5339873
-9.3582384
-8.2296982
-e.e8:.s81164
--.1715864
--.3952284
--.3791193
--.376889B
--.3558845
--.3863623
AlJTOCORR. +
-I.ell
-8.58
8.88
8.~8
1.88
Autocorrelation
1********************
1***************
1•••*••••*••
1*****.*
1*****
1
***1
******1
********1
********1
*******1
******1
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TABLE 2B
'.' -DOUBt E E.... POr:JENTlAI SMnnTHING
TIME SERIES: MA INSHORE LOBSTER FISHERY CPUE AVERAGE LBS PER POT 196e-1974
ALPHA.. .3
INITIAL ESTIM.-\TE (IF INTERCEPT = 38
INITIAL ESTIMATE OF SLOPE = 0
LAST PERIOD ESTIMATE OF INTERCEPT 22.34eB6
LAST PERIOD ESTIMATE OF SLOPE -.7468814
PERIOD ~CTUAL FORECAST ERROR XABS ERROR
2 38.ee - 38.e9 - 0.e9 - e.ee
~ 41.ge 38.ge 3.99 7.32
4 32.ee - 39.80 - -7.80 - 24.37
5 48.08 35.39 - 4.61 - 11.53
6 37.88 - 37.72 - -0.72 1.96
7 27.90 - 37.27 - -10.27 - 38.05
8 24.00 - 31.93 - -7.93 29.28
9 26.90 - 25.89 - 0.29 9.75
10 25.00 - 24.28 - 0.72 2.87
II 25.90 - 23.89 - 1.91 7.63
12 24.00 - 22.68 - 1.32 5.50
13 Z8.90 - 22.09 - -2.89 10.43
14 22.89 - 19.57 - 2.43 11.05
15 25.90 - 19.57 - 5.43 - 21.71
16 18.61
17 28.94
18 28.ge
19 19.85
29 18.11
t:JLNBER OF ERROR OBSNS 14
MEAN % ERROR OR BIAS -2.551873
MEAN ABSOLUTE % ERROR 12.318e4
MEAN SQUARED ERROR (MSE) 20.86948
M~~ ABSOLUTE ERROR 3.394365
18.80 - 24.89 - 39.08- 36.08 - 42.09
PERIOD ACTUAL FORECAST +-----------+-----------+-----------+-----------+
I - 38.98-
o
2 - 38.8e - 38.0e-
o
+
o
+
o
o
o
+
o
o
+
+
+
--&--_..- ._--
+
+
+-
+
o
+
37.27 -
35.39 -
o
37.72 -
38.00 -
o
39.89 -
31.03 -
25.88 -
24.28 -
23.89 -
22.68 -
22.09 -
19.57--
19.57 -
18.61 - +
28.94 -
28.00 -
19.05 -
18.11 -+
FORECAST +-----------+-----------+-----------+-----------+
18.8e - 24.80 - 38.88 - 36.00 - 42.00
+
41.90 -+
32.0e
- +
48.e0
-
37.08
-0+
27.88 -+
24.88 -
26.89 -
25.00 -
25.80 -
24.e9 -
28.99 -
22-.90
25.e8 -
ACTUAL
3 -
6 -
5 -
7 -
4 -
+
B -
9 -
Ie -
11 -
12 -
13 -
- 14
1~ -
I,:,
17
18
19
2e
PERIOD
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'J'ABLE 3A
TOTAL NO. OF OBSNS 10
OBSN 1 25
OE'SN 2 21
OBSN .3 2~
OSSN 4 28
08SN 5 26
iJE<SN 6 :.(1
Of<SN 7 31
Gf<:,N 8 30
OEiSN 9 31
OE<SN 10 28 ,
MINIMUM ., 21
MAXIMUM
'"'
31
ME;AN 27.5
STO DEV 3.24037
TINE SERIES: NA INSHORE LOBSTER FISHERY CPUE AYERAGE LBS PER POI 1975-1984
-1.(1)
LAG
6
7
a
9
LAG
-0.50
0. O~)
I). ,=.(1
1.0(1
AUTOCORR. +
(I -1. 00000(10
1 -0.'5793651
2 -0.23809:53
3 -0.1137:500
4 --.2:539083
::; --.3024339
--.3:544974
--.3201058
--.1209841
--.0132275
AUTOCORR. +
-1. (10
-0.50
0.0(1
0.50
1. 00
Autocorrelation
1********************
1************
1*****
1**
*****1
*******1
*******1
******1
***1
1
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'T'ABLE3B
SEASONAL FACTOk IIJ I TI AL ES". F I !IIAL EST.
1 - I.OOOO(~ - 1.000000
NUMBER OF ER~rR OBS~5 10
MEAN % ERROR OR BIAS 37.73101
/'lEAN ABSOLUTE ./. ERROR :.7.73101
ME~~ SQUARED ERRO~ (MSEI 157.9828
ML~~ ABSOL~T5 ERRUR 10.91872
SMAVE-2 periods
ACTUAL FORECAST
23.(H) -
23.0U -
26.~(J
""27.00 -
28. fH) -
30.50 -
::.(J. ~o -
~,(). ~,!)
4
6
7
8
q
1 (:
25. (H)
78.00 -
~6" (II) -
30" (1(1 -
31.00 -
30.00 -
31.00 -
28. \)1) .-
ERROR 'l.ABS ERROR
2.00 - 8.00
5.00 - 17.86
-(I • 50 - 1 . 92
: .• 00 - 10.00
.:;.1)(' - 9.68
-1).50 - 1.67
0.50 - 1.61
-2.50 - l:1.9.;'
+-----------+-----------+-----------+---_._------+
27.0(' -
2·3.00 -
23. (H)
26.50 -
11 29.5(1
1~ 28.(11)
1::' 28. \)(1
14 28.00
15 28.00
NUMBER OF ERROR OBSNS
MEAN % ERROR OR BIAS
MEAN ABSOLUTE X ERROR
MEAN SOUARED ERROR (MSEI
MEAN ABSOLUTE ERROR
o
33.00
+
0+
30. (>0 -
o
o
27.00 -
+
+
6
4.328644
7.458223
6.75
2.125
21.00 - 24.00-
-0
PERIOD AcrUAL FORECAST
1 - 25.00-
2 - 21. (lO -
:5 - 25.00-
4 28.00
:5 - 26.00-
6 - 30.00-
o
7 -
8 -
q -
! (I -
31. (II) -
o
30.00 -
o +
31. 00 -
+0
28.00
+
28. ')0 -
30.50 ..
~,(l. 50
+
o
1 1 29.50 _.
+
1:: 28. (II) - +
13 26. (n) - +
14 28.00 - +
1~ 28.00 - +
PERIOD ACTUAL FORECAST +-----------+-----------+-----------+-----------+
21.00 - 24.00 - 27.00 - 30.00 - 33.00
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.:.'.
: l-··t.
,; '-'.
.O'j'·
.I-,;·,
.:.t'
~ol
.:,)
.;;:.b
TABLE 4A
'IEo..,"/
",.< "
:":C'. ~.;
.C'"'.'.
"; I.~l f l'1Uf"l
...~ -: f MLJM
w;f r,r...
~,' ~ DE"\. ..
:,
. I:
. ....;"'0
.... 71)B6:'7t:: -'.l~·
~:''''r ~.F\;IES :
'Q • ... S...:;,:RF lP~>TEK ~-I!:I'"\C::hV f- tl bklM NUCLEAk POWER ~TATION CPUE A\'t:.:RAGF LEGAL
,.~.:;.~r.. rS""!("'H Ff~ F'nr I-tAU! ~Eh MONTH FOR I-\l..l. CN.1ApRATS CON~JNf:n Iq71")-1984
'.t'
L..;..j ~l" 1O~,:~f\R.
1..1 - J , (lI.ll11)ll'}')
1 --.<.I10(1~.':I:
_ --.\)870806
--.19;,;,148
4 -0.0904513
~ -O.J~7
0--.)19:;4,,,/
7 --.(,~l(iI~:S
6 --.(/227Cj147
",-AG AliTOCO~R.
-1. f)(t
-(I.~U
;.... (10
(J.~l"I
1.00
Autocorrelation
1······.·•••··..••·..
I
•• j
···.1I ..
"~
.. I
.j
I
p=period
NUH£oER' DF"Ef<ROF< OElSIilS"- '- - 14 '-"
MEAN 'l. E~~O~ OR BIAS -7.Jq7136
MEAN ABSQl.UTE % ERROR 19.387~5
M~AN SQUARED ERROR C~SE) 1.447143E-02
""E~N ABSOLUTE ERF<OR 9. 42a~72E-(12
N~M~ER OF ERF<OR 085NS 1~
r-,EA:4 7. ERAOR OR P I AS -8.62(1039
~EAN ABSOLUTE ~ E~ROR 18.32319
ME~N SQUARED ERROR (M5E' 1.3;'8;'~5E-02
MEAN ABSOLUTE ERROR 8.730771E-02
fJOHBEk OF ERROR OBSNS'~--I""
t€AN '7. Ef(ROR OR &IAS -1(l.0~17
"EAN A8SOLUTE Yo ERROR 24. (17832
MEAN SQUARED ERROR (MSE) 2.09~O~4E-02
MEAN A~SOLUTE ERROR .JI8~417
NUMSEFc OF £kROf( O~SNS 1(I
"EAN X ERRQk Ok PIAS -11.67187
nEAN ABSOLUTE 'l. EkROR ~b.25399
MEAN SQUARED ERROR {NSE> 2.38.951£-02
~EAN ABSOLUTE ERROR .119
NOM&ER' D"'ERROR OBSNS 13
MEHN X ERROR OR BIAS -8.820;'09
"E AN ABSOLUTE 7. EF<ROR 29.59254
MEAN SOUARED ERROR (M5E) 3. 222309E-02
MEA,.. A&SOLUTE ERRQk .15
NUM&ER OF ERROR O~5N5 12
r1EAN :~ ERRQk OR l:tIAS -1(1.61)3:iJ
,.,(AN A&SDLUTE 'l. 'ERROR 24.7586 J
MEAN SQUARED ERROR (MSE) , ~.086007E-02
r1(AN A&SOLUTE ERROR • 1=22~~Z
SMAVE
1p
2p
LMAVE
2p
3p
REGRESS
2p
3p
.L S·I\tG' f= r'fPo;J'''"rttU SMOOTHIN':j
T~:"t€ SI:f\IES :
~~ INS~OF~ ~Q~~r~~ FJSH€R~ ~lLGRIM NUCLEAk POWEk STATION CPuE AVERAGE LEGAL
.. t:EiSTE'k CATC'" ~f'l;- ~or Io1AL"_ PER MONTa.t FOR ALL OU~ORI:,TS COMFINt::D lQ70-1984
_i....l=-I--lA -' .u~·
(Nl T : A.... Sr1LJ01HlO ""·Jr..W;:'&P:. ~ .:;6
:.-AST F'Ekl0tJ EST IM':HE 01': SMOOH1EO AvERAGE· • ~73040~
r~ur;L:..ER OF EIiROJi' O&SNS 14
--:t.""l" 7. Ef-'P;':Jk UK ~IAS -~. 7:Bo09
-.i ~r.. .-,&!:tU,-..;' I: ". It. "':f;Oh 1~. 7 1~:56
213
'T'ABLE 4B
J::,
- ~~:2. 36564
"!.2. 91 :-,58
3.904841E-(>2
.1658681
1 - 1. 1)1)(,)l)I)C)
~UMbER OF ERROR UB3NS
MEAN X ERROR CR BIAS
MEAN ABSOLUTE :: ERROR
MEAN SQUARED ERk~R iMS~;
MEAN ABSOLUTE ERROR
~ ~'Nrn E fXfONENTlill SMOOCHING
TIME SERIES: .
:"lA J NSHURE L.OE<S: Ek F J SHERY PI LGFc J M NUCLEAR POWER STAT J ON CPUE AVERAGE LEGI'.L
:"Ol:tSTE"< CA'TI-i !"ER I"·OT 'iAUL PEj;' MONTH FOR ALL QUADRATS COME< INED 1970-1984
"':'t-r't-4A = . \l~
irJITIA~ ·.~,~UIHED AV£RAG~ ~ .~8
..~ST ~ERIOD ESTIMAlE OF SMOOTHED AVERAGE .5730405
NUMBER OF ERROR OBSNS
riEAN X ERROR OR B I AS
MEAN ABSOLUTE X ERROR
MEAN SQUAREO ERROR CNSEl
~EAN ABSOLUTE ERROR
0.54 - ...
0.53 - +
ACTUAL FORECAST +-----------+-----------+-----------+-----------+
0.20 - O.3~ - 0.50 - 0.65 - 0.80
",CTUA:" FOF,!:L"Ac~ r
('.64 - (l.~~8-
n.7'::· /::.58
c).57 -- (I.t,q-
~RROR XABS ERROR
<).06 - 9.38
0 .. 15 20. 14
-(1.02 - 3.57
0.07 - 10.71
··(1,('7 14.01
-('. 04 - 7. 1:3
-0'('4'- 6.77
0.04 7.08
-0.13 - 27.75
-0.04 - 7.64
0.06 - 9.50
(1.06 - 9.03
0.02 - 4.08
-0.27 - 83.24
14
-5.728669
15.71556
9.816815E-03
7. 647705E-02
0.2() - ().35 - 0.50 - (1.65 - 0.80
+-----------+-----------+-----------+-----------+
0
0.:58 - +
0.58 -
O.5~ - 0+
O.~9 - +
•
0.59 - 0 ...
0.59 - [I ...
0.59 - 0 ...
0.59 - ...
0.59 - 0 ...
0.58 - 0 ...
0.58 - ...
0.::i8 - ...
0.59 - "'0
0.59 - 0 ...
0.57 - ...
0.56 - ...
0.::::: ...
'~'. 5'7l -
:). ~9
:).59 -
(1.59
O.5?
'J. ~9 -
\).58 -
I)" 58 -
0.58 -
0.59 -
0.59 -
').57
0.56
0.55
0.54
0.53
<,.64 -
<.>.04 -
0.01 -
( •• 32 -
<1.6:::,
0.46 -
(I. ~,4 --
,). ::':;7-
. ~r
"I. _'-'
o
0.64 -
0.61 -
0.32 -
0.46 -
0.54 -
0.64 -
0 .. 52 -
0 .. 55 -
0 .. 55 -
0.63 -
0.73 .-
(l.57 -
0.66 -
ACTUAL FORECAST
0.58
0.'64 -
13
:.2
~
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
PERIOO
1 -
:-
G
3 -
4 -
5 -
0
6 -
7 -
8 -
9 -
0
10 -
1 1 -
12 -
0
1:C. -
a
14
15 -
10
17
18
19
20
PERIOD
·'ThleD
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